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INTRODUCTION 
During the signing ceremony authorizing the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (“Title VII” or “Act”), President Lyndon B. Johnson 
thoughtfully remarked, “The purpose of the law is 
simple. . . . [T]he only limit to a man’s hope for 
happiness . . . shall be his own ability.”1  Consistent with that 
1 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill 
(July 2, 1964) [hereinafter Johnson’s Remarks], available at http://millercenter.org/ 
president/speeches/detail/3525. The entire relevant portion of the President’s 
remarks reads: 
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perceptive encapsulation, the Act’s fair employment component2 
prohibits workplace discrimination predicated on race, sex, color, 
national origin, and religion.3  To mark Title VII’s fiftieth 
anniversary, this Article reasserts, in light of greatly developed 
antidiscrimination law, the thesis that this author urged nearly 
thirty years ago.4  President Johnson’s sentiment aptly elucidates 
what was and remains Congress’s overarching principle, the 
Act’s first principle, if you will:  To assure that a person indeed is 
“limit[ed]” only by his or her “own ability,” any use of the five 
forbidden criteria as terms or conditions of employment defies 
Title VII unless it satisfies a textual exemption or defense.5 
The purpose of the law is simple. It does not restrict the freedom of any 
American, so long as he respects the rights of others. It does not give 
special treatment to any citizen. It does say the only limit to a man’s hope 
for happiness, and for the future of his children, shall be his own ability. 
Id. Perhaps, needless to say, President Johnson spoke in the idiom of his time, using 
male nouns and pronouns as shorthand to denote things that apply to all persons. 
Indeed, even provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Act”) proscribing sex 
discrimination in employment use the male third person singular pronoun. See infra 
note 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)). Accordingly, President Johnson’s 
signing statement certainly should not be construed as gender-specific. 
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
3 Most prominently, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 
The Act contains additional proscriptions; the most significant for this Article is a 
nearly twenty-five-year-old amendment clarifying that to prevail, a plaintiff need 
not prove that animus was the “but-for” cause of the defendant’s discriminatory 
employment action. Rather, a plaintiff may obtain nonmonetary relief, including 
injunctions and attorney fees, upon proving that discrimination based on one of the 
five forbidden classes was a “motivating factor” of the defendant’s behavior. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The profound importance of § 2000e-2(m) to the very 
definition of unlawful discrimination under Title VII is discussed infra at notes  
213–44 and accompanying text. 
4 See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition 
of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 (1987). 
5 Strictly speaking, Title VII does not assure that individuals’ employment 
opportunities will be “limit[ed]” only by their “own abilit[ies].” Johnson’s Remarks, 
supra note 1. By its express text, the Act’s “[p]rotection is limited to individuals who 
are discriminated on the basis of ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ ” Kiley 
v. Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 F. App’x 107, 109 (2d Cir. 
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Indeed, from the standpoint of its statutory text, the Act’s 
“first principle” permitting only such discrimination as 
specifically authorized therein appears both explicit and obvious.6  
Yet, reaffirmation of that first principle is necessary to debunk 
the judicially prominent “unequal burden” doctrine.  Specious 
when introduced roughly forty years ago,7 “unequal burden” 
continues to flourish notwithstanding United States Supreme 
Court rulings plainly invalidating its underpinnings, although 
admittedly without mentioning that doctrine by name.8  Applied 
particularly to grooming and appearance, such as male-only 
2008). Therefore, Title VII permits invidious discrimination based on unenumerated 
classes, as well as other extraneous considerations such as nepotism. See, e.g., id. 
(holding that Title VII does not forbid discrimination based on “sexual orientation” 
per se); Thomas v. Wash. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(“Nepotism is not per se violative of Title VII.”). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this 
Article, President Johnson’s understanding essentially is correct: Persons’ ability to 
work and their actual work product should be judged on their individual merit, not 
on the irrelevant bases of their race, sex, color, ethnicity, or religious inclination. 
6 Kiley, 296 F. App’x at 109. 
7 See Bayer, supra note 4, at 843–80 (discussing primarily unequal burden’s 
initial incarnation as “mutable characteristics” theory). While this Article offers a 
detailed and multilayered structure to refute unequal burden theory, a simple but 
extraordinarily telling scenario suggested by Professor B. Glenn George debunks the 
doctrine. “Consider an employer who pays his black employees one cent less than 
similarly situated white employees. Trivial? Certainly. A violation of Title VII? 
Absolutely.” B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment 
Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1993). Professor George offers other examples, such as 
an employer who provides individual coffee pots to all male employees but requires 
female employees to use a women’s-only communal coffee pot. See id.; cf. Picou v. 
City of Jackson, Miss., 91 F. App’x 340 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $10,000 in attorney fees to a 
Title VII plaintiff who obtained only $1.00 in nominal damages); Barber v. T.D. 
Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an award of 
$1.00 in nominal damages in a Title VII sexual harassment case does not evince 
that, in actuality, the plaintiff suffered no harm and that no legally prohibited 
harassment occurred); Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 393 (2d Cir. 1994). 
Through such examples, Professor George illustrates the core statutory theme: The 
very act of differentiating pursuant to one of the five proscribed classifications 
insults and demeans the personhood—the humanity—of the discriminatees. Such is 
harm even if unaccompanied by attendant injuries such as loss of income, of 
advancement, or of training. 
8 See infra notes 165–86 and accompanying text. Many of these decisions 
postdate this author’s 1987 article in the University of California at Davis Law 
Review. See generally Bayer, supra note 4. Moreover, four years after that 
publication, Congress enacted a significant amendment reaffirming Title VII’s “first 
principle.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), discussed infra notes 214–45 and 
accompanying text. Therefore, the Act’s half-century mark offers an apt opportunity 
both to augment and to expand that earlier argument with contemporary materials. 
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short hair rules,9 the theory purports that certain per se 
discriminatory employment practices do not statutorily constitute 
“discrimination” if those practices are “reasonable” and impose 
no unequal burden.10  Because these supposed reasonable 
employment terms and conditions are factually but not legally 
discrimination, defendants need not justify their facially biased 
standards under the Act’s exacting, textually explicit 
exceptions.11 
Typically summarizing the unequal burden theory, the en 
banc United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
asserted a mere decade ago that under Title VII, “the touch-stone 
is reasonableness.”12  The Ninth Circuit’s crucial phrasing is an 
apparent reworking of, but in fact misrepresents the pivotal 
explication of, statutorily permissible discrimination that the 
Supreme Court declared soon after Title VII’s enactment:  “The 
touchstone is business necessity.”13  Thus, from the beginning, 
our highest court recognized that nothing short of “necessity” 
excuses discrimination under Title VII.14  “Necessity” is quite 
distant from the unequal burden doctrine’s dilution of the Act’s 
“touchstone” to mere “reasonableness.”15  This Article explains 
how the courts strayed so far afield and why their deviation is so 
erroneous. 
Simply put, courts have no authority to create extrastatutory 
varieties of lawful discrimination under a banner of 
“reasonableness,” especially varieties thoroughly dissimilar from 
Congress’s legislated exclusions.  Contrary to fundamental 
9 See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 
1998) (holding that an employer’s rule requiring men but not women to wear short 
hair does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII); Willingham v. Macon 
Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (same). 
10 Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that the FBI’s  
“gender-normed [physicial fitness tests]” do not impose unlawful unequal burdens); 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc); cf. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1088. 
11 See infra notes 133–50 and accompanying text discussing Title VII’s defenses. 
12 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113 (holding that an employer’s rule requiring only 
female bartenders to wear prescribed facial makeup is lawful because plaintiff failed 
to prove an “unequal burden”); see discussion infra notes 75–89 and accompanying 
text. 
13 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (describing the “disparate 
impact” cause of action under Title VII, including the “business necessity” defense); 
see also infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
14 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
15 Compare Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113, with Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
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“separation of powers,”16 unequal burden theory elevates to 
supremacy judicial determinations that certain forms of 
discrimination are lawful due simply to their seemingly 
widespread acceptance, which acceptance the courts feel is 
reasonable.17  But, the rightful definition of reasonable prejudice, 
which I take to mean lawful prejudice, is found solely in Title 
VII’s subsections specifically permitting consideration of race, 
sex, and other otherwise unlawful criteria.18  Consequently, by 
creating within Title VII a classification of lawful extratextual 
discrimination titled “reasonable,” unequal burden theory 
illegitimately permits employers to impose the very class-based 
16 Separation of powers concerns the proper authority exercised by each branch 
of the federal level of government. “Our Constitution divided the ‘powers of the new 
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial.’ ” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 
(2010) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). 
17 Certainly, the judiciary’s duty to discern how given legislation applies to 
discrete situations is thorny because often, “with many . . . narrow issues of 
statutory construction, the general language chosen by Congress does not clearly 
resolve the precise question.” Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deffered Annuity & 
Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1107–08 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (Title VII decision). Equally vexing is the interpretive quandary that 
even seemingly straightforward applications of unambiguous statutory commands 
may engender results confounding the very policies underlying the given legislation. 
See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 11 (2008); see 
also infra notes 247–52 and accompanying text. Accordingly, as their title denotes, 
judges should, indeed must, exercise judgment in their attempts to enforce statutory 
provisions consistent with legislative will. As Judge—later Justice—Cardozo 
instructed nearly a century ago, “The question is in every case [how] the legislature, 
if [the given issue] had been foreseen, would have wished the statute to be 
enforced . . . . The answer must be reached pragmatically, by the exercise of good 
sense and sound judgment, by considering how the statutory rule will function . . . .” 
People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 60 (1920) (Cardozo, 
J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quote editing extrapolates on observations 
specifically regarding whether invalidation of a portion of a statute requires 
invalidation of the entire act). Cognizant that the latitude accorded to the courts is 
and should be generous, this Article urges nonetheless that despite its widespread 
acceptance, the unequal burden doctrine is an abuse—indeed, a particularly 
unsubtle and inappropriate abuse—of the discretion attendant to the exercise of 
discerning statutory meaning through judicial review. 
18 See infra notes 132–62 and accompanying text. As Dean Van Detta observed, 
“But what prerogative does Title VII leave to employers to discriminate because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin? None, of course, except as expressly 
defined in such narrow statutory exceptions as the bona fide occupational 
qualification defense . . . .” Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An 
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every 
Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 71, 123 (2003). 
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stereotypes, suppositions, and biases that Congress sensibly and 
legitimately outlawed.19  For example, unequal burden theory 
would uphold regulations requiring female judges to emphasize 
their femininity by wearing black robes adorned with white 
lace.20  One might have thought that such a ridiculous outcome 
offends Title VII per se.  Yet, given its dominance, explaining the 
wrongfulness of the unequal burden doctrine remains necessary 
at the Act’s half-century mark. 
This is hardly the first work to despair over judicially 
created Title VII doctrine that undeniably legitimizes race- and 
sex-specific grooming, clothing, and appearance rules in apparent 
disregard of express statutory protections.21  Perhaps 
19 See infra notes 170–208 and accompanying text. Even when the explicit text 
of civil rights laws does not expressly or impliedly exempt discriminatory practices, 
too frequently, judges mistake their personal preferences for legislative meaning 
simply because these judges find their view to be proper, or at least unobjectionable. 
See, e.g., Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace 
Appearance Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 290 (2009); Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community 
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2556 (1994). Such offends 
elementary American separation of powers often learned during the first semester of 
law school, if not before: Courts are obliged to enforce what Congress actually 
enacted, not what the courts suppose Congress should have enacted. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court recently reiterated, “The role of this Court is to apply the statute as 
it is written—even if we think some other approach might ‘accor[d] with good 
policy.’ ” Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text (reviewing the proper 
mode of statutory construction under Title VII). 
20 See infra notes 308–10 and accompanying text. Arguably, “unequal burden” 
could validate as well facially neutral criteria. For example, applying unequal 
burden precedents, the court in Finnie v. Lee County, Mississippi upheld the Lee 
County Juvenile Detention Center’s (“JC”) requirement that all detention officers 
wear pants issued by the sheriff’s department. 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 772–75 (N.D. 
Miss. 2012). Discerning no discriminatory animus, Finnie concluded that the JC’s 
policy reasonably assures uniformity among officers. Additionally, the court rejected 
Ms. Finnie’s Title VII argument that the JC’s pants-only policy unlawfully denied 
her the option of “wearing traditional female apparel.” Id. at 774. While Finnie’s 
holding may be correct, its reliance on unequal burden theory is problematic. 
Regardless, given space considerations, this Article limits its critique of unequal 
burden theory to facially discriminatory employment standards and, thus, leaves for 
another article whether, as one might suppose, the same or similar arguments would 
invalidate the use of that theory in Title VII litigation where discriminatory animus 
is not obvious. 
21 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2541; D. Wendy Greene, Black Women 
Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405 
(2011); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of 
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice 
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understandably deeming Title VII a promise yet unfulfilled, 
scholars such as Gowri Ramachandran conclude that 
“[a]ntidiscrimination law is not the best law for protecting 
identity performance such as dress.”22  Instead, Professor 
Ramachandran proposes a singular and separate “freedom of 
dress” legal standard because “[t]he fact that identity 
performance is so contextual and complex makes it hard, if not 
impossible, to formulate legal rules for protecting identity 
performance under the traditional equality-based rubrics of 
antidiscrimination law.”23 
Provocative entreaties such as Professor Ramachandran’s 
certainly inform, inspire, and enlighten.  Still, it is unlikely that 
either Congress or the courts soon will discard the egalitarianism 
underlying American civil rights laws—although as their 
membership changes they may be amenable to appreciating 
traditional concepts in new ways.  Therefore, while the likelihood 
of success remains uncertain, it may be easier to sway the 
judiciary, particularly newer judges, to reverse unfortunate 
rulings by way of established civil rights milieus than to convince 
courts to undergo the particularly uncomfortable process of 
overturning precedent by first requiring them to endure the  
 
 
of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (2009); Yofi Tirosh, Adjudicating Appearance: 
From Identity to Personhood, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 49 (2007). 
22 Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of 
Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 21 
(2006). 
23 See id. at 23. Doubtless, Title VII and similarly designed civil rights statutes 
are too constrained because, to borrow Professor Ramachandran’s phrasing, “the 
traditional equality-based rubrics of antidiscrimination law” omit bigoted conduct no 
less offensive, arbitrary, and destructive to a given individual than are racial, 
sexual, and other commonly outlawed animus. Indeed, nearly three decades ago, this 
author identified a constitutional doctrine remedying such urgent criticisms. See 
generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality—and the Irrational Underinclusiveness 
of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1988) (explaining why due 
process of law under the U.S. Constitution requires that statutes first identify areas 
of endeavor, such as employment and voting, and then proscribe all discrimination 
of any kind that unreasonably obstructs successfully achieving those endeavors). 
Accordingly, to be constitutional, legislation such as Title VII must proscribe all 
arbitrary employment discrimination including but not limited to that act’s five 
forbidden classes. Given, however, that the proposition set forth in this author’s 
Rationality article has not, and likely will not, be judicially adopted, the notion that 
legislatures reasonably may limit civil rights protections to chosen classes remains 
good constitutional law.  
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comparably disagreeable process of adopting essentially new, 
unaccustomed, and likely unwelcome frameworks of legal 
analysis.24 
Moreover, as mentioned previously, over the last three 
decades, both Congress and the Supreme Court have enriched 
familiar discrimination theory,25 particularly regarding what 
constitutes unlawful stereotyping.  Although not fully 
appreciated by many lower courts, these happy clarifications 
amply discredit those courts’ rationales allowing employers to 
indulge unnecessary racial and sexual categorizing through 
grooming and appearance rules.26  Therefore, despite the 
thoughtful conclusions of critics such as Professor 
Ramachandran, this Article need not, and does not, go afield 
from the considerable body of jurisprudence enforcing Title VII’s 
“first principle,” sounding in traditional antidiscrimination 
theory, that any form of discrimination based on the Act’s five 
forbidden criteria is unlawful unless expressly textually 
exempted. 
The line of argument is not complex.  Part I explicates the 
unequal burden doctrine and its link to the predecessor theory of 
“mutable characteristics.”27  Part II offers the aforementioned 
statutorily formal argument, disproving unequal burden theory 
through an examination of Title VII’s plain language and 
structure28 in light of modern Supreme Court precedents 
addressing Title VII’s ban against stereotyping.29  This analysis 
places special emphasis on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m),30 in which  
 
 
24 Cf. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Just how complex 
and difficult the new argument plaintiffs ask us to address, and thus the reason for 
our particular reluctance to decide it with finality, is worth pausing to underscore.”); 
Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why 
This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1218 
n.281 (1996) (“[I]t [often is] more difficult for doctrinally-minded judges to craft new 
theories . . . to deal with new problems because they lack the doctrinal tools to 
confront novel problems.”). 
25 See infra notes 162–240 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 57–58, 62 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 45–79 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 107–31 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 165–86 and accompanying text. 
30 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 [hereinafter “the 
CRA of 1991”]. 
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Congress clarified that plaintiffs prevail when discriminatory 
animus merely is a “motivating factor” rather than the “but-for 
cause” of the defendants’ conduct.31 
Although not the lengthiest discussion herein by any means, 
Part III presents what may be this Article’s most substantial 
enhancement to relevant scholarship by applying abstract moral 
philosophy, specifically modern dignity theory, to assure that the 
doctrinal arguments presented in Part II do not constitute 
unduly literal—absurd—applications of the Act’s text.32  
Eschewing as patently mistaken the “consequentialist” approach 
adopted by most commentators criticizing unequal burden 
theory,33 this Article argues in favor of deontology, the belief that 
“morality is transcendent, a set of a priori principles discernable 
through reason.  [Contrary to consequentialism, 
m]orality . . . does not care what the possible outcomes of a 
particular moral problem may be.”34  Pursuant to deontological 
theory, the concern in grooming code cases is not whether the 
given race- or sex-based appearance rule—say, forbidding male 
employees from wearing long hair—engenders good or bad 
outcomes.35  Rather, rejecting the “balancing” approach that 
characterizes determining the aggregate “good,”36 the issue is 
whether the employer’s rule objectively is immoral, thereby a 
violation of Title VII, or is objectively moral, in which case it 
comports with Title VII.  Indeed, this Article shows that although 
ostensibly logical, the morality of civil rights is not discerned by 
balancing tests because such protocols inevitably endorse as the 
meaning of “morality” the personal preferences, predilections, 
and biases of the judge, administrator, commentator, or indeed 
any person performing the “balance.”  Instead, morality must be  
 
31 See infra notes 214–45 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 246–307 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 305–06; Ramachandran, supra note 22, 
at 50–51. Often aligned with utilitarianism, consequentialism avers that in any 
given situation, the morally correct resolution is that which produces the best 
outcome in terms of some sort of societal good, often measured as the greatest 
aggregate happiness. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: 
Why the Constitution Is a “Suicide Pact,” 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 294–96 
(2011). 
34 See Bayer, supra note 33, at 292. 
35 See id. at 295–96. 
36 See, e.g., Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 305–06; Ramachandran, supra note 22, 
at 50–51. 
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understood as independent in its own right, not as the 
culmination of reviewers’ private, albeit deeply held and sincere, 
inclinations.37 
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that placing Title VII 
analysis within a deontological milieu—where it squarely 
belongs—renders a particularly unique benefit to critical 
analysis: explaining in a disinterested, thus unprejudiced, 
fashion why Title VII’s protection of individual dignity cannot 
depend on the personal preferences and predilections of 
employers, employees, job applicants, or the judges who review 
the allegedly discriminatory employment policies.  Deontology 
forestalls what many commentators inappropriately embrace: 
defining and applying moral precepts based on what makes 
either the given commentator or those whom that commentator 
respects—possibly the employer, possibly the employee—happy.  
Deontology compels the disentangling of private preferences from 
moral argument.  Accordingly, one can prove that unequal 
burden theory truly is immoral, thus unlawful, only if the 
reviewer accepts unequal burden theory’s immorality even if the 
reviewer deems resulting outcomes distasteful, such as 
compelling employers to tolerate male employees’ long hair.  That 
the moral analysis offered herein to invalidate the unequal 
burden doctrine may please this author—as indeed it does—is a 
fortuitous happenstance, and surely no independent proof that 
this Article discerned the correct moral and legal result. 
This Article explains Title VII’s applicable moral principles 
using “Kantian ethics,” that is, the concepts of human dignity 
and moral comportment expounded in broad terms by the noted 
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant.38  As detailed in 
Part III, albeit implicitly and perhaps instinctively rather than 
knowingly, Congress embraced Kantian deontology through 
enacting Title VII—and indeed any of its civil rights laws.39  Title 
37 Thus, for instance, it is irrelevant whether in the aggregate male employees 
do or do not feel more deeply offended by a male-only hair rule than the employer 
would feel offended if that rule were invalidated under Title VII. Likewise, whatever 
the data reveals, it is irrelevant that the given reviewer, judge, or scholar personally 
believes that the interests of one of the parties—employer or male  
employees—outweighs the interests of the other. Instead, the answer derives from 
what a priori, objective reason establishes as the morally correct resolution. 
38 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., 3d ed. 1996). 
39 See infra notes 266–307 and accompanying text. 
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VII declares that by imposing unnecessary racial, sex-based, 
religious, color, and ethnic criteria, employers and unions offend 
the innate, intrinsic human dignity of employees and 
employment applicants, which first and foremost is a moral 
offense although it likely offends victims’ economic, professional, 
and social statuses as well.40  While these latter offenses are 
hugely significant, it is the moral offense that explains—indeed 
justifies—Congress’s intrusion by way of Title VII into 
traditional management prerogative.41 
Accordingly, this conclusion confirms that unless truly 
necessary to the conduct of the given business, Title VII prohibits 
employers from imposing their racial, sex-based, ethnic, or 
religiously inspired grooming and appearance standards, even if, 
in light of widely accepted social conventions, the vast majority 
would feel exceptionally uncomfortable in the presence of 
employees who refuse to comport with their employers’ 
discriminatory rules.42  Indeed, nearly four decades ago, with 
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
41 Certainly, even a modicum of proof that employment discrimination affects 
interstate commerce technically is sufficient to sustain Title VII’s constitutionality. 
Much theory supports the argument that discrimination obstructs rather than 
enhances commerce. Cf. Jessica Leigh Rosenthal, Comment, The Interactive Process 
Disabled: Improving the ADA and Strengthening the EEOC Through the Adoption of 
the Interactive Process, 57 EMORY L.J. 247, 268 n.162 (2007) (citing Russell Powell, 
Beyond Lane: Who is Protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act, Who Should 
Be?, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 25, 50 (2004)). It is equally well-established that Congress 
need not be motivated by purely economic considerations when exercising its 
commerce authority. Rather, the legislature’s authority to implement the Commerce 
Clause and its other constitutionally enumerated powers to prevent immoral 
governmental and private conduct is well-established. E.g., Heart of Atlanta  
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (addressing the  
Public Accommodations Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,  
42 U.S.C. § 2000a–2000a-6); see also United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1118–19 
(9th Cir. 2006) (same). Pursuant to such moral authority, Congress almost certainly 
would not rescind Title VII even if presented with compelling evidence that 
discrimination does not disrupt or even enhances interstate commerce. That hiring 
criteria and employment standards affect interstate commerce, favorably or not, is 
constitutionally sufficient, therefore, Congress may address what apparently is its 
primary concern: the immorality of imposing employment conditions predicated on 
racial, ethnic, sex-based, and religious stereotypes. Cf. Andrew Brenton, Comment, 
Overcoming the Equal Pay Act and Title VII: Why Federal Sex-Based Employment 
Discrimination Laws Should Be Replaced with a System for Accrediting Employers 
for Their Antidiscriminatory Employment Practices, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 
349, 372–75 (2011) (discussing how arguably efficient employment discrimination 
“practices are not permissible under the inexorable sex-blind logic of the [Equal Pay] 
Act and Title VII”). 
42 See infra notes 308–19 and accompanying text. 
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correct simplicity and directness the Supreme Court recognized 
Title VII’s first principle:  “Congress intended to prohibit all 
practices in whatever form which create inequality in 
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion, sex, or national origin.”43  Therefore, contrary to 
the harsh dismay expressed by Judge Richard Posner, Title VII’s 
enlightened prohibition against discrimination indeed and quite 
rightly recognizes “a federally protected right for male workers to 
wear nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince 
about in high heels, [and] for female ditchdiggers to strip to the 
waist in hot weather,”44 if such prohibitions are predicated on 
unnecessary sex-based bias, as almost certainly they would be. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE UNEQUAL BURDEN DOCTRINE 
A. Unequal Burden Doctrine’s Precursor: Mutability Theory 
Normally, it would seem unremarkable to conclude that 
distinctly sex-specific terms of employment, such as rules 
forbidding only male employees from wearing long hair, are per 
se gender discriminatory.45  After all, based manifestly on the 
affected workers’ sex, such patently gender-specific work rules 
apparently violate Title VII’s express and unequivocal 
antidiscrimination prohibition.  Indeed, reviewing the plain 
43 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (emphasis added) 
(citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971)); accord, e.g., Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981); 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); Miranda v. B & B 
Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992). 
44 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
45 Because most of the applicable precedents concern sex discrimination, it is 
worth noting that although sometimes differentiated in other disciplines, as a 
matter of antidiscrimination law, courts treat the terms “gender” and “sex” 
synonymously and so will this Article. E.g., Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 
F.3d 214, 220 (9th Cir. 2013); Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball 
Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 116 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 
(11th Cir. 2011). See Mark E. Berghausen, Comment, Intersex Employment 
Discrimination: Title VII and Anatomical Sex Nonconformity, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1281, 1286–92 (2011), for an interesting, accessible discussion explaining why the 
concepts gender and sex are and should be distinct, although certainly related. Id. at 
1286 (“It has become an academic norm to use the term ‘sex’ to refer to gonadal, 
chromosomal, or genital anatomy and to use the term ‘gender’ to refer to the socially 
expected behaviors and preferences commonly ascribed to each sex.”). 
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language and underlying policy of the Fair Employment Act, the 
first decisions addressing hair length and similar grooming rules 
simply but sensibly concluded, “It is clear, therefore, that [Title 
VII’s] term ‘discrimination’ in this context contains no 
qualifications.  Every difference in treatment is discrimination.”46 
These holdings were short lived, quickly replaced by 
appellate decisions asserting that, as a general matter, Title VII’s 
prohibition against discrimination covers only terms and 
conditions of employment premised on “immutable 
characteristics”—essentially irreversible attributes associated 
with the Act’s five forbidden criteria—rather than “mutable” 
characteristics meaning easily alterable traits.47  Mutability 
theory posits that because the protected classes themselves are 
immutable,48 Congress intended Title VII to apply only when 
46 Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 665 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
Early opinions rightly understood that sex-specific grooming rules confound not only 
the Act’s unambiguous text, but also the Act’s pivotal humanitarian and empathetic 
principles. As the Aros court frankly and firmly reasoned forty years ago, “The issue 
of long hair on men tends to arouse the passions of many in our society today. In 
that regard the issue is no different from the issues of race, color, religion, national 
origin and equal employment rights for women, all of which are raised in Title VII.” 
Id. at 666. Initially, several courts agreed with the Aros court. See Willingham v. 
Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1973) (divided panel), vacated on 
reh’g, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. 
Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 
1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971). Identically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), the agency that enforces Title VII, consistently has determined that Title 
VII proscribes employers’ male-only hair policies. See E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-1529, 3 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 952 (Apr. 2, 1971); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-2343, 3 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1253 (June 3, 1970); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)  
§ 15-VII(B)(5), 2006 WL 4673430 (2006). But see EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 
§ 619.2(a)(4), 2006 WL 4672749 (2006) (noting that federal courts have not adopted 
the EEOC’s position). 
47 See generally Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977) (divided 
panel); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976) (divided 
panel); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); 
Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title 
Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (per curiam); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(divided panel). An en banc opinion overruled the sole court of appeals decision 
holding that male-only hair rules constitute per se sex-based discrimination. See 
Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092. With rare exceptions, state precedent likewise finds 
that local anti-discrimination statutes do not per se forbid sex-specific hair 
standards. See 3 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 45.02[2] (2d ed. 
2015) (collecting cases). 
48 Specifically, one cannot transform one’s race or national origin. Similarly, 
there is no serious dispute that based on today’s science, changing one’s skin color or 
sex, although not impossible, is difficult and extraordinarily costly in time, effort, 
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discriminatory employment policies relate to the affected class’s 
very immutability, such as refusing to hire women because of 
their gender.49  By contrast, because hair is mutable—with 
arguable ease, one can cut and style one’s hair and recut and 
restyle hair as it grows back—rules forbidding only male 
employees from wearing long hair and similar grooming 
requirements fall outside the Act’s sphere of protection.50  
Although acknowledging, as they must, that male-only hair rules 
regulate employees due to their immutable gender,51 courts 
accented that such rules apply not only to the entire protected 
class but also to a subset of a sex: men who wish to wear long 
hair.52  Courts maintained that because the “plus” or modifying 
and trauma, thus rendering those attributes effectively immutable. By contrast, 
deciding to either adopt or to change one’s religion is hardly immutable. “Religion is, 
of course, a forbidden criterion [under Title VII], even though a matter of individual 
choice.” Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying mutability 
analysis to uphold employers’ English-only rules). Possibly, changing religious 
affiliation may be sufficiently psychologically arduous to fall into a special category: 
mutable but difficult to alter. See discussion infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
  Recognizing that religion is not immutable, opinions assert that religion is 
among Title VII’s protected groups due to its time-honored elevated status as 
evinced by the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 
n.22. This attempt to salvage mutability theory, however, is infirm because it 
contradicts the Supreme Court’s admonition that the definition of discrimination 
under Title VII is not predicated on either the concept of or the law explicating 
fundamental rights under the Constitution. See, e.g., Barker, 549 F.2d at 404 
(McCree, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976)). See 
Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title 
VII’s Failure To Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 453 (2010), for a thoughtful critique of mutability analysis as courts apply it to 
religious discrimination in employment. 
49 E.g., Baker, 507 F.2d at 897 (“Since race, national origin and color represent 
immutable characteristics, logic dictates that sex is used in the same sense rather 
than to indicate personal modes of dress or cosmetic effects.”); see also, e.g., Gloor, 
618 F.2d at 269; Earwood, 539 F.2d at 1351; Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125. 
50 Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1166 (D. Or. 
2001) (citing Earwood, 539 F.2d at 1351). 
51 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 
1032 (7th Cir. 1979). 
52 Rules affecting portions rather than the totality of a protected class are 
known as “plus” rules, as in “race-plus” or “sex-plus.” For instance, the Sixth Circuit 
recently noted, “[A] plaintiff can maintain a claim for discrimination on the basis of 
a protected classification considered in combination with another factor. In many of 
these so-called ‘sex-plus’ cases, the plaintiff's subclass combines a characteristic 
protected by Title VII with one that is not.” Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744 
F.3d 948, 957–58 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (citing Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam)). 
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aspect concerns a mutable characteristic such as hair, the 
employment rule is not statutorily sex discrimination despite the 
rule’s application solely to one gender.53  Consequently, mutability 
theory does not aver that flagrant sex- and race-based 
employment standards are prima facie illegal pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)54 but are legal nonetheless under a textual 
exception such as the Act’s express bona fide occupational 
qualification (“BFOQ”) defense.55  Rather, although no statutory 
provision so suggests, the courts propounded that when involving 
mutable characteristics, employment terms and conditions 
tangibly predicated on race or sex are not per se statutorily 
predicated on race or sex.56 
Predictably, courts expanded mutability-immutability 
theory, hewing a substantial safe harbor of legal sex 
discrimination.57  Lamentably consistent with its basic premise, 
53 E.g., Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2559–65; see Bayer, supra note 4, at 842. 
54 See supra note 3 for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
55 Title VII provides that employment classifications may be based on certain 
usually forbidden criteria when “religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); see also infra notes 
133–46 and accompanying text. 
56 As explicated infra at notes 68–91 and accompanying text, the judiciary’s core 
rationale is that such indisputably sex-based policies are not statutorily problematic 
because they promote customary, “reasonable” management prerogatives. See, e.g., 
Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The 
Seventh Circuit expressed tidily the general presumption, “So long as [sex-specific 
attire and grooming rules] find some justification in commonly accepted social norms 
and are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such regulations are 
not necessarily violations of Title VII even though the standards prescribed differ 
somewhat for men and women.” Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 
604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). 
57 See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that sexually based dress and appearance code to enhance company’s image 
is proper exercise of management prerogative); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 181 (3d. Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (same); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding an employer’s policy requiring 
male employees to wear ties); Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (analogizing to Title VII precedent and holding that judges may require male 
attorneys to wear neck ties to preserve courtroom decorum). Not surprisingly, courts 
have been equally loath to strike governmental employers’ grooming rules as 
violations of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. E.g., Kelley v. 
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (holding that the police department’s male-only 
hair length rules were lawful under rational basis analysis if they helped make 
officers recognizable to the public or promoted internal “esprit de corps”); Weaver v. 
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mutability theory applies as well to racial-ethnic grooming 
standards, including facially neutral employment rules that 
disproportionately hinder racial and ethnic groups.58  Indeed,  
 
 
 
 
Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that the police department’s 
“no mustache” rule was at least constitutionally rational to help induce 
departmental cohesion); Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir. 
1990) (holding that the police department may ban male officers from wearing ear 
studs when both on and off duty). Importantly, these representative decisions are 
not premised on the necessity of police or other administrative departments to 
promote the safety of either the general public or of fellow law enforcement officers, 
although such would likely be legitimate reasons to uphold grooming and 
appearance codes. Rather, the rationales are grounded in traditional employers’ 
prerogatives regarding worker comportment and workplace ambiance. Thus, the 
constitutional law cases are analogous to the Title VII cases discussed herein. 
58 See, e.g., Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(finding that the discharge of a black male because his sideburns did not conform to 
employer’s grooming requirements did not result from racial discrimination); 
Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 
1981) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s ban against racial discrimination in contracts 
does not forbid an employer from banning the cornrows hairstyle that at the time 
was particularly popular among African Americans). 
  A much cited telling instance is worth a bit of detail. In Rogers v. American 
Airlines, Inc., the district court rejected Renee Rogers’s challenge that her 
employer’s policy forbidding the cornrow hairstyle unlawfully discriminated against 
her on the basis of African Americanism. 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
Rogers rebuffed plaintiff’s contention that cornrows, then prevalent among African 
Americans of both sexes, represent a cultural and historical expression of racial 
identity. Dismissing the popular hairstyle as a mere fad, the court reasoned that Ms. 
Rogers’s claim failed because she could not demonstrate that “an all-braided hair 
style is worn exclusively or even predominantly by black people.” Id. at 232. The 
court might have ended its analysis there, but, significantly, felt compelled to reject 
entirely any argument that a particular grooming or appearance style’s proven racial 
or ethnic significance is relevant under Title VII. See Rhode, supra note 21, at  
1058–59 (discussing Rogers in detail). Specifically, the court ended its analysis by 
reaffirming the legal preeminence of mutability analysis as virtually an absolute 
trump: “An all-braided hair style is an ‘easily changed characteristic,’ and, even if 
socioculturally associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an 
impermissible basis for distinctions in the application of employment practices by an 
employer.” Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
  Although its reasoning arguably has been supplanted by contemporary 
“unequal burden” theory, the thirty-five-year-old Rogers is no relic. E.g., Pitts v. 
Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5–6 (M.D. Ga. 
Apr. 25, 2008) (applying the Rogers mutability theory to uphold employer’s ban on 
cornrows hairstyle); McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, 
at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (upholding employer’s ban on braided hair styles 
under the Rogers court’s mutability theory). 
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courts enlarged the doctrine to validate intrusions into core 
indicia of ethnic personhood, such as rules forbidding the use of 
languages other than English.59 
Despite significant amending of Title VII and the profound 
maturation of federal court judgments recognizing employers’ 
unlawful use of sexual, racial, and other forms of “stereotyping,”60 
the nearly thirty years since the publication of this author’s 
Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination 
Under Title VII61 have seen no surcease of the judicial dogma, in 
both federal and state courts, that explicitly sex-based 
appearance and grooming codes are not per se discrimination 
under Title VII.62  Indeed, the impact likely is especially 
59 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that a meat and poultry producer’s rule forbidding the use of any language 
other than English on the job did not violate the Title VII rights of predominately 
Spanish-speaking employees and, thus, need not be validated as a BFOQ); Garcia v. 
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an employer’s rule forbidding the 
use of Spanish in the presence of an English-speaking customer was not 
discrimination and, thus, need not be defended under BFOQ); cf. Church v. Kare 
Distribution, Inc., 211 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Gloor, 618 
F.2d at 266–69) (holding that firing sales representatives who could not speak 
Spanish did not violate Texas Labor Code § 21.051). 
60 See infra notes 214–45 and accompanying text (discussing  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)); see also infra notes 165–200 and accompanying 
 text (discussing unlawful stereotyping under the Act). 
61 See Bayer, supra note 4, at 772. 
62 See, e.g., Kare Distribution, Inc., 211 F. App’x at 281 (holding that firing sales 
representatives who could not speak Spanish does not violate section 21.051 of the 
Texas Labor Code); Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (finding that the employer gambling casino’s requirement that 
female bartenders must wear makeup was not unlawful); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that unlawful 
harassment may occur if a male employee suffers discrimination for acting in a 
 too-feminine manner, but noting that reasonable sex-based dress and grooming 
standards are not necessarily per se unlawful under Title VII); Harper v. 
Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that a  
male-only hair length policy did not violate Title VII); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile 
Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908–09 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (upholding a male-only hair-
length rule); Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1490 (upholding rule forbidding use of any 
language other than English on the job); Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 181; Pitts, 2008 WL 
1899306, at *5–6 (applying mutability theory to uphold employer’s ban on cornrows 
hairstyle); Dodd v. SEPTA, No. 06-4213, 2007 WL 1866754, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 
2007) (upholding employer’s ban against male employees wearing ponytails); 
Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. 03-1540 (JBS), 2004 WL 1739724, at *4–6 
(D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2004) (finding that a male employee who wanted to wear his ponytail 
set in a neat bun stated no claim under Title VII); Boyce v. Gen. Ry. Signal Co., No. 
99-CV-6225T, 2004 WL 1574023, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004) (upholding a 
male-only hair-length rule); Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. 99-5025, 2000 WL 
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widespread because one reasonably might assume that numerous 
potential plaintiffs now are chilled from challenging patently 
discriminatory grooming policies.63 
B. “Unequal Burden” Doctrine Essentially Replaces Mutability 
Theory 
The judiciary realized that mutability theory qua mutability 
theory is facially problematic.  First, courts properly have 
invalidated employment rules premised on sex traits that 
technically are mutable but nonetheless difficult to alter, such as 
disparate weight standards for male and female airline 
stewards.64  Such policies impose greater difficulties on women 
than men because, although mutable, weight control often is 
arduous.65 
Additionally, despite the then-prevailing mutability theory, 
courts invalidated employment policies they considered 
excessively humiliating, demeaning, and disrespectful to 
124559, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2000) (upholding rule forbidding male employees 
from wearing earrings); McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3 (upholding a employer’s 
ban on braided hair styles under mutability theory); Seitz v. O’Connor, No. 95 CV 
0122 (SJ), 1995 WL 745012, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1995) (upholding a male-only 
hair-length rule); Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 170 P.3d 655, 658–59 (Alaska 2007) 
(holding that sex-based hair-length policies do not violate state contract law’s 
“implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”); Matthews v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., 
Inc., No. B206764, 2009 WL 117406, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2009) (noting that 
an employer’s male-only hair-length rule is not unlawful unless it imposes an 
unequal burden); Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Dev. Co., 2013 WL 4105183 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. July 18, 2013) (finding Borgata Casino’s sex-based grooming and appearance 
policies reasonable, thus, lawful); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 603–04 
(Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that employer’s rule forbidding men from wearing facial 
jewelry does not violate OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(b)); Rohaly v. Rainbow 
Playground Depot, Inc., No. 56478-1-1, 2006 WL 2469143, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 28, 2006) (addressing employer’s gender-neutral requirement that all 
employees wear specified red blazers, the court noted that employer’s sexually 
disparate dress and grooming codes are lawful under state and federal law absent an 
unequal burden). 
63 Likewise, legal counsel may feel obliged to dissuade potential plaintiffs from 
suing due to the improbability of a successful outcome or, worse, lest such claims be 
adjudged frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise worthy of sanctions pursuant to, among 
other things, FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
64 See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2000). 
65 Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) 
(striking the weight requirement that applied exclusively to female stewards); see 
also, e.g., Frank, 216 F.3d at 854–55 (holding that the airline unlawfully required 
female flight attendants to be proportionally slimmer than their male counterparts). 
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women.66  For example, deeming the situation different from 
male-only hair-length rules, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass’n of Chicago,67 invalidated a bank’s policy instructing 
male employees to use good judgment when choosing business 
attire but requiring female employees to choose their work outfits 
from a limited, preset wardrobe euphemistically called a “career 
ensemble.”68  The court rejected the bank’s rationale that, unlike 
men, women are apt to engage in “dress competition” and 
otherwise cannot be trusted to dress appropriately.69  Similarly, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Allen 
v. Lovejoy,70 invalidated, as an offense to the individual 
personhood of women, the Health Department of Shelby County, 
Tennessee’s rule requiring married female employees to assume 
their husbands’ surnames.71  Such holdings correctly 
acknowledge that discriminatory animus often arises in response 
to what Professor Ramachandran elegantly denotes 
“performative” aspects of behavior, facets that well may concern 
mutable characteristics either predominately or through some 
interplay of mutable and immutable attributes.72  Nonetheless, 
preserving the fundamental failing of mutability analysis, 
Carroll’s and Lovejoy’s rationales permit courts to uphold 
purportedly “reasonable” facially discriminatory grooming and 
66 See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 
1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979). 
67 604 F.2d 1028. 
68 Id. at 1032–33; see also infra notes 288–91 and accompanying text. 
69 Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033. 
70 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977). 
71 Id. at 523–24. 
72 Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 20–21 (footnote omitted). Professor 
Ramachandran noted: 
[O]ur identities are either wholly or partially ‘performative,’ meaning that 
they are constituted not just by immutable, biological traits but also by our 
actions, such as the sexual acts we engage in, the way we wear our hair, 
the way we speak, our clothing, and even the magazines we like to read. 
Thus, when an African-American woman wears her hair in braids, this act 
is usually part of what constitutes her status as an African-American 
woman. . . . It is, after all, largely her outward appearance and  
behavior—certainly not the shape of her genitals—that signals to most 
people who interact with her that she is a woman, and that at least 
partially signals her identity as an African American. 
Id. See generally Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 291–97 (critiquing immutability 
theory). 
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comportment policies.73  In that regard, their jurisprudence 
remains infirm, for Title VII’s text and structure define as 
unlawful all discrimination based on the five forbidden classes 
unless proven necessary, and not simply useful, to the given 
defendant-business.74 
Courts substantially have replaced mutability analysis with 
unequal burden theory,75 although the embers of the former 
continually warm the latter.76  Indeed, if only implicitly, courts 
continue to rely on concepts of mutability—particularly ease of 
conformance with employers’ grooming demands—to discern 
unequal burden.77  The “reasonableness” vel non of employers’ 
facially discriminatory appearance and grooming rules may well 
depend upon how purportedly easily discriminatees can comply.  
Logically, the more ostensibly mutable the affected trait, the 
more likely the courts are to conclude the challenged 
discrimination is legal.  Therefore, mutable characteristics theory 
surely remains a silent yet inappropriately influential partner in 
grooming case analysis. 
The archetypal modern opinion espousing “reasonableness” 
as the definition of Title VII discrimination, thus enabling the 
“unequal burden” approach, is Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
73 See, e.g., Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032. 
74 See infra notes 132–50 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII’s textual 
exceptions). 
75 For example, Rohaly v. Rainbow Playground Depot, Inc. held that requiring 
only female employees to purchase and to wear specified navy blazers is not facially 
discriminatory but might be unlawful if imposed for discriminatory purposes. No. 
56478-1-I, 2006 WL 2469143, at *5–6 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2006). Therein, the 
court noted that mutability analysis is “outdated.” Id. at *4 n.10. 
76 Modern opinions espousing the unequal burden doctrine often cite mutable 
characteristics decisions. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 
1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). However, such opinions tend not to discuss, much 
less expressly endorse, mutability analysis per se, indicating that perhaps courts cite 
mutable characteristics decisions not to reprise that theory but to demonstrate the 
historical persistence of upholding facially discriminatory grooming rules. But see 
Church v. Kare Distribution, Inc., 211 F. App’x 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(using mutability theory to uphold under the Texas Commission on Human Rights 
Act, the firing of a sales employee who could not speak Spanish); Pitts v. Wild 
Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5–6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 
2008) (applying mutability theory to uphold employer’s ban on the cornrows 
hairstyle); McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (upholding employer’s ban on braided hairstyles under 
mutability theory). 
77 Brian P. McCarthy, Note, Trans Employees and Personal Appearance 
Standards Under Title VII, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 964 (2008). 
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Co.78  Therein, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit rebuffed Darleen Jespersen’s Title VII challenge to 
that aspect of Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming and appearance 
policy requiring female, but not male, bartenders to wear 
makeup or lose their jobs.79  Ms. Jespersen argued that her  
long-standing and deeply felt disdain for facial cosmetics 
exemplified why Harrah’s sex-based makeup standards 
unlawfully inflict the common stereotype that genuine women 
wear cosmetics to enhance their femininity but real men do not 
lest they appear ladylike and weak.80 
In a ploy derived from mutability analysis, Jespersen held 
that Harrah’s policy is not statutorily sex-based because it strives 
to enhance the productivity and attractiveness of all bartenders, 
both male and female.81  Acknowledging that certain rules are 
unequivocally gender specific, Jespersen pronounced such sex 
differentiation to be merely judicious nods to reasonable 
prevailing social conventions.82  Indeed, Jespersen reiterated the 
familiar bizarre canon of mutability analysis:  “Grooming 
standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders 
78 444 F.3d 1104. 
79 Id. at 1110–13. Regarding Jespersen’s specific facts, Harrah’s Corporation 
owns and manages resorts combining hotels, restaurants, bars, and gambling 
casinos. Id. at 1105. Harrah’s Reno, Nevada, facility set grooming standards 
containing sex-neutral rules as well as both male- and female-specific rubrics. Id. at 
1107. Men may not wear hair extending below the top of their shirt collars, may not 
wear ponytails, and must keep their hands and fingernails clean and their 
fingernails neatly trimmed at all times. Id. Similarly, male employees cannot wear 
colored nail polish or use facial or eye makeup. Id. Female employees are required, 
among other things, to keep their hair teased, curled, or styled and always worn 
down. Id. Nail polish can be only clear, white, pink, or red, and nails may not be 
unduly long or sport “exotic nail art.” Id. In addition, “[m]ake up (face powder, blush 
and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors. Lip color 
must be worn at all times.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
80  Id. at 1107–08. She testified that wearing makeup both slighted her personal 
dignity and “took away [her] credibility as an individual.” Id. at 1108 (alteration in 
original). Professor Tirosh, accenting the physical as well as emotional effects of 
Harrah’s grooming code, stated, “Jespersen’s earlier attempts to wear makeup made 
her feel emotionally distressed, ‘sick, degraded, exposed, and violated.’ Still, when 
makeup became mandatory in her workplace, she tried wearing it in order to 
conform to the new regulations, but again felt extremely unconformable [sic] and ill.” 
See Tirosh, supra note 21, at 70 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc)) (citing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 
1194 (D. Nev. 2002)). 
81 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109–10. 
82 Id. at 1107, 1112. 
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are not facially discriminatory.”83  Declaring that Title VII’s 
“touch-stone is reasonableness,”84 the Ninth Circuit essentially 
embraced mutability theory’s principle conceit:  “So long as they 
find some justification in commonly accepted social norms and 
are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such 
regulations are not necessarily violations of Title VII”85 
regardless whether such sex- or race-specific regulating of 
employees meets any of the express exemptions or defenses 
Congress chose to include within Title VII. 
The issue then became whether Harrah’s sex-based 
standards impose an “unequal” and thus inappropriate or 
unequal burden, a requisite Ms. Jespersen failed to meet.86  
Specifically, nothing in the record suggested to the Ninth Circuit 
that Harrah’s sex-based grooming requisites would “objectively 
inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job.”87  The court similarly 
opined that Harrah’s female-specific requirements “are not more 
onerous” either in theory or practice than are its male-only 
83 Id. at 1109–10 (emphasis added). Such reasoning is obstinate. That courts 
think it appropriate to carve a “reasonableness” exception to Title VII regarding 
employers’ grooming rules cannot alter the actuality that, borrowing Jespersen’s 
prose, “standards . . . differentiat[ing] between the genders” is exactly what “facially 
discriminatory” means. Id.; see Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Foster-Hall, No. 97 
C 1441, 97 C 2209, 1998 WL 419483, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1998) (“[The 
employer’s] policy was facially discriminatory because by its own terms it 
dictated . . . disparities along racial lines. That is what it means for a policy to be 
‘facially discriminatory.’ ” (emphasis omitted)). 
84 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113; see also supra notes 12–20 and accompanying 
text. 
85 Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). Similarly, one of the pivotal mutable characteristics 
rulings asserted uncritically: 
We may take judicial notice that reasonable regulations prescribing good 
grooming standards are not at all uncommon in the business world, indeed, 
taking account of basic differences in male and female physiques and 
common differences in customary dress of male and female employees, it is 
not usually thought that there is unlawful discrimination “because of sex.” 
Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
86 The court averred, “Our settled law in this circuit, however, does not support 
Jespersen’s position that a sex-based difference in appearance standards alone, 
without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a prima facie case.” 
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also 
supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
87 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
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requisites.88  Absent evidence of an unequal or unequal burden, 
the court refused to find even a prima facie case of 
discrimination.89 
In brief, the now prevailing standard holds that employment 
grooming, attire, or appearance requisites—and their  
like—facially premised on any of the five forbidden criteria are 
not discriminatory under Title VII if (1) they are reasonable, 
likely because they mirror purportedly innocuous, socially 
prevalent sexual statuses or otherwise are judicially deemed 
inoffensive and (2) they impose no burden judicially determined 
to be “unequal” or otherwise undue. 
This author avers today no less adamantly than he did 
nearly thirty years ago90:  Courts know or should know that the 
principles this writing assembles as “undue burden” theory—a 
modest variation of the older mutability standard—defiantly 
thwarts the letter, structure, purpose, and spirit of Title VII.  
88 Id. at 1109. Indeed, the majority declined to “take judicial notice of the fact 
that it costs more money and takes more time for a woman to comply with the 
makeup requirement than it takes for a man to comply with the requirement that he 
keep his hair short.” Id. at 1110. The dissenting judges strongly disagreed, urging 
that while perhaps it would have been helpful had Ms. Jespersen supplemented the 
district court record, common knowledge and experience debunks the majority’s rash 
and willful disregard of commonly known facts: 
[I]s there any doubt that putting on makeup costs money and takes time? 
Harrah's policy requires women to apply face powder, blush, mascara and 
lipstick. You don’t need an expert witness to figure out that such items 
don’t grow on trees. Nor is there any rational doubt that application of 
makeup is an intricate and painstaking process that requires considerable 
time and care. . . . Makeup, moreover, must be applied and removed every 
day; [Harrah’s] policy burdens men with no such daily ritual. While a man 
could jog to the casino, slip into his uniform, and get right to work, a 
woman must travel to work so as to avoid smearing her makeup, or arrive 
early to put on her makeup there. 
Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Pursuant to Jespersen, plaintiffs now must 
engage in extensive fact-specific, discrete proofs when the social reality, worthy of 
judicial notice, informs that the costs in time, money, and stress of most women’s 
grooming exceeds that borne by most men. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 
1096. 
89 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110–11. This Article accepts but does not concede that 
without unequal burden, individuals may change to employers’ satisfaction the 
traits, characteristics, and behaviors encompassed in “unequal burden” cases. The 
thesis, herein, is that the moral imperatives of Title VII do not allow employers to 
impose such intrusions absent BFOQs. However, many commentators strongly and 
cogently dispute judges’ usually rough assertions that changing reviewed 
mannerisms and appearances incurs no burden worthy of judicial note. See infra 
note 182 and accompanying text. 
90 See generally Bayer, supra note 4. 
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Inferring a “reasonableness” exception, the judiciary devised its 
own regime of professed wisdom to supplant imagined 
inadequacies of Title VII’s unadorned, uncomplicated, 
unambiguous structure prohibiting five classifications of 
discrimination unless justified by textual exceptions.91  This 
Article offers below arguments supporting its author’s admittedly 
vehement contention. 
II. THE MANY INFIRMITIES OF MUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS CUM 
UNEQUAL BURDEN THEORY 
A. Title VII Is Not Limited to Policies Directly Affecting Work 
Product 
Unequal burden doctrine is premised on a flurry of doubtful 
ancillary propositions borrowed from “mutable characteristics” 
theory to defend the brusque declaration that Title VII’s text 
implicitly excludes “reasonable” discrimination from statutory 
coverage.92  Notably, Jespersen accented that Harrah’s policy is 
detailed, explicitly covering both male and female employees, 
with some provisions applying identically to both genders, some 
setting gender disparate rules, and some addressing only one 
sex.93  But, while interesting, those facts have neither logical nor 
legal significance because by definition, all grooming and 
appearance codes pertain to both sexes either explicitly or 
implicitly.  No less than exclusively single-sex grooming codes, 
dual-gender grooming codes instruct what both sexes may or may 
not do.  Thus, any dress or grooming code—or any discrete  
 
 
91 This Article notes for thoroughness that one respected commentator would 
adopt a reasonableness standard but modified as a balancing test, comparing the 
employer’s need to impose the grooming standard with the extent the standard 
inappropriately invades individuals’ choices of how to define themselves. LEX K. 
LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 45.02 (2d ed. 2015). Consequently, Mr. 
Larson strongly criticizes court rulings that find grooming issues trivial pursuant to 
mutable characteristics theory. Certainly, Larson’s balancing test would more 
closely approximate the commands of Title VII; however, as urged herein, Congress 
nowhere so much as hinted that discrimination purportedly imposing no unequal 
burden is a special, lesser subcategory of discrimination nor did Congress establish a 
“reasonableness” standard to discern if per se sex- or race-based employment policies 
are sufficiently unreasonable to premise a triable cause of action. 
92 See supra Part I.B. 
93 See supra notes 79, 88–89 and accompanying text. 
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provisions therein—applying to only one gender deliberately 
frees the other from coverage, thereby permitting the other to do 
what the covered sex may not.94 
Hence, contrary to Jespersen, that Harrah’s took the time to 
draft a detailed set of rules makes the gender-exclusive aspects 
thereof no more nor less sexually discriminatory than any other 
employer’s appearance rules, thorough or sparse, new or 
longstanding, written or unwritten. 
On a different tack, accenting a remnant of mutability 
theory, Jespersen highlighted that grooming rules do not affect 
the actual ability of individuals to work.95  That practical fact, 
however, has no legal meaning because Congress appropriately 
extended Title VII’s protection beyond blanket refusals to hire 
members of a protected class and similar discriminatory policies 
directly denying or limiting opportunities for employment.96  To 
offer a prominent example, employers cannot impose pension 
plans that discriminate on the basis of sex.97  Not surprisingly, 
courts routinely invalidate similar discrimination regarding 
94 Certainly, a female-specific makeup standard is no less gender-specific 
whether part of a larger grooming policy or standing as the sole appearance-
requisite demanded by a given employer. 
95 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 
2006). Reiterating the premises of mutability theory, the Eleventh Circuit likewise 
offered the following farcical conclusion regarding a sex-based rule setting a sine qua 
non for obtaining or retaining employment: “[T]he [male-only short hair] grooming 
policy at issue in Willingham ‘related more closely to the employer’s choice of how to 
run his business than to equality of employment opportunity.’ ” Harper v. 
Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Willingham 
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). In fact, a consistent principle of Title VII 
jurisprudence affirms, “[T]he language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or 
‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ 
evinces a congressional intent ‘ “to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women” ’ in employment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 
(1986) (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707 n.13 (1978), superseded in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2012), 
as recognized in Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303 (N.D. 
Ala. 2013)); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
97 Perhaps most notably, the Supreme Court invalidated an employer’s pension 
program that, based on empirically reliable actuarial tables, charged female 
employees more than similarly situated male employees. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711. 
The Supreme Court confirmed and expanded Manhart’s rationale when it held that 
employers may not so much as offer pension annuity plans that charge employees 
equally but pay less in benefits to female retirees than to similarly situated male 
retirees. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans 
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074–75 (1983) (per curiam). 
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other beneficial perquisites that are unrelated to either discrete 
work duties or the actual quality of employees’ work.98  For 
instance, the Act prohibits discriminatory vacation pay.99 
While certainly an inducement to work proficiently, 
employees can perform perfectly well even if employers’ pension 
funds, vacation policies, or other perquisites are discriminatory, 
or indeed, if employers offer any benefits at all.  Thus, Title VII 
proscribes discriminatory employment policies that do not 
directly inhibit employees from successfully performing their 
jobs.100  Nonetheless, under the unequal burden model, Darleen 
Jespersen had to accept the female-only aspects of Harrah’s 
grooming policy or be fired lawfully.101  Paradoxically, Ms. 
Jespersen would not have to endure gender distinct pension 
plans, vacation pay, or similar discrimination as conditions of her 
continued employment if Harrah’s imposed such terms.  It makes 
no sense that extant Title VII doctrine prohibits employers from 
indulging discriminatory preference regarding perquisites, but 
permits employers to enforce discriminatory grooming codes as 
conditions for employment itself with no regard for whether such 
grooming codes are essential to performing the particular work. 
The pension rulings strongly explicate the logical fallacy of 
unequal burden theory in a separate but related regard.102  
Remarkably, the Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that Title 
VII prohibits employers from offering perquisites predicated on 
98 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) ¶ 7230, 2009 WL 3608272 (2009). 
99 E.g., Craig-Wood v. Time Warner N.Y. Cable LLC, 549 F. App’x 505, 509 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Atkinson v. N. Jersey Developmental, 453 F. App’x 262, 263–66 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
100 One might respond that a disparate pension fund or similar employment 
perquisite is a monetarily significant “term” of employment under  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). Therefore, any sex-based employment practice 
adversely affecting pensions imposes an unequal burden. However, failing to obtain 
work or being fired are more costly employment outcomes in terms of money, lost 
opportunities, and other manifest harms for the obvious reason that the employee is 
no longer employed. Indeed, § 2000e-2(a)(1) begins, “It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual . . . .” Id. Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s inaugural language evinces Congress’s 
deep concern that discrimination’s first significant adverse effect is to cause 
discriminatees either to lose or to be denied gainful employment. In that regard, the 
“burden” judicially validated in the grooming cases—loss of employment for failure 
to conform—is much greater than the burdens courts actually forbid in the cases 
addressing pensions and other work perquisites. 
101 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
102 See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074−75; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711, 716–17. 
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the scientifically accurate “stereotype[]” that the average female 
will outlive the average male even if unfortunate economic 
consequences result.103  The Court so ruled despite an 
incredulous rejoinder by Chief Justice Warren Burger: 
[T]o operate economically workable group pension programs, it 
is only rational to permit [employers] to rely on statistically 
sound and proved disparities in longevity between men and 
women.  Indeed, it seems to me irrational to assume Congress 
intended to outlaw use of the fact that . . . women as a class 
outlive men.”104 
If employers cannot take into account such relevant 
actualities as economic disparities revealed by empirically 
reliable sex-based actuarial data, certainly they may not require 
that, as a condition of obtaining pensions and other perquisites, 
employees conform with sex-based policies that are completely 
irrelevant to such economic realities.  For instance, surely courts 
would not uphold an employer’s rule allowing longhaired men to 
work but prohibiting them from earning vacation days, 
accumulating sick leave, and participating in the pension and 
insurance plans available to shorthaired male employees and 
female employees of any hair length.  Absent untoward political 
103 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708; see also Norris, 463 U.S. at 1080. Title VII’s ban 
against stereotyping is explicated infra at notes 167–79 and accompanying text. 
104 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 726 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Five years later, four 
dissenting Justices similarly worried that the Court’s strict, indeed literal, 
application of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination would result in harm 
to employers and employees alike with no apparent countervailing benefit: 
Employers may be forced to discontinue offering life annuities, or 
potentially disruptive changes may be required in long-established methods 
of calculating insurance and pensions. . . . If the cost to employers of 
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carriers choose not to 
write such annuities, employees will be denied the opportunity to purchase 
life annuities—concededly the most advantageous pension plan—at lower 
cost. If, alternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer 
these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits probably will 
be passed on to current employees. 
Norris, 463 U.S. at 1095, 1098–99 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun 
& Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). As explicated infra at notes  
165–200 and accompanying text, the Norris majority elegantly articulated the core 
infirmity of the dissenters’ analysis: “[The] underlying assumption—that sex may 
properly be used to predict longevity—is flatly inconsistent with the basic 
teaching . . . that Title VII requires employers to treat their employees as 
individuals, not ‘as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national 
class.’ ” Norris, 463 U.S. at 1083 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Manhart, 435 
U.S. at 708). 
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motives, courts should find such rules unlawful under Title VII, 
either as unequal burdens or as utterly irrational, for there is no 
logical reason why longhaired men may be deemed employable 
but unworthy of valuable employment perquisites.105 
Nonetheless, if its precepts are to be believed, unequal 
burden theory sustains such ridiculous employment standards; 
because the employer could have refused in the first instance to 
hire longhaired males, any employment-related discrimination 
imposed on such employees is permissible.  Yet, hiring men with 
long hair but refusing them benefits seems as untoward as the 
unlawful practice of hiring but limiting benefits to women.  The 
answer must be that, like discriminating against women, 
prejudice against longhaired men is arbitrary, humiliating, and 
otherwise harmful.  Such discrimination is unlawful and thus 
burdensome per se, which means any arguable lack of economic 
or other sex-specific adverse effects is irrelevant, although such 
harm would be pertinent to a court’s determination of 
appropriate remedy.  Accordingly, employers must have valid 
reasons to impose male-only hair-length rules or, indeed, any 
discriminatory grooming rules, as requirements for either 
employment itself or any term or condition thereof.106 
B. The Statutory Definition of Discrimination Eschews 
Judicially Created Exceptions 
Unequal burden theory defies the respected canon that “[w]e 
discover a statute’s plain meaning ‘by looking at the language 
and design of the statute as a whole.’ ”107  Appreciating that these 
105 It would be perverse to argue that the very irrelevance of the sex-based 
requirement insulates that discriminatory condition from Title VII’s purview. When 
a bigoted employer believes that her discriminatory policy enhances productivity, we 
can at least ascribe some modicum of legitimate motivation to her discrimination. 
For instance, an employer who supposes, rightly or not, that some customers will 
refuse to be served by longhaired men evinces a rational—but, this Article argues, 
insufficient—basis to impose a male-only hair-length rule. That employer’s motive is 
not wholly malevolent. By contrast, mandating a discriminatory policy unrelated to 
efficiency or safety simply is vindictive and, as such, is all the more offensive and 
illegal under Title VII than would be discrimination fostering a less malicious 
motive. 
106 See infra notes 132–50 and accompanying text (Congress enacted the 
meaning of “valid reasons” through express Title VII defenses and exemptions). 
107 Perez v. Postal Police Officers Ass’n, 736 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Metro. Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
712 F.3d 248, 259 (6th Cir. 2013)). Identically, very recently the Supreme Court 
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tenets expound nothing less than the Constitution’s equilibrium 
of legislative and judicial authority, the Court explained, “Our 
charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted.”108  A reliable 
legal compendium expressed superbly the enduring norm in 
terms that undermine the jurisprudence of Jespersen: 
[A]n omission or failure to provide for contingencies, which it 
may seem wise to have provided for specifically, does not justify 
any judicial addition to the language of the statute.  To the 
contrary, it is the duty of the courts to interpret a statute as 
they find it, without reference to whether its provisions are wise 
or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or 
inappropriate, or well or ill conceived.109 
 
 
 
 
reiterated, “Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.’ ” 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)). 
  Indeed, three years ago, noting Title VII’s detailed and thorough design, the 
Court reaffirmed, “Just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so 
too are its structural choices.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 
2529 (2013) (Title VII case). These admonitions, of course, derive from the venerated 
axiom, “Absent ambiguity, our analysis also ends with the statutory 
language. . . . ‘[W]e must presume that the statute says what it means.’ ” Fed. Hous. 
Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Devine v. United States, 202 F.3d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also supra 
note 16 and accompanying text. 
108 Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 217 (2010) (Title VII case); see, e.g., 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (Title VII 
case). The Eighth Circuit nicely linked that esteemed axiom to the Constitution’s 
structure of government, stating, “Our role is to interpret and apply statutes as 
written, for the power to redraft laws to implement policy changes is reserved to the 
legislative branch.” Doe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 519 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
109 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 164 (2015) (footnotes omitted). Nearly a century 
ago, albeit in the context of criminal law, Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court 
likewise scolded, “What the government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, 
in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by 
inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the 
judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (emphasis 
added). Eight decades later, immediately after quoting Iselin, the Court expounded, 
“There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and 
rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.” Lamie v. 
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 
U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit employs a fortuitously appropriate apparel metaphor 
encapsulating the proper judicial function:  “When a statute is as 
clear as a glass slipper and fits without strain, courts should not 
approve an interpretation that requires a shoehorn.”110 
Applying the constitutionally predicated framework of 
statutory interpretation, Title VII’s text, organizational 
structure, and national objectives reveal the true meaning of 
discrimination.111  Indeed, federal courts recognize that 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 itself—the Act’s central guarantee of “fair 
employment”—defines unlawful discrimination.112  Moreover, 
110 Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Eight years 
prior, somewhat overplaying the reference, that court wrote, “The language of this 
statute is as clear as a glass slipper, there is no shoehorn in the legislative history, 
and the government, just as surely as Cinderella’s step-mother, cannot make the fit.” 
Brush v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 982 F.2d 1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Shortly before 
Brush, the Federal Circuit offered a more extended image, “When the law has been 
crafted with the clarity of crystal, it also has the qualities of a glass slipper: it cannot 
be shoe-horned onto facts it does not fit, no matter how appealing they might 
appear.” Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
111 Indeed, the Supreme Court freshly reiterated that because Title VII is a 
detailed statutory scheme, a textual approach is essential to discern the meaning of 
both the Act as a whole and its constituent parts. “ ‘Congress’ special care in drawing 
so precise a statutory scheme’ as Title VII ‘makes it incorrect to infer that Congress 
meant anything other than what the text does say.’ ” EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 
738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 
S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013)), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015). Likewise, as the highly 
regarded legislator Senator Edmund Muskie pleaded during legislative debates, “I 
submit that, read in their entirety, these provisions provide a clear and definitive 
indication of the type of practice which this title seeks to eliminate.” 110 CONG. REC. 
12,618 (1964) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie); see also infra note 120 and 
accompanying text for additional remarks confirming Congress’s intention that the 
text of Title VII speaks for itself. 
112 E.g., Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 
2000); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), quoted in Firefighters 
Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1977); Lucido 
v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Rogers, 
454 F.2d at 238; Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 409−10 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Puntolillo v. 
N.H. Racing Comm’n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1091−92 (D.N.H. 1974)). See generally 
Bayer, supra note 4, at 774–80. 
  Of utmost importance, the Supreme Court agrees with the above-cited 
circuit and district courts. Regarding that portion of § 2000e-2 providing special 
status to bona fide seniority systems, the Court explained: 
On its face, § 703(h) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)] appears to be only a 
definitional provision; as with the other provisions of § 703 [§ 2000e-2], 
subsection (h) delineates which employment practices are illegal and 
thereby prohibited and which are not. . . . [I]t is apparent that the thrust of 
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discerning Title VII’s definition of discrimination must conform 
with the sensible canon, “When faced with a remedial statute, 
our interpretive charge is simple:  Employ a ‘standard of liberal 
construction [to] accomplish [Congress’s] objects.’ ”113  That tenet 
applies with exceptional rigor because Title VII’s “policy of 
outlawing such discrimination should have the ‘highest 
priority.’ ”114 
1. The Extraordinarily Expansive Breadth of Protection Under 
Title VII 
Cognizant of these norms, the Supreme Court definitively 
and with uncomplicated elegance stated the applicable, 
overarching definition which this Article deems to be Title VII’s 
first principle:  “Congress intended to prohibit all practices in 
whatever form which create inequality in employment 
opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, 
sex, or national origin . . . .”115  A decade later, the Court 
the section is directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal 
discriminatory practice . . . . 
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758, 761 (1976) (emphasis added); see 
also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69 (1982); accord Balint v. Carson 
City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Franks, 424 U.S. at 761). 
Clearly then, not all definitions are found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(n), the Act’s 
provision specifically entitled “Definitions.” Thus, the Seventh Circuit perhaps 
obdurately opined, “Title VII does not define ‘discrimination,’ the key term . . . for 
§ 2000e-2(a) . . . .” Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 
2005). It is true that the actual term “discrimination” is not specifically defined but 
the nature of the unlawful conduct—discrimination or to discriminate—is clear from 
the Act’s words and configuration. In that regard, the idea of “to discriminate” is 
self-evident as next discussed in this Article’s text. 
113 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 444 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)); see also, e.g., Marais 
v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 736 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2013); Long v. Tommy Hilfiger 
U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012). 
114 Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 47 (1974)); see also, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994); 
EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 510, 516 (4th Cir. 2012); cf. Fox v. Vice, 563 
U.S. 826, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)) (noting generally that statutes vindicating 
civil rights protect national interests of the “highest priority”). 
115 Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added) (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44; 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971)); accord, e.g., Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 
U.S. 161, 180 (1981). Expectedly, that definition still controls Title VII analysis. E.g., 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); Miranda v. B & B 
Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992). Interpreting Franks, 
the EEOC exclaimed, “Today, the national policy of nondiscrimination is firmly 
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reasserted the comprehensive scope Congress explicitly enacted.  
“[T]he language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or 
‘tangible’ discrimination.  The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘ “to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women” ’ in employment.”116 
The Supreme Court’s definition explicitly and unswervingly 
demands the elimination of workplace bigotry.  Consistent with 
its duty not to alter Congress’s express construct,117 the Court’s 
explication of unlawful discrimination neither suggests nor 
invites judicially conceived exceptions such as “unequal burden” 
theory, which would thwart Congress’s goal that, to borrow from 
desegregation cases, “discrimination would be eliminated root 
and branch.”118  Rather, courts emphasize that Congress 
demarcated discrimination expansively by, among other things, 
not including many examples of discrete discriminatory conduct 
which courts might mistakenly interpret to connote narrow, 
particularized coverage.  Thus, the Eighth Circuit rightly 
clarified that Title VII’s text “evinces a Congressional intention 
to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms.  Congress  
 
rooted in the law.” EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) ¶ 8700 n.3, 2009 WL 3608301 (2009) 
(quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 763). 
116 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (emphasis added). The 
Court consistently has reaffirmed that understanding of Title VII. E.g., Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009) (“[O]ur decision[s] must be consistent with the 
important purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of 
discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”); Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004) (holding that Title VII recognizes claims of 
“constructive discharge”); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 
115−16 (2002); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998). 
117 See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
118 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486 (1992) (quoting Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 
391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also United States 
v. Fletcher ex rel. Fletcher, 805 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that once 
complete desegregation is accomplished, control of the particular school district 
should return to local hands); Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 788 F.3d 132, 140 
(4th Cir. 2015). Courts rightly have applied that objective in employment 
discrimination cases. For example, as the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts noted, “[T]he duty of a court once racial discrimination is 
established is clear and undoubted—to extirpate racial discrimination root and 
branch, adequately compensate its victims, and creatively invoke its equitable 
powers to provide equal opportunity to all citizens free of the blight of racial 
animus.” Cotter v. City of Bos., 193 F. Supp. 2d 323, 327 (D. Mass. 2002), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor 
to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious 
activities.”119 
Properly then, the Act’s uncomplicated but thoroughgoing 
ban against discrimination may be considered Title VII’s first 
principle.120 
119 Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 
1977)) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). See generally Bayer, supra note 4, at  
774–80. A decade ago, the United States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico summarized the idea superbly: “Congress could well have believed that 
protecting everyone involved in a protected activity was so important to the remedial 
structure that it was better to be overbroad rather than leave any gaps or 
distinctions that might narrow Title VII’s protections.” Kelley v. City of 
Albuquerque, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1224 (D.N.M. 2004) (finding that 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) covered a retaliation claim brought by a former city 
attorney averring she was fired by the mayor for participating in the defense of a 
mediated Title VII claim). 
120 Title VII’s legislative history accents the remarkable and deliberate breadth 
of coverage properly recognized by the courts. See Bayer, supra note 4, at 780–82. 
For example, in their authoritative memorandum to their colleagues, Senators Clark 
and Case, the bipartisan floor managers of the fair employment portion of the 
proposed Civil Rights Act, stated Title VII’s purpose succinctly, unequivocally, and 
lucidly with no hint that facially discriminatory employment rules would be 
excluded from coverage due to purported reasonableness: 
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it 
is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to 
make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those 
distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by 
section 704 [enacted as § 2000e-2(a)] are those which are based on any five 
of the forbidden criteria . . . . 
110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). Courts cite the Clark-Case Memorandum to clarify 
legislative intent under Title VII. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 
(1982); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350–52 & n.35 (1977); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1971); Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 
168 F.3d 468, 474 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999); Thornley v. Penton Publ’g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 
29 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997). Similarly, Senator Clark asserted in response to a question 
from the skeptical minority leader, Senator Everett Dirksen, “To discriminate is to 
make distinctions or differences in the treatment of employees, and are prohibited 
only if they are based on any of the five forbidden criteria (race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin); any other criteria or qualification is untouched by this bill.” 110 
CONG. REC. 7218 (1964) (statement of Sen. Joseph S. Clark). Identically and in 
seeming anticipation of judicial aversion to the Act’s deliberately expansive breadth, 
an exasperated Senator Edmund Muskie pleaded: 
What more could be asked for in the way of guidelines, short of a complete 
itemization of every practice which could conceivably be a violation? . . . I 
submit that, read in their entirety, these provisions provide a clear and 
definitive indication of the type of practice which this title seeks to 
eliminate. Any serious doubts concerning its application would, it seems to 
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2.  The Act Protects Every Covered Person Regarding the Full 
Panoply of Employment 
While the foregoing should suffice to establish that Congress 
brooked no extratextual weakening of Title VII’s proscriptions, 
care and thoroughness require this Article to note that, of equal 
significance and entirely consistent with its first principle, the 
Act vindicates the individual over the collective.  That is, the text 
does not protect groups but rather “individuals” from 
discrimination based on their affiliation with the Act’s five 
covered classes.121  Reviewing § 2000e-2(a)’s wording,122 the 
Supreme Court has long recognized, “The statute’s focus on the 
individual is unambiguous.  It precludes treatment of individuals 
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national 
class.”123  Accordingly, a class of but one person enjoys the full 
me, stem at least partially from the predisposition of the person expressing 
such doubt. 
Id. at 12,618 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie) (emphasis added). 
121 E.g., Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
579 (1978); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09 (1978). 
The Eighth Circuit recently reaffirmed that “[t]he principal focus of [Title VII] is the 
protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority 
group as a whole.” Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 
n.4 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54). In fact, the reliable legal 
encyclopedia American Jurisprudence determined this principle to be so 
fundamental that it included in the brief opening section of its extensive exposition 
of Title VII, “It has also been said that the principal focus of Title VII is the 
protection of the individual employee rather than the minority group as a whole.” 
45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1 (2015) (footnoting Lewis, 591 F.3d 1033 and 
Chadwick, 561 F.3d 58). 
122 See supra note 3. 
123 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. Manhart concluded that “[e]ven if the statutory 
language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on 
fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.” Id. at 709; see also Ariz. 
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 
U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983) (Marshall, J., with four Justices, concurring in part); id. at 
1108 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708); Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 
F.3d 582, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Discrimination against one Hispanic employee 
violates the statute, no matter how well another Hispanic employee is treated.”); 
Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he courts have 
consistently emphasized that the ultimate issue is the reasons for the individual 
plaintiff’s treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within the 
workplace.”); Bayer, supra note 4, at 784–85. 
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protection of the Act.124  It does not matter if the employer 
neutrally treats every member of a protected class except one;125 
the person singled out for discrimination enjoys full statutory 
protection.126 
124 E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that 
discrimination directed to a particular individual is unlawful); Diaz, 653 F.3d at 588. 
125 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579 (“It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed 
by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, 
without regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are already 
proportionally represented in the work force.”). Therefore, “discrimination against 
one employee cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another 
employee in that same group.” Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 n.4; see also, e.g., Diaz, 653 
F.3d at 587–88; Henderson, 257 F.3d at 252; Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of 
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998). 
126 To accent using a prominent example, over thirty years ago the Supreme 
Court invalidated the “bottom line” theory. Specifically, the Court ruled that 
employment criteria, standards, or tests that disqualify a disparate number of 
applicants within a protected class may be unlawful even if the employer hired 
enough such applicants from among the few who satisfied the disparate criteria to 
match their percentage within the “applicant flow,” that is, among those who applied 
for work. Teal, 457 U.S. at 454–55 (holding that individual discriminatees may 
challenge the portion of their employer’s hiring process that disqualified them, even 
if final hiring statistics reveal no unlawful discrimination); see also, e.g., Furnco, 438 
U.S. at 580 n.9 (finding that an employer’s policy of hiring only bricklayers 
previously known to the employer may result in discriminatory denial of 
employment opportunity to “at the gate” minority applicants even if the minority 
group happens to be well represented in the bricklayer workforce); Lewis, 591 F.3d 
at 1039–40 (discussing Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54); Bayer, supra note 4, at 815–18. 
For example, suppose for ten vacant positions, fifty persons apply of which  
twenty-five are African American and twenty-five are white. Hence, the “applicant 
flow” reveals that half the applicants are minority and half are majority. Suppose 
further that the employer’s application process includes requirement X, which 
immediately disqualifies twenty African-American but only five white applicants. 
Under Title VII’s “disparate impact” cause of action, see infra note 147 and 
accompanying text, unless justified as a “business necessity,” requirement X might 
well be unlawful because it eliminated fully eighty percent of the minority 
applicants but only twenty percent of the nonminority job seekers. That requirement 
X excluded four times as many African Americans as whites is sufficient to establish 
a statutory violation. However, suppose the employer fills the ten vacant slots with 
five white applicants and the five African-American individuals who satisfied 
requirement X. In that case, the employer might aver that the “bottom  
line”—ultimate hiring outcome—reveals no unlawful discrimination because the 
hiring percentages and the applicant flow are identical at fifty percent minority and 
fifty percent nonminority. The Supreme Court’s Teal ruling clarified that because 
Title VII protects “individuals,” “bottom line” data cannot insulate the employer 
from colorable claims brought by minority applicants who but for failing to meet 
requirement X might have been among those hired. Teal, 457 U.S. at 442 (“We hold 
that the ‘bottom line’ does not preclude respondent employees from establishing a 
prima facie case, nor does it provide petitioner employer with a defense to such a 
case.”). 
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Congruently, the judiciary applies Title VII’s coverage of 
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”127 as generously 
as those words allow.  Capturing the manifest expanse of Title 
VII’s first principle, as earlier quoted, the Supreme Court 
enthused, “We have held that this not only covers ‘terms’ and 
‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense, but ‘evinces a 
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women in employment.’ ”128 
The Courts’ rationale is no mystery.  Congress understood 
that discrimination causes harm that in many ways is shared 
among discriminatees yet is unique to each victim.129  Congress 
sought to preserve nothing less than the dignity of every person 
from the degradation of discrimination.130  Therefore, as next 
explained, an employer must have a compelling reason and not 
simply, as in unequal burden theory, a plausible purpose, to 
inflict the financial and career harm plus humiliation attendant 
to discrimination.131 
3. The Limited Impact of Title VII’s Express Exceptions 
Fittingly and of equal importance, Congress carefully curbed 
its otherwise expansive definition of discrimination through 
express but narrow exceptions.132  Most notably, Congress 
127 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
128 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). 
129 See Bayer, supra note 4, at 785–86. 
130 See, e.g., Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Don’t Awaken the Sleeping Child: Japan’s 
Gender Equality Law and the Rhetoric of Gradualism, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
143, 149 (1999); Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The Challenges of 
Creating Sexual Harassment Protections for Prisons and Other Nonworkplace 
Settings, 83 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52–68 (2009). As Justice Souter observed, the Act 
“vindicates an interest in dignity as a human being entitled to be judged on 
individual merit.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 247 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring), modified on other grounds, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755. See infra Section C for a detailed 
account of the meaning and extent of dignity as applied to Title VII. 
131 “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal 
construction in order to carry out the purposes of Congress to eliminate the 
inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of . . . discrimination.” Sandoval v. Am. 
Bldg. Maint. Indust., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009) (ellipsis in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 
1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132 Courts acknowledge that Congress drafted Title VII’s defenses and 
exemptions narrowly, expecting the judiciary to “read [them] narrowly.” Int’l Union, 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (discussing specifically the 
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enacted the statutory defense popularly known as BFOQ, short 
for bona fide occupational qualification:  Employment standards 
may be based on otherwise forbidden criteria when “religion, sex, 
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.”133 
BFOQ is based on one sound, crucial principle:  Because 
usually unnecessary to the sustainability of the particular 
business, discrimination is an illegitimate impediment to inflict 
on employees and job applicants.134  By contrast, when truly 
necessary to fulfill the given lawful employment’s minima, 
discrimination becomes reasonable because it is essential.  
Consequently, BFOQs are not measured purely by employers’ 
subjective preferences,135 nor is it enough that discriminatory 
policies may enhance business efficiency, promote convenience, or 
otherwise seem “reasonable.”  Indeed, because the “test [is] one of 
business necessity, not business convenience,” BFOQs do not 
concern business practices that may be lawful, even rational in a 
business sense, such as maximizing profits or enhancing 
efficiency.136  Were it otherwise, Title VII’s first principle would  
 
BFOQ defense); see also, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 
122–25 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); Teamsters Local 
Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dept. of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2015). 
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012). 
134 See Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 
2013) (impermissible criteria under Title VII means that such considerations are 
“illegitimate”); United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 951 (4th Cir. 1994) (Title VII 
prohibits, among other things, “an action by an otherwise unfettered 
actor . . . animated by an illegitimate discriminatory bias”); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines 
Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 298 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
135 Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 201. 
136 Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303 (discussing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning nearly a half-
century ago still aptly defines the meaning of BFOQ: “We begin with the proposition 
that the use of the word ‘necessary’ in section 703(e) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)] 
requires that we apply a business necessity test, not a business convenience test. 
That is to say, discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the 
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex 
exclusively.” Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388; see also, e.g., Henry v. Milwaukee Cty., 539 F.3d 
573, 579–80 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing Diaz); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 
F.3d 737, 748 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (BFOQ under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act)); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 
1987). 
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be devoured by the BFOQ defense for employers commonly can 
demonstrate that blatant discrimination enhances profits by 
catering to customers’ bigoted preferences. 
Consequently, the employer objectively must show that the 
discriminatory criterion is essential to the safe and effective 
operation of the business.137  As explicated at Part III,138 in such 
cases the individual’s dignity remains intact—she is not 
humiliated, that is, treated as inherently inferior due to her race, 
gender, national origin, color, or religion.  Rather, she is denied 
employment that she has no reasonable expectation of obtaining 
because she cannot perform the required tasks.  There is nothing 
untoward in requiring that individuals be capable of 
accomplishing the jobs for which they seek employment.139 
Hence, absent extraordinary instances such as patients’ 
bodily privacy interests at medical and retirement facilities,140 to 
construe the BFOQ defense as narrowly as possible,141 customers’ 
preferences cannot constitute BFOQs.142  Otherwise, even 
137 Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 204 (“[T]he BFOQ provision 
itself . . . suggests that permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to 
perform the duties of the job.” (emphasis added)). 
138 See infra notes 246–307 and accompanying text. 
139 Correspondingly, any law forcing employers to hire incapable individuals is 
not only ridiculous but also a probable violation of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment 
due process as thoroughly irrational. 
140 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, “In 
the non-prison context, other courts have held that privacy concerns may justify a 
discriminatory employment policy.” Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 
128, 133–34 (3d Cir. 1996); see also AFSCME v. Mich. Council 25, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 
1014 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (noting that privacy rights of mental health patients can 
justify a BFOQ to provide for same-sex personal hygiene care); Backus v. Baptist 
Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (noting that the essence of 
an obstetrics nurse’s business is to provide sensitive care for a patient’s intimate and 
private concerns), vacating as moot 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir.1982); Fesel v. Masonic 
Home of Del., Inc. 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978) (retirement home 
patients), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., Chaney v. 
Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing cases involving 
medical patients’ privacy interests). 
141 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
142 E.g., Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements 
and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 257, 257–58 & n.5 (2007); see 
also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that stereotyped customer preferences do not justify sexually discriminatory 
practices); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that the airline violated Title VII by refusing to hire male flight attendants 
even though customers preferred women for the job); Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 
F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that the employer could not refuse to 
hire male massage therapists even though women customers preferred women). 
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disinclined employers would discriminate to enhance profits by 
satisfying customers’ prejudices.143  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s pivotal decision in Diaz v. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc.144 aptly explained forty-five years 
ago, “[I]t would be totally anomalous . . . to allow the preferences 
and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex 
discrimination was valid.  Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these 
very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.”145 
In sum, pursuant to Title VII’s first principle, unless 
justified by a bona fide occupational qualification, employment 
discrimination predicated on any of the five protected classes is 
illegal.  In the direct words of the Supreme Court, “The only  
 
143 See, e.g., Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913 (“It is now widely accepted that a 
company's desire to cater to the perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a 
defense under Title VII for treating employees differently based on race.”); Gerdom 
v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606–08 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Fernandez, 
653 F.2d at 1276–77. 
144 442 F.2d 385. 
145 Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389; accord Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 609; EEOC v. St. Anne’s 
Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1981). This Article has no quarrel 
with the proposition that in exacting instances, sex-specific grooming and 
appearance rules might be BFOQs if marketing sex appeal truly is the core function 
of the particular company: 
If worker freedom of dress is truly interfering with core job functions and 
the core goals of the enterprise in question, then I believe we should not 
protect employee dress. To do so might eliminate or heavily burden certain 
sectors of the market, such as the entertainment and clothing 
industries. . . . Protecting the freedom of dress might also pose safety 
problems in certain industries. 
Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 62. However, a mere preference for unisex 
uniforms or similar seeming sex-neutral rules could infringe on individuals’ 
“freedom of dress.” Id. at 62–63. Therefore, employers’ requirements that male 
employees wear short hair or that female employees groom themselves with makeup 
are legal if the given business actually meets the rigorous requisites of the BFOQ 
defense. However, to be lawful, the appearance policy cannot simply be “reasonable” 
as unequal burden theory would have it. Rather, sex or race must be the core 
function of the given enterprise, not an adjunct or enhancement. E.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d 
at 389 (finding that an airline may not hire only women as flight attendants even 
though customers prefer to be waited on by women); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 517 
F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that even though hiring only women as 
flight attendants and advertising itself as the “love airline” may have helped the 
newly incorporated airline to emerge from bankruptcy, sex was not a BFOQ for the 
job because Southwest’s primary purpose is safe, efficient, punctual air 
transportation, which indeed was that airline’s primary reputation). On this aspect 
of BFOQ, Professor McGinley’s thoughtful exegesis, supra note 142, at 267–75 
(detailed, provocative discussion of this point as it relates to casinos), is particularly 
compelling. See also, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2541. 
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plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all 
other circumstances, a person’s gender may not be considered in 
making decisions that affect her.”146 
 
 
146 E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (evidencing a 
plurality opinion accepted by lower courts as controlling law); see infra note 167 and 
accompanying text; see also, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity 
& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983); L.A. Dep’t of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09 (1978). As noted, the text of 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) accords the BFOQ defense to but three of Title VII’s five 
covered classes: sex, national origin, and religious discrimination. See supra note 
133 and accompanying text. This has led some courts and commentators to conclude 
that there can be no BFOQ for race or color discrimination. Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913; 
Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Knight v. 
Nassau Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981); 110 CONG. REC. 
2550–63 (1964) (expressly rejecting race as a BFOQ under Title VII during house 
discussion). See generally Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News 
and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 473 (2001). However, judgment informs that Title VII includes an implied 
BFOQ for race and color in the rare instances where race- or color-based 
determinations are essential to the legitimate conduct of lawful businesses. Baker v. 
City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting in dicta that 
race may be an appropriate consideration in law enforcement undercover 
operations); see also 110 CONG. REC. 7213, 7217 (1964) (memorandum of Sens. Clark 
and Case, the bipartisan floor managers of the fair employment provision of the 
proposed civil rights act) (“Although there is no exemption in Title VII for 
occupations in which race might be deemed a bona fide job qualification, a director of 
a play or movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro, could specify that 
he wished to hire someone with the physical appearance of a Negro.”). Baker’s 
dictum is not simply sensible, it is indispensable to Title VII’s design. As discussed 
in the text, the legitimacy of the BFOQ defense is not that the discrimination under 
review is simply efficient, or that it enhances profits. Rather, to be lawful, 
discrimination must be essentially indispensable to the successful completion of 
valid business goals. See supra notes 133–45 and accompanying text. For example, it 
seems clear and uncontroversial that, as opined in Baker, a police department might 
assign only a Caucasian male officer to infiltrate a violent “white supremist” 
organization reasonably believed to be planning unlawful activities. In that example, 
the very race of the undercover agent is crucial to his successful infiltration of the 
suspected unlawful group. In the foregoing critical regard, inferring a race or color 
BFOQ although Title VII’s text includes none is utterly unlike the judicially 
contrived mutability and unequal burden theories inventing an extratextual form of 
non-BFOQ yet lawful discrimination. The former addresses situations where 
individuals are not hired because they actually cannot complete the given work 
successfully. Unqualified persons suffer no legally cognizable harm because they 
have no legitimate claim to be hired. See supra notes 246–307 and accompanying 
text. The latter substitutes court-made social and legal dogma for explicit statutory 
antidiscrimination directives in situations where discrimination is not essential to 
the successful conduct of business. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 27 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 27 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_BAYER 3/29/2016  4:26 PM 
442 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:401   
While perhaps BFOQ is the most renowned, Title VII 
contains other provisions limiting its coverage.  For instance, 
“disparate impact”147 is lawful only if the offending employment 
device meets the BFOQ-like “business necessity” test.148  Like 
BFOQ, “business necessity,” is exacting.  Culling precedents, the 
Fifth Circuit explained, to be related to employment, “[T]he 
employer must demonstrate that the qualification standard is 
necessary and related to ‘the specific skills and physical 
requirements of the sought-after position.’ ”149  That court added, 
“Similarly, . . . to be ‘consistent with business necessity,’ the 
employer must show that it ‘substantially promote[s]’ the 
business’s needs.”150 
147 Title VII recognizes four overarching types of discriminatory conduct: (1) per 
se discrimination, that is, employment terms, conditions and actions that are facially 
discriminatory such as expressly refusing to hire African Americans or, yes, 
requiring that female employees wear makeup; (2) “individual disparate treatment” 
wherein through direct or circumstantial evidence plaintiffs seek to prove that a 
seemingly neutral employment decision directed at one or a small number of 
individuals actually was motivated by unlawful animus; (3) “systemic disparate 
treatment” wherein through direct or circumstantial evidence, particularly 
statistical data, plaintiffs seek to prove that the given employer’s widespread and 
broad-based seemingly neutral employment practices were motivated by unlawful 
animus; and (4) “disparate impact” wherein through statistical evidence, plaintiffs 
seek to prove that a facially neutral employment standard, test or criterion, such as 
use of a standardized intelligence test or refusing to hire persons with arrest 
records, disproportionately adversely affects members of a protected class. Unlike 
the first three causes of action, plaintiffs do not have to prove under disparate 
impact that the employer intended to discriminate against the protected class. See 
generally Bayer, supra note 4, at 795–818. 
148 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
149 Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 682 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting 
Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
150 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 511 
F.3d 974, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Very recently, the Court answered yes to the 
issue of “whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. (ICP), 135 
S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015). As part if its overall review of disparate-impact precedent 
and how that cause of action under Title VII informs its application in FHA suits, 
the ICP Court stated, “These cases also teach that disparate-impact liability must be 
limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make the practical 
business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic 
free-enterprise system.” Id. at 2518. Read in inappropriate isolation, ICP’s florid 
prose might be taken to substitute practicality, such as enhanced efficiency or 
increased profitability, for true business necessity as a defense to disparate-impact 
claims. However, shortly thereafter, the Court clarified its meaning by reaffirming 
the long-established explication of business necessity that has animated  
disparate-impact theory since its inception nearly half a century ago: 
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Congress provided limited immunity to seniority systems to 
safeguard the legitimate vested interests of innocent workers 
who likely were not responsible for discrimination that indirectly 
affected the operation of the given seniority plan.151  Specifically, 
Title VII does not permit a disparate impact claim against a bona 
fide seniority system.152  However, seniority systems purposefully 
designed or operated to effect discrimination are unlawful.153 
Furthermore, the Act only applies to employers engaged in 
interstate commerce who employ fifteen or more employees.154  
Those limitations may be understood to assure the 
constitutionality of Title VII,155 although policy motives likewise 
influenced limiting the Act’s coverage to larger employers.156 
Nothing about the above-described provisions even obliquely 
invites the judiciary to circumvent Title VII’s first principle by 
devising new exclusions.  Indeed, the inclusion of exceptions in  
 
As the Court explained in Ricci, an entity “could be liable for  
disparate-impact discrimination only if the [challenged practices] were not 
job related and consistent with business necessity.” Just as an employer 
may maintain a workplace requirement that causes a disparate impact if 
that requirement is a “reasonable measure[ment] of job performance,” so 
too must housing authorities and private developers be allowed to maintain 
a policy if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest. 
 Id. at 2522–23 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 436 (1971)). Importantly, the Court augmented its rationale by accenting that 
policy consideratons informing housing, particularly public housing projects, may 
differ markedly from the economic dynamics of employment. “To be sure, the Title 
VII framework may not transfer exactly to the fair-housing context, but the 
comparison suffices for present purposes.” Id. at 2523. In light of the ICP Court’s 
precise quoting of both Griggs and that decision’s reaffirmation in Ricci, coupled 
with the admonition that application of the defense in housing cases may differ from 
employment cases, there is no reason to suppose that within ICP, an FHA decision, 
the Court suddenly decided to dilute the stringent standards of the business 
necessity defense under Title VII.  
151 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 
152 Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1982). 
153 AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2009); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353–54 (1977). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
155 E.g., EEOC v. Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now, No. 95-30347, 1996 WL 
197411, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 1996). 
156 “Congress [among other things] did not want to burden small entities with 
the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims. . . . Congress decided to 
protect small entities with limited resources from liability . . . .” Miller v. Maxwell’s 
Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), quoted in Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 
557 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).   
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the very text of the Act demonstrates exactly what the judiciary 
frequently admonishes:  “Congress knows how to limit a court’s 
discretion . . . when it so desires.”157 
Moreover, even if the above-discussed subprovisions 
impliedly invite the judiciary to enhance Title VII, such 
augmentation must be reasonable, that is, must comport with, 
not defiantly confound, the Act’s framework and objectives.  158  In 
that regard, unequal burden theory falls outside the meaning 
and spirit of Congress’s allowance of discrimination.  By 
definition, unequal burden is not a defense, unlike BFOQ and 
business necessity, nor does it protect the vested seniority and 
similar perquisites of blameless employees, nor is it necessary to 
premise Congress’s authority under the Constitution to enact 
civil rights laws. Rather, unequal burden is a judicial policy 
legitimizing discriminatory employer and customer preferences 
that courts believe should be legal although not integral to job 
responsibilities, thus not BFOQs. 
In sum, Title VII’s precise, uncomplicated, explicit structure 
establishes its first principle:  Employment discrimination based 
on any of the forbidden categories is unlawful absent satisfying 
an express exception.  Adapting apposite Supreme Court 
language nearly a century old, contriving “lawful” but not 
textually excepted discrimination is “not a construction of a 
statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it, . . . [and] [t]o supply 
omissions transcends the judicial function.”159  Thus, the 
“unequal burden” doctrine encroaches into authority that is 
exclusively left to Congress by creating an entirely new species of  
 
 
 
 
157 Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013); see also, e.g., Elgin 
v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2134–35 (2012); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 n.8 (2010) (Title VII case). 
158 Compare, for instance, the discussion at note 146 supra explaining why Title 
VII impliedly recognizes a BFOQ for race and color discrimination even though 
Congress deliberately did not include those among the classes explicitly covered by 
the BFOQ defense. 
159 Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (interpreting a criminal 
statute); see also supra notes 107–11 for citations to similar precedent. 
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statutorily lawful discrimination.160  Under the Constitution, 
Congress alone has discretion to create such a new exception by 
amending the Act.161 
160 It is worth noting that, even assuming Congress is acutely aware of the 
judicially contrived unequal burden theory, failure to statutorily reverse such 
precedent does not evince legislative approval. “As a general matter, we are 
‘reluctant to draw inferences from Congress’ failure to act.’ ” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 632 (1993) (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 
306 (1988)). But see Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 
616, 629 n.7 (1987) (noting that Congress may have approved Supreme Court 
rulings that established when non-BFOQ, race-based voluntary affirmative action 
plans are lawful under Title VII by not statutorily overturning those cases). 
Research has disclosed no evidence that congressional inaction infers legislative 
approval of unequal burden theory. To the contrary, Congress’s response to Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–41 (1989), evinces the opposite. Hopkins 
reaffirmed Title VII’s comprehensive ban against employers’ use of non-BFOQ 
stereotypes predicated on any of the Act’s five forbidden classes. See infra notes  
165–86 and accompanying text. Indeed, as presently emphasized, Hopkins and 
analogous precedents implicitly abrogate mutability and unequal burden theory, 
although not mentioning those doctrines by name. While leaving the Court’s 
analysis of unlawful stereotyping intact, in 1991, Congress statutorily reversed an 
entirely different portion of the holding in Hopkins that discriminatory animus must 
be the “but-for” motivation of the defendant-employer’s offending conduct, not simply 
a motivating cause. See infra notes 214–45 and accompanying text discussing 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Aware of the various legal propositions in Hopkins, had 
Congress wished to reverse that opinion’s implicit rejection of unequal burden 
theory, it could have and likely would have done so, just as it overturned the 
Hopkins Court’s evidentiary standard under Title VII. Congressional silence, then, 
may well evince that the legislature endorses the utter rejection of non-BFOQ 
discriminatory stereotyping in Hopkins. Alternatively, at the very least, referencing 
its silence yields no reliable conclusions of legislative intent because we cannot know 
whether Congress’s present-day inaction is based on approving unequal burden 
theory, approving the Hopkins Court’s implicit overruling of that theory, lack of 
interest, or simple inertia. 
161 This is an appropriate juncture to mention briefly a singular prominent 
instance wherein courts properly declined to apply Title VII’s text literally. Readers 
may ask: If non-BFOQ race- and sex-based grooming codes are per se unlawful even 
when employers reasonably believe that they are beneficial for business, how can 
race- or sex-based voluntary affirmative actions plans (“AAPs”) be legal? Courts 
recognize the legality of carefully delineated, limited race- and sex-based affirmative 
action programs “designed not to demean or debase downtrodden groups, but to 
remedy the effects of discrimination.” Bayer, supra note 4, at 827. Thirty-five years 
ago, the Supreme Court famously upheld a voluntary recruitment and training AAP 
negotiated by the United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corporation to rectify persistent racial imbalances in certain workforces. 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (five-two opinion). 
Among other reasons, union and management entered into the AAP to forestall 
costly agency proceedings and litigation by voluntarily reforming certain 
employment practices that could premise nonfrivolous, although very possibly 
unsuccessful, court challenges. Thus, Kaiser and the union recognized that even if 
not technically unlawful, extant tenacious employment disparities both generated 
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the serious prospect of litigation and affronted Title VII’s general goal “to eliminate 
traditional patterns of racial segregation.” Id. at 201. On its face, the Kaiser-
Steelworkers’ AAP apparently violated per se 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) and (d), 
which prohibits racial discrimination in terms and conditions of employment, 
including training programs. Moreover, the Act neither then nor now contains an 
express provision exempting voluntary race-based affirmative action programs 
except those authorized by a competent court under § 2000e-5(g)(1) as part of 
ongoing litigation to remedy proven statutory violations. Nonetheless, Weber, 443 
U.S. at 201, noted longstanding precedent holding that sometimes challenged 
conduct may offend a statute’s “letter” but safeguard its “spirit.” In such instance, 
particularly regarding remedial, humanitarian enactments, such as civil rights 
statutes, the spirit prevails as the true index of the legislature’s intent. Accordingly:  
[T]he Court recognized two Title VII’s: a long-range enactment that 
foresees the day when employment discrimination will be eliminated, and a 
short-range statute that permits occasional and duly limited race or gender 
conscious measures to achieve restructuring of the labor market. Thus, to 
reach the day when the long-term Title VII becomes a reality, the short-
term Title VII permits limited race-conscious, voluntary affirmative action 
even absent pending litigation. The interesting irony is that the very 
measures used to help reach that day of transformation will themselves 
become unlawful when that day arrives. 
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 834–35 (discussing Weber, 443 U.S. at 201–04). In sum, 
although employers and unions understandably need not admit that pre-AAP 
employment conditions constitute actual Title VII violations, Weber coherently 
concluded that it would be absurd to require Kaiser and the Steelworkers Union to 
wait until they were sued before they could take effective measures to cure what 
appeared to be labor conditions contrary to the essence, if not the letter, of the Act. 
Under such conditions, AAPs may be lawful so long as their remedial provisions are 
duly limited in both duration and scope and do not “unnecessarily trammel” the 
interests of other employees. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The courts repeatedly have 
reaffirmed, indeed enlarged, the law and theory of Weber. E.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 
631, 641–42 (voluntary sex-based AAP instituted by a public employer); Sharkey v. 
Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 262 F. App’x 598, 603–04 (5th Cir. 2008); Schurr v. 
Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 496–97 (3d Cir. 1999). The pivotal difference 
between AAPs and the unequal burden doctrine is uncomplicated. Properly 
constrained AAPs carry out Title VII by eliminating pockets of apparent 
discrimination through voluntary compliance. By contrast, mutability and unequal 
burden theory frustrate Title VII’s letter and spirit by validating the very type of 
discrimination that the Act’s express language proscribes and that none of its 
exceptions excuses. It is as simple as that. For thoroughness, this Article notes the 
Court’s recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), holding that an 
employer violates Title VII by refusing to apply the racially disparate results of its 
own facially neutral employment test unless a “strong-basis-in-evidence” evinces 
that utilizing the test’s scores actually would result in unlawful disparate impact. Id. 
at 582–84. While its full effect has yet to be determined, arguably Ricci does not 
apply to a classic AAP, that is, when “an employer has undertaken a race- or gender-
conscious affirmative action plan designed to benefit all members of a racial or 
gender class in a forward-looking manner only.” United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 
65, 72 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(noting that Ricci does not displace the classic Weber-Johnson framework), petition 
for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 2015) (No. 15-742). Therefore, Ricci does not seem to have 
undermined Weber at its core. Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New 
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4. Three Key Directives Enforcing Title VII 
Pursuant to its explicit text, thoroughgoing structure, and 
humanitarian purpose, the Supreme Court fittingly has 
identified three systemic directives augmenting Title VII’s ban 
against discrimination:162  (1) Title VII’s definition of unlawful 
discrimination forbids employment actions based on racial, 
sexual, ethnic, and religious stereotyping; (2) Title VII’s 
proscriptions may invalidate, and indeed have invalidated, 
practices that the enacting and amending congresses might have 
considered neither problematic nor illegitimate; and (3) Title 
VII’s protections are not limited to discrimination traditionally or 
popularly considered wrongful.163  Indeed, as next explained, 
pivotal decisions establishing these directives invalidated 
discriminatory policies with which the discriminatees might have 
conformed without “unequal burden.”  Thus, although not 
mentioning such theories expressly, the Court effectively has 
overturned the mutability and unequal burden doctrines.164 
Standard for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 242 
(2011) (“Ricci, while having dealt a blow to disparate impact theory, has not 
necessarily dealt a fatal blow to affirmative action in the process.”); Charles A. 
Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate 
Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 426 (2010). But see Stephen M. Rich, Against 
Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 73 (2011) (“Ricci calls the Weber-Johnson 
rationale into question . . . .”). 
162 Although strongly hinted in earlier decisions, the Court elucidated and 
enriched these directives in rulings postdating this author’s 1987 Mutable 
Characteristics article, cited supra note 4. It is gratifying to have the opportunity to 
update that work, this author’s debut law review article, in recognition of Title VII’s 
golden anniversary. 
163 In these important regards, one might conclude that Congress intended Title 
VII to lead rather than lag common social sentiments regarding what is or is not 
acceptable race and sex discrimination. Within the realm of dignity and fairness in 
society, such is the authority and, one might go so far as say, the duty of the national 
legislature empowered to shape conduct if not attitudes. This, of course, is in stark 
contrast to things over which law has little, sometimes no, actual or legitimate 
control. For instance, a popular legal maxim–perhaps more a cliché–holds, “Law lags 
science; it does not lead it.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 
1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 
(11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
164 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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a. Title VII Prohibits Discrimination Based on Stereotyping 
Turning to the first directive, discriminatory stereotyping, 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins165 expounded expansively upon the 
Court’s earlier judgment: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”166 
The Court’s breadth of language evinces appropriate fervor for 
Congress’s intended coverage of the Act,167 particularly so when 
165 490 U.S. 228 (plurality opinion with concurring and dissenting opinions). 
166 Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
167 Lower courts appropriately have accepted as controlling Title VII law the 
Hopkins plurality’s explication of unlawful stereotyping. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. 
Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 479 (5th Cir. 2013) (Jones, C.J., dissenting); Vickers v. 
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006); Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Dawson v. Bumble & 
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005). Indeed, that explication arguably 
represents the unanimous sentiment of the Hopkins Court. Concurring in the 
judgment, Justices White and O’Connor explained their particular positions 
regarding a separate and distinct procedural issue: whether plaintiffs’ evidence of 
“direct discrimination”—noncircumstantial proof that agents of the defendant 
considered sex when rendering their employment decisions—shifted the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258–61 (White, J., concurring in 
the judgment); id. at 261–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Both 
Justices agreed, however, that Ms. Hopkins should prevail and expressed no 
criticism of the plurality’s interpretation that sexual stereotyping poisons the 
workforce environment and taints a given employment decision in violation of Title 
VII. In fact, Justice O’Connor expressly stated that Ann Hopkins had made a 
sufficient case of discriminatory animus based on sexual stereotyping to shift the 
burden of proof to defendant Price Waterhouse. Id. at 272–74. Therefore, at the very 
least, Justices White and O’Connor impliedly joined the plurality’s analysis of 
unlawful stereotyping for, having taken the effort to write separately on other 
matters, surely they would not have relinquished the opportunity to dissent had 
they disagreed on such a profound and manifestly far-reaching understanding of 
Title VII. Similarly, although vigorously dissenting regarding the issue of causation 
and burden shifting, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia 
embraced the substantive rule that evidence of unlawful stereotyping can 
demonstrate a claim of unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 279–95 
(Kennedy, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting). “Evidence of use by 
decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the question of 
discriminatory intent. The ultimate question, however, is whether discrimination 
caused the plaintiff's harm.” Id. at 294. The dissenters explicated, “In this case, 
Hopkins plainly presented a strong case both of her own professional qualifications 
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considered in combination with the Hopkins Court’s 
accompanying unambiguous edict that § 2000e-2(a)’s 
“words . . . mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment 
decisions.”168  In that light, it is worth recalling that even a 
scientifically or empirically true race or gender stereotype cannot 
support an employer’s decision to treat each covered individual 
as though he or she shared the given group’s stereotypical 
characteristic.169  Therefore, the Court’s definition and 
understanding of unlawful stereotyping seems to be as broad as 
that term allows:  Absent BFOQ, if considerations of sex played 
any part in the employer’s actions, the plaintiff states an 
actionable claim.170 
True, some thoughtful critics view stereotypes as empty 
vessels used by advocates to sort and to stow distinctions they 
consider appropriate from distinctions they perceive as wrongful, 
thus stereotyping.171  Especially in the realm of civil rights, one 
and of the presence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse’s partnership process. 
Had the District Court found on this record that sex discrimination caused the 
adverse decision, [we] doubt it would have been reversible error.” Id. at 294–95 
(Kennedy, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240; see also, e.g., Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 
592 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240–41). Presumably, Hopkins 
mentioned only “gender” because Plaintiff-Respondent Ann Hopkin’s Title VII claim 
sounded in sex discrimination. Certainly, one could augment the Court’s statement 
to read, the Act’s “words . . . mean that [discrimination based on any of the five 
proscribed classes] must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” Miller, 47 F.3d at 
592. 
169 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708; Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity 
& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 (1983) (opinion of Marshall, 
J., with Brennan, White, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ.) (per curiam); see supra notes 
97–104 and accompanying text discussing pension benefits. Consistent with earlier 
discussion in this Article, see supra notes 121–31 and accompanying text, the Court 
accented that because “Title VII’s ‘focus on the individual is unambiguous,’ ” 
employers cannot offer employees sexually disparate retirement annuity plans. 
Norris, 463 U.S. at 1080 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708). 
170 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 239–51. The Court unambiguously ruled: 
Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take 
gender into account in making an employment decision, namely, when 
gender is a “bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business or 
enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e). The only plausible inference to draw 
from this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a person’s gender may 
not be considered in making decisions that affect her. 
Id. at 242 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
171 It surely is germane to note Professor Bernstein’s lament that professionals 
and laypersons alike tend to use the term “stereotype” frequently but somewhat 
offhandedly. See Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong With Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 
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could conclude that stereotype is simply a synonym for 
discrimination because both concern treating individuals or a 
group pursuant to some generalized notion, accurate or 
inaccurate, about the particular group.172  Nonetheless, judicial 
655, 658 (2013) (quoting 16 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 651 (2d ed. 1989)). In 
particular, legal application tends to imbue stereotyping with negative connotations. 
However, as Professor Bernstein explained: 
[T]hese definitions of stereotypes are agnostic on the question of whether 
the associations asserted or implied are true or false or somewhere in 
between. 
 . . . [Certainly,] not all stereotypes are wrong in the sense of doing harm 
that is severe enough to warrant sanction from the law, a costly response. 
Some stereotypes might be false or unreliable but do not offend the groups 
of people they reference. Some might offend but have the virtue of being 
reliable, or true enough. 
 . . . [Still,] many—probably most—messages in stereotypes are reductive 
and demeaning[, commonly inspiring significant, extensive, and numerous 
kinds of devastating harms to individuals, groups, and communities]. 
Id. at 659 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Professor Render believes that emphasis on 
stereotyping is distracting because “stereotype” is an heuristic—“empty”—construct; 
that is, too often commentators label beliefs or practices as “stereotypes” and, having 
done so, conclude tautologically that the particular beliefs or practices must be 
unfair: 
This is because the idea of a stereotype carries with it a connotation of 
unfairness or injustice, but it does not delimit or offer specific guidance 
about the type of unfairness that transforms a garden-variety nonuniversal 
generalization into a stereotype. Thus, to determine whether a 
generalization is a stereotype, an analyst or adjudicator must first be 
committed to a principle of justice by which the “fairness” of the application 
of the generalization can be measured. 
Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 144 (2010) 
(footnote omitted). In that way, such commentators deliberately or negligently avoid 
critical analysis while essentially daring readers to disagree with their unproven but 
intimidating application of the damning label. See id. at 134–40. In light of 
Professors Bernstein’s and Render’s astute concerns, although the use of the term 
“stereotype” remains familiar, even comfortable, this Article proposes a moral 
framework, see infra notes 246–307 and accompanying text, for Professor Render 
rightly insists that such is needed to prove any assertion that a given stereotype 
indeed is untoward. 
172 Of course, while conceptually connected, stereotyping and discrimination 
surely need not become indistinguishable. Stereotyping could be defined 
dispassionately as the act of describing groups according to rightly or wrongly 
perceived shared characteristics. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 171, at 657–59 
(defining “stereotype”). Discriminating, by contrast, is actually imposing terms and 
conditions differentiating persons or things based on stereotypical characteristics. 
Cf. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 306–07 (Kennedy, J., with two Justices dissenting) (noting 
that sexual stereotyping is not necessarily discrimination under Title VII). 
Therefore, one can stereotype without discriminating although the obverse might be 
impossible. Nonetheless, one of Professor Render’s overarching excellent projects is 
alleviating any confusion that legal stereotyping analysis unintentionally imposes to 
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emphasis on stereotyping seems notably useful at least 
pragmatically.  Hopkins reaffirms that civil rights theory views 
uncritical stereotyping as hugely problematic.173  Thus, even if 
not synonymous, perhaps more than discrimination itself, the 
idea of stereotyping evokes with singular intensity impressions 
depicting why discrimination typically is unreasonable.174  
Understanding stereotyping prompts the concurrent 
understanding that discrimination tends to be the injurious and 
unjust supposition that a given individual possesses attributes 
accurately or otherwise rendered to particular classes.  The 
concept of stereotypes, then, helpfully reminds us that (1) any 
given stereotype may be mistaken thus  
reliance—discrimination—thereon is arbitrary and (2) even if 
accurate, not all individuals necessarily share the stereotypical 
characteristic, thus, reliance on the stereotype in the context of 
individual rights portends arbitrariness. 
The foregoing prelude leads to a particularly important 
point:  The Hopkins Court did not moderate its comprehensive 
condemnation of sexual stereotyping as a proxy for individual 
merit even though the discrimination Ann Hopkins endured 
concerned predominately grooming and appearance 
characteristics that she could control at will.175  The theory of 
unlawful sterotyping in Hopkins, then, evinces a scrupulous 
commitment to enforce fully Title VII’s broad proscriptions, 
including, contrary to unequal burden theory, abrogating non-
BFOQ gender-based conceptions of beauty and comportment.176 
discern what should be considered unlawful sex discrimination vel non. See 
generally Render, supra note 171. 
173 See also, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 171, at 659. 
174 E.g., Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing 
the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law 
and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 67 n.173 (1995) (discussing how the term “lipstick 
lesbian” arouses certain images); Chris Watkins, Comment, Beyond Status: The 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled 
Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1456–57 
(1995) (discussing how descriptive labels about individuals and groups induce 
stereotypical impressions); Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the 
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1229 n.153 (1974) (“Like race and alienage, 
mental illness evokes a stereotype which carries a stigma of inferiority . . . .”). 
175 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235. 
176 Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity 
Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657, 672 (2010); 
Allison T. Steinle, Comment, Appearance and Grooming Standards as Sex 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 261, 287–95 (2006) 
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Specifically, Ms. Hopkins, an accountant with the then-
thriving Price Waterhouse firm, alleged she was denied 
promotion to partnership due to both conscious and unwitting 
discriminatory attitudes of voting partners.177  Throughout the 
promotion process, several partners, including some of Ms. 
Hopkins’s supporters, described her appearance and demeanor in 
uncomplimentary, gender-explicit terms evincing the sex-based 
stereotype that women should act in a demure, ladylike manner: 
Supervisors described her as “macho,” “somewhat masculine,” 
“a lady using foul language” who “overcompensated for being a 
woman,” as well as someone in need of “a course at charm 
school.”  One evaluator suggested that Hopkins could improve 
her partnership chances if she would “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”178 
Paradoxically, many of the pejoratives leveled against Ms. 
Hopkins, such as purportedly being overaggressive, would have 
been compliments if directed to male accountants, thus evincing 
further the sexually stereotypical nature of Price Waterhouse’s 
decision not to promote her.179   
(contrasting and analyzing, in depth, the facts of Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 and 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). 
177 Among its many significant rulings, Hopkins explained that officers, 
managers, and other business decision makers may be unconsciously prejudiced, 
that is, unaware that they are acting out sexual biases. Unconscious though it may 
be, such bias can taint the decision making of corporate agents as readily as willful 
discriminatory action. Indeed, because actors are unaware of, and therefore cannot 
recognize and purge, their prejudice, unwitting discrimination can be more insidious 
than deliberate bias. Rightly then, obliviousness is neither an excuse nor a 
justification for acts stemming from actors’ discriminatory attitudes. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. at 251, 255–56. 
178 See Bernstein supra note 171, at 682 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hopkins, 
490 U.S. at 235). 
179 Indeed, the Court recognized, “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in 
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and 
impermissible Catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if 
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251; see 
also, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–12; Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 
5436, at *10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). Similarly, Professor Yuracko noted what has 
been termed the “double-bind” effect: 
Hopkins was required to be feminine, while the successful performance of 
her job required her to adopt more traditionally masculine traits and 
behaviors. As the Court explained, given the demands placed on her, 
Hopkins would be out of a job if she behaved aggressively, and out of a job 
if she did not. 
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Significantly, virtually all of the sex-based condemnations 
against Ann Hopkins involved mutable characteristics adaptable 
without unequal burden.180  Ms. Hopkins could have taken “a 
course at charm school,” dressed and walked as her critics 
preferred, adjusted her attire, wore some jewelry, and adopted a 
less aggressive, more demure, ladylike attitude.181  Aside from 
charm school, assuaging the partners’ predilections would have 
engendered costs in time and money comparable to getting 
haircuts roughly every month, buying and applying makeup, and 
other activities required to satisfy lawful gender-distinct 
grooming rules.182 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 762 (2013). Importantly for the thesis of this Article, 
stressing Title VII’s “first principle” that all discrimination based on the five 
forbidden classes is unlawful unless justified by a BFOQ, both the Hopkins opinion 
itself, 490 U.S. at 242, 252, and subsequent Supreme Court precedent, confirm that 
even if Ms. Hopkins had not been caught in the “double-bind,” the discrimination she 
suffered is unlawful. Thus, plaintiffs need not prove that they have been subject to 
the “double-bind” or “Catch-22” to state an actionable claim based on unlawful 
stereotyping; although certainly the “double-bind” is an aggravating factor 
emphasizing the illegality of particular sexual stereotyping. See infra notes 183–86 
and accompanying text. 
180 See Jones, supra note 176 (“[T]he Court placed reduced reliance upon 
immutability, a quality the Court has used often to justify protection for certain 
classifications, including gender. Although the attributes for which Ann Hopkins 
was penalized were arguably mutable, the Court nonetheless recognized sex 
stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination.”); McCarthy, supra note 77, at 962–63 
(discussing the implied mutability analysis in Jespersen); Steinle, supra note 176, at 
277–83. 
181 This list of Price Waterhouse partners’ criticisms of Ms. Hopkins is found at 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 256. 
182 Some commentators compellingly dispute from an empirical  
perspective—physical and psychological—the very idea of an “unequal burden,” 
arguing that persons in Ms. Hopkins’s predicament cannot comport either easily or 
readily with their superiors’ race- and sex-based criticisms. For instance, Professor 
Yoshino insightfully explained: 
This comment reveals that while being too masculine is not valued, being 
too feminine is not valued either. To succeed as a woman, one must have 
the correctly titrated balance of masculine and feminine traits. One must 
be “authoritative” and “formidable,” but remain an “appealing lady.” . . . If 
a woman covers too much, then the reverse covering demand will be made 
to bring her back into the zone of appropriate behavior. 
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 910 (2002). Professor Yoshino’s 
conclusions not only make eminent good sense, but they also underscore that 
conforming with the types of grooming rules the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen and 
virtually every other circuit deem reasonable may be much more demanding and 
intrusive than judges realize. Yes, cutting one’s hair and applying makeup may 
seem to be, and perhaps are not, difficult endeavors. But when, as in Hopkins and 
Jespersen, discrete sex-based grooming requirements are both numerous and part of 
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Given the verve of the Court’s denunciation of sex 
discrimination by way of sex stereotyping in Hopkins, the Court 
surely would not alter its stance on the contention that Ms. 
Hopkins could have kowtowed with ease.183  Under the Hopkins 
Court’s statutory analysis, any non-BFOQ sex-based grooming 
code violates Title VII’s first principle that “gender must be 
irrelevant to employment decisions.”184  Indeed, it is worth 
recalling that after reviewing § 2000e-2 in its entirety, the Court 
ruled, “The only plausible inference to draw from [§ 2000e-2(e)(1), 
the BFOQ] provision is that, in all other circumstances, a 
person’s gender may not be considered in making decisions that 
affect her.”185  The term “in all other circumstances” manifestly 
instructs that courts may not concoct extratextual forms of legal 
employment discrimination, of which “unequal burden” certainly 
is one.186 
a larger, complex schema of appearance standards, successful fulfillment of these 
tasks may be elusive. E.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., with Graber 
and Fletcher, JJ., dissenting). This is particularly true where, as Professor Yoshino 
accents, grooming and appearance rules—express or implied—are so integrally 
linked to employers’ stereotypical conceptions of gender comportment that to retain 
employment, or to earn promotions, raises, transfers, and similar advantages, 
females must maneuver the precarious path of being neither too male nor 
excessively female. The foregoing, of course, does not consider the burden grooming 
and appearance discrimination inflicts on employees’ psyches—a burden that, 
contrary to the dismissive attitudes of the courts, is substantial. See infra notes  
286–307 and accompanying text. If Professor Yoshino is correct, as likely he is, then 
grooming rules such as those in Jespersen should be considered unequal burdens per 
se and, thus, unlawful under Title VII. But, even if compliance with the employment 
standards discussed in Hopkins and Jespersen would not be difficult, this Article 
pursues its contention that the Supreme Court implicitly and appropriately has 
invalidated unequal burden theory. 
183 See Steinle, supra note 176, at 293–95. As the Court accented, “By focusing 
on Hopkins’ specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the possible 
ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment 
decision . . . .” Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251–52. Possibly, had Ms. Hopkins assuaged her 
critics, she would have been promoted to partnership. Of course, she would have had 
a valid Title VII claim if she were trapped in the “double-bind,” that is, losing her 
promotion because she was considered too meek and submissive to be an effective 
partner after having altered her comportment to conform with some Price 
Waterhouse partners’ stereotypical perceptions of femininity. See supra note 179 
and accompanying text. 
184 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240, quoted in Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 592 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
185 Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
186 E.g., Patrick S. Shin, Vive La Différence? A Critical Analysis of the 
Justification of Sex-Dependent Workplace Restrictions on Dress and Grooming, 14 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 491, 493 (2007) (symposium issue on grooming and Title 
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Although among the most significant, the Court’s analysis of 
discriminatory stereotyping in Hopkins is not the first instance of 
Supreme Court implicit disapproval of unequal burden theory.187  
The analogous context of sexual harassment, of which there are 
two kinds,188 certainly springs to mind.  First, “quid pro quo” 
harassment in which employers demand sexual favors as 
preconditions either to receive employment benefits or to avoid 
employment detriments is per se unlawful.189  Moreover, the 
courts have repeatedly held that “hostile work environment” 
harassment is illegal if “the work environment was so pervaded 
by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment 
were altered.”190  The employer is liable for unlawful quid pro quo 
VII). At least two circuits properly understand Hopkins in that regard. Albeit in 
dictum, the Sixth Circuit stated as a clear and obvious legal fact, “[a]fter Price 
Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, 
they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.” Smith v. City of Salem, 378 
F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit agreed, finding that the plaintiff 
stated an actionable sex discrimination claim that her employer, a motel, dismissed 
her because she appeared too mannish and lacked the “Midwestern girl look.” Lewis 
v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (8th Cir. 2010); see also 
Finnie v. Lee Cnty., Miss., 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 775 (N.D. Miss. 2012) (quoting and 
distinguishing Smith, 378 F.3d at 574, the court held that the county’s policy 
requiring all detention officers to wear identical uniforms, including pants, was 
gender-neutral, reasonably implemented to assure uniformity among officers, and 
was not a pretext for discrimination). Thus, perhaps Professor Yuracko is not wholly 
correct in her lament that “the broad language used . . . by the Supreme Court in 
Price Waterhouse, is more accurately viewed as judicial rhetoric than legal reality.” 
See Yuracko, supra note 179, at 779 n.90. 
187 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
188 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004) (citing Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). 
189 E.g., Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., 533 F. App’x 624, 628 (6th 
Cir. 2013); Rader v. Napolitano, 552 F. App’x 617, 617 (9th Cir. 2013). A typical 
instance is, “Have sex with me and I will give you a raise; but if you refuse, I will fire 
you.” By definition, quid pro quo harassment explicitly fulfills Title VII’s definition 
of discrimination because the employee understands that submitting to her 
employer’s sexual demands is necessary either to attain or to maintain a job, a raise, 
a promotion, or similar “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
190 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013); see also, e.g., Harris 
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (determining that hostile environment 
harassment is unlawful if it is so severe, pervasive, or both, that enduring 
harassment becomes a term or condition of the victim’s employment). Specifically, 
an employer is “strictly liable” if harassment emanates from the victim’s 
“supervisors”—those who are authorized to “take tangible employment actions 
against the victim”—and the harassment results in a “tangible” employment action, 
that is some decision, usually adverse, affecting the victim’s compensation, 
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or hostile environment harassment because Title VII secures for 
employees a work environment free from the psychological, 
economic, social, and employment-related damage harassment 
inflicts.191  Accordingly, Title VII prohibits harassment because of 
Title VII’s first principle: workers’ intrinsic right to “workplace 
equality.”192 
promotions, work assignments, or similar employment terms and conditions. See 
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439, 2443. If the supervisor’s harassment does not affect a 
“tangible” term of employment or if the hostile environment is caused by the victim’s 
nonsupervisory co-workers, the employer may nonetheless be liable if it knew of but 
negligently failed to take appropriate steps to stop the harassment or if the employer 
was unaware of the harassment because properly notifying the employer likely 
would have been a futile or possibly detrimental act on the victim’s part. Id. at 2439. 
191 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, quoted in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). As the Harris Court explained: 
A discriminatorily abusive work environment . . . can and often will detract 
from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on 
the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even 
without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the 
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work 
environment abusive to employees because of their . . . gender . . . offends 
Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality. 
Id. at 22, quoted in Suders, 542 U.S. at 133–34. 
192 As the Suders Court stated, “[T]he very fact that the discriminatory conduct 
was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees 
because of their . . . gender . . . offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.” 
Suders, 542 U.S. at 133–34 (alterations in original) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 22). 
Accordingly, an employer may engage in discriminatory harassment that is 
insufficiently “severe or pervasive” to create an unlawfully “abusive” work milieu. 
Importantly, Suders and similar decisions do not tacitly support unequal burden 
theory by implying that the courts may contrive non-BFOQ yet lawful 
discrimination in situations where Title VII’s coverage lawfully is invoked. This 
distinction, explicated below, is a bit tricky but fundamental. Absent quid pro quo 
harassment, plaintiffs must find another link to § 2000e-2(a)(1)’s explicit text to 
prove that the particular non-quid pro quo harassment is unlawful. See supra note 
189 and accompanying text. In this regard, the theory of “hostile environment 
harassment” holds that although an employee is neither explicitly promised an 
employment benefit nor is directly threatened with an employment detriment, the 
employer violates the Act if that employee is subjected to discriminatory harassing 
treatment such as insults, ridicule, or taunting “so objectively offensive as to alter 
the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. This makes 
sense because even if non-quid pro quo harassment is predicated on a forbidden 
criterion such as sex, unless it is either severe or pervasive enough to comprise an 
actual § 2000e-2(a)(1) “term” or “condition” of employment, the harassment does not 
meet those textual requisites under Title VII. E.g., Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Redd v. 
N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). To prove hostile 
environment harassment, courts require severity or pervasiveness as a matter of 
statutory compliance, that is, to satisfy Title VII’s express text, not as a matter of 
policy that less serious harassment is lawful because it is “reasonable” to humiliate 
and demean employees so long as the torment is not excessive. Therefore, courts and 
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Crucially, but not surprisingly, courts do not excuse the 
employer if the victim could have prevented the harassment by 
changing her behavior.193  The victim is not required to prove 
that the harassment would have continued even if, for instance, 
she wore less attractive clothes, applied less makeup, or 
otherwise attempted to make herself unappealing to her 
harasser.194  Because the victim is innocent, it would be perverse 
if to prevail, the victim first had to change her lawful behavior, 
comportment, or appearance and thereafter prove that, 
nonetheless, the harassment continued.  Yet, unequal burden 
theory implicitly mandates such proof if the inducement to 
harass stems in whole or part from the victim’s mutable 
characteristics such as dress, makeup, hair style, and other 
aspects of demeanor.195 
commentators cannot use hostile environment harassment as an example to show that 
Title VII permits courts to contrive lawful substantive, non-BFOQ discrimination. 
There is yet another reason why the doctrine of hostile environment harassment 
provides no analogy supporting unequal burden theory. Pursuant to the applicable 
legal definitions, grooming rules reviewed under unequal burden theory are not 
comparable to hostile environment harassment at all because the affected employee 
or employment applicant does not seek to prove that the totality of discrete events 
demonstrates an unwritten but manifest discriminatory term or condition of 
employment. Rather, as male-only hair-length and female-only makeup rules 
exemplify, there is no debate that the particular grooming or appearance 
requirement is a “term of employment”—an explicit requisite—to obtain or to retain 
a job. Rather, unequal burden really is analogous to quid pro quo harassment, where 
employers require employees to accept explicitly discriminatory terms or conditions. 
Like the classic harassment scenario, “Have sex with me if you want a raise, 
otherwise I will fire you,” compliance with facially discriminatory grooming and 
appearance policies is a quid pro quo either to secure an employment benefit, such 
as keeping one’s job, or to avoid an employment penalty, such as losing one’s job. 
Thus, both quid pro quo harassment and unequal burden situations are per se 
discriminatory. The author’s colleague Proffesor Angela Morrison greatly assisted in 
the understanding of this significant point. 
193 See supra notes 175–86 and accompanying text. 
194 Similarly, distressed victims often try to stop or at least lessen the 
harassment’s impact through coping tactics, such as seeking counseling or acting the 
“good sport” by taking part in the taunting. That the victim could have but did not 
get psychological therapy and that she occasionally joined voluntarily in the 
“horseplay”—arguably mutable behaviors—do not per se refute that she was 
harassed, as courts correctly understand. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir. 2001). 
195 It is no answer, of course, to claim that harassment is different because a 
victim should not be made to suffer the indignity of harassment even when the 
harasser is motivated by the victim’s mutable characteristics. The foregoing moral 
and legal truth must counsel as well that the same work-qualified victim should not 
suffer the indignity of losing or being denied employment due to her refusal to 
change her mutable characteristics to conform with her employer’s non-BFOQ sex-
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.196 offers an 
exceptional, compelling example.  Joseph Oncale, an oil worker 
on an eight-person all-male work crew, was harassed because he 
acted in a manner his coworkers considered “homosexual.”197  In 
a remarkably brief opinion authored by the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia, the Court unanimously agreed: 
We see no justification in the statutory language or our 
precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex 
harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. . . . Title VII 
prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the “terms” 
or “conditions” of employment.  Our holding that this includes 
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any 
kind that meets the statutory requirements.198 
As in Hopkins and earlier harassment cases, the Court 
apparently was unconcerned that Mr. Oncale perhaps could have 
easily modified his mannerisms, speech phrasings, and other 
behaviors evincing an unmanly or homosexual demeanor in the 
minds of his coworkers.199  Indeed, possibly such adjustments 
would have ended his mistreatment; but the Court neither 
expressly nor impliedly required Mr. Oncale to prove that he was 
caught in the “double-bind.”200  Of course, the Court foisted no 
based standards. This Article can discern no apparent substantive difference 
between harassing a woman for refusing to wear makeup and firing her for so 
refusing. In fact, one might easily believe that such firing is the deepest form of 
harassment. As discussed supra, the Hopkins Court apparently would agree. See 
supra notes 175–86 and accompanying text. 
196 523 U.S. 75. 
197 Id. at 77. 
198 Id. at 79–80 (alteration in original). 
199 See generally Oncale, 523 U.S. 75. 
200 In this very significant regard, Oncale and similar harassment cases 
demonstrate that Hopkins cannot be limited to instances involving “double-bind” or, 
as the Supreme Court said, a “Catch 22.” See generally Oncale, 523 U.S. 75. See also 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). As earlier discussed, 
considering Ann Hopkins to be an unsuitably mannish female, her employer, 
accounting firm Price Waterhouse, denied her promotion to partnership; but had Ms. 
Hopkins adopted the female behaviors favored by Price Waterhouse, she likely 
would have been considered too weak to be a partner. Thus, no matter what attitude 
Ann Hopkins struck, due to her employer’s sexual bias, she could not attain 
partnership. See supra notes 165–79 and accompanying text. Although noting Ms. 
Hopkins’s distressing dilemma, the Court’s broad and emphatic rationale evinces 
that Hopkins applies to any non-BFOQ use of discriminatory stereotypes, not simply 
when employees are subjected to the “double-bind.” See supra notes 179–86 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, given the vital importance of the point, it is useful to 
reiterate that Hopkins specifically and tellingly instructed, “By focusing on [Ann] 
Hopkins’ specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways 
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such requirement because discriminatees are not required to 
surrender to the demands of their discriminators.201  Thus, 
of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment 
decision . . . .” 490 U.S. at 251–52. Correspondingly, as stressed earlier, after 
reviewing 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2, the Court ruled, “The only plausible inference to draw 
from [§ 2000e-2(e)(1), the BFOQ] provision is that, in all other circumstances, a 
person’s gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her.” Id. at 
242 (emphasis added). In light of the above, it is distressing that in Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co., the en banc Ninth Circuit erroneously implied that Hopkins 
is limited to “Catch-22” situations where, “the very traits that [Ms. Hopkins] was 
asked to hide were the same traits considered praiseworthy in men.” 444 F.3d 1104, 
1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). But, as shown, the Supreme Court unequivocally 
reaffirmed Title VII’s blanket ban against any sex discrimination absent a proven 
BFOQ. See supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text; accord Jespersen, 444 F.3d 
at 1114 & n.2 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Oncale precludes any lurking doubts to 
that effect. As in many harassment scenarios, had Mr. Oncale adjusted his behavior 
to assuage his harassers, the harassment might well have stopped or, at least, 
diminished considerably. In other words, to forestall further harassment Joseph 
Oncale could have changed his behavior without losing either his job or attendant 
benefits such as raises and promotions. Nonetheless, his Title VII claim remained 
viable although he was not trapped in the Catch 22 or double-bind. Inexplicably, the 
Jespersen majority did not discuss Oncale, which is disappointing yet hardly 
surprising given that the unanimous Oncale Court’s holding and rationale did not 
depend on Mr. Oncale being caught in the double bind. Identically and oddly, neither 
of the two Jespersen dissents noted Oncale, a decision that would have bolstered 
substantially the dissenters’ otherwise sound rejection of the majority’s holding and 
rationale. 
201 Proponents of unequal burden theory can find no solace in Oncale’s 
admonition: 
In same-sex . . . harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful 
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and 
is experienced by its target. A professional football player’s working 
environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the 
coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the 
same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s 
secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of 
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured 
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. 
Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable 
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing 
among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive. 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82. Plainly, the Court limited its invocation of “context” to 
the unique proof essential to hostile environment lawsuits, specifically whether the 
victim demonstrates that the irksome behavior has crossed the somewhat elusive 
line from irritating but acceptable hazing to illegal discrimination. As explained 
supra at notes 189–95 and accompanying text, that requirement is necessitated by 
Title VII’s language because for a claim to be cognizable, the hostile environment 
must have become effectively a “term” or “condition” of the victim’s employment, 
otherwise it does not satisfy the textual requisites of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
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Oncale, especially understood with Hopkins, confirms that 
employers may predicate employment terms and conditions on 
discriminatory stereotypes only if doing so is a BFOQ.  This Title 
VII standard apparently applies to all stereotyping, such as 
whether real men wear short hair or whether genuine women 
such as Ms. Hopkins and Ms. Jespersen wear makeup. 
b. Title VII’s Protection Is Not Limited to Discriminatory Conduct 
That the Enacting Congress Believed To Be Wrongful 
The pivotal Oncale decision nicely segues into the Supreme 
Court’s second Title VII directive.  The Justices neither denied 
nor limited Mr. Oncale’s recovery based on the arguably unusual 
nature of his statutory claim: male-on-male harassment in a 
unisex workforce.202  Indeed, the Court accented that while the 
enacting Congress apparently never considered, and possibly 
would have been unconcerned with, prejudice against 
purportedly womanly men, “statutory prohibitions often go 
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”203  
That a remedial statute ultimately might condemn practices the 
enacting legislators found acceptable, even appropriate, is a  
well-established and honorable tenet of statutory construction.204 
(2012). But the subjects of unequal burden theory, such as grooming codes, are per 
se “terms” of employment and, thus, are comparable not to hostile environment 
harassment but to quid pro quo harassment. See supra note 192. 
202 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80. 
203 Id. at 79. Oncale’s sound rationale that the impact of statutory texts often 
transcend the original concerns of the enactors is not an odd occurrence but rather 
has been emphasized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. E.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167–68 (2004); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 
U.S. 229, 248 (1989). Indeed, Oncale’s jurisprudence is embraced by Justices who 
otherwise often disagree regarding legal philosophy and statutory analysis. E.g., 
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 719 (2008); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243, 288 (2006). 
204 For instance, citing numerous precedents particularly Oncale, the prevailing 
trend is that while homosexuality and transgenderism are not per se protected 
classes, discrimination against transgender persons due to their  
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 
F.3d 1312, 1316–19 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2011); Kasti v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
325 F. App’x 492, 493–94 (9th Cir. 2009); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 
1215, 1222–24 (10th Cir. 2007) (discrimination based on a person’s status as 
transsexual is not cognizable under Title VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 
214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198–203 
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(9th Cir. 2000) (addressing a claim under both Title VII and the Gender Motivated 
Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)). See generally Jason Lee, Note, Lost in 
Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination 
Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 423 (2012); Ilona M. Turner, Comment, 
Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561 
(2007). Significantly from the administrative perspective, as recently noted by the 
Second Circuit, the EEOC likewise has changed its original legal position in light of 
Oncale and similar modern precedent: 
[T]he EEOC had developed a consistent body of decisions that did not 
recognize Title VII claims based on the complainant's transgender status. 
See, e.g., Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. 01942053, 1994 WL 
744529, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 27, 1994) (concluding that an “appellant's 
allegation of discrimination based on her acquired sex (transsexualism) is 
not a basis protected under Title VII”); Campbell v. Dep't of Agriculture, 
No. 01931730, 1994 WL 652840, at *1 n.3 (E.E.O.C. July 21, 1994) 
(recognizing precedent holding that “gender dysphoria or transsexualism is 
not protected under Title VII under the aegis of sex discrimination”); 
Casoni v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 01840104, 1984 WL 485399, at *3 
(E.E.O.C. Sept. 28, 1984) (“[A]ppellant's allegation of sex discrimination on 
account of being a male to female preoperative transsexual . . . [is] not 
cognizable . . . under the provisions of Title VII.”). It was not until Macy v. 
Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 
2012), . . . that the EEOC altered its position and concluded that 
discrimination against transgender individuals based on their transgender 
status does constitute sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII.  
Id. at *11 & n.16 (alterations in original); see also Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 
40, 790 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 Addressing a different legal matter, the en banc Eleventh Circuit wrote: 
Given prevailing attitudes at the time [42. U.S.C.] § 1985(3) [conspiracy to 
deprive one or a class of persons of “the equal protection of the laws, or of 
equal privileges and immunities under the laws”] was enacted, it is 
certainly possible, if not probable, that many legislators who voted for the 
statute were not concerned about affording legal protection to women as a 
class. Nonetheless, we follow the plain meaning of the statute, because 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.” 
Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). Similarly, the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently noted: 
[W]hile the specificity of section 628’s [Communications Act of 1934, 
§ 628(b), 47 U.S.C. § 548(b)] references to satellite cable and satellite 
broadcast programming may reveal the primary evil that Congress had in 
mind, nothing in the statute unambiguously limits the Commission to 
regulating anticompetitive practices in the delivery of those kinds of 
programming by methods addressed to that narrow concern alone. 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). 
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We often analogize those who drafted our basic, or earliest, 
or most important laws as parents.205  Like good parents, these 
lawmakers expected, or should have expected, that subsequent 
generations—their progenies—would build on their knowledge, 
learn greater lessons, and see more clearly, deeply, and broadly 
than the original legislators themselves were either capable or 
willing.  These subsequent generations may discern rightfully 
fresh applications of earlier enactments—enlargements duly 
comporting with the letter and dominant spirit of the original 
law—in ways that the original enactors might not have 
appreciated, or would even have resisted.206  Courts enforcing 
non-BFOQ, discriminatory grooming codes as “reasonable” 
employment bigotry reject the actuality that law, particularly 
civil rights, may, indeed should, mature. 
205 E.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(referring to “the Founding Fathers” who drafted the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 376 (4th Cir. 2003) (same). 
206 A compelling instance is Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 
176–77 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§§ 101(2), 1981(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071–72. Thirteen years earlier, the Court held in 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1976), that a provision of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, banning racial discrimination in contracts, regulates 
private as well as governmental contracts. Patterson determined that even if the 
Court had misapprehended the actual intent of the 1866 Congress, Runyon ought 
not be reversed because, among other things, it rightly enforces the “prevailing sense 
of justice” emanating from Congress’s choice of words and overarching theory of 
fairness under § 1981. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174. Equally persuasively, writings of 
James Madison evince a pivotal Founding Father attempting to reach not only his 
fellows, but also more urgently his metaphorical children with an entreaty this 
Article paraphrases as: If I and my contemporaries have done well, do not rest 
complacently on our laurels, but rather learn from what we have done and do better. 
Specificially, in a remarkably little quoted essay, Madison stated that proposition 
with regard to the proposed Constitution itself, “[T]he leaders of the 
[r]evolution . . . pursued a new and . . . noble course. . . . They reared the fabrics of 
governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of 
a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and 
perpetuate.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 88–89 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961) (emphasis added). Nearly forty years after the 
Constitution’s ratification, Madison expressed a similar hope. “And I indulge a 
confidence that sufficient evidence will find its way to another generation, to ensure, 
after we are gone, whatever of justice may be withheld whilst we are here.” John D. 
Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, 
and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 321 n.906 (quoting Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 24, 1826)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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c. Title VII Leads Rather Than Lags 
The foregoing further teaches that Title VII does not merely 
codify contemporary societal concepts of legitimate versus 
illegitimate discrimination.  Rather, Title VII leads and 
transforms, compelling persons and groups either to change their 
bigoted attitudes or, at the very least, learn to abide by a legal 
order that will no longer tolerate acting out such prejudices.  In 
this regard, Title VII leads; it does not lag.207  That is, the Act 
cuts the greatest path possible, allowing all who are victims a 
route to relief.  The Act does not simply languish, waiting for a 
more progressive legislature or a more tolerant society to declare:  
Now, at last, is the time you no longer must endure the 
discrimination considered acceptable by the traditionalist general 
population, conformist social groups, chauvinistic employers, or 
even a fundamentalist Congress. 
In that regard, worth emphasizing again, the Oncale Court 
recognized that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in the form 
of male-on-male harassment directed against a man considered 
not conventionally masculine due to his purportedly womanly, 
possibly homosexual manner.208  It was hardly clear that all, 
most, or many Americans just before the turn of the present 
century would have agreed with the unanimous Court that 
federal law does and should protect purportedly effeminate or 
homosexual males, especially given that homosexuals are not a 
statutorily protected class.209  Such reality did not influence the 
207 Researchers understand the actuality of this point by contrasting areas 
wherein the judiciary is not expert. For instance, “courts may only admit the state of 
science as it is. Courts are cautioned not to admit speculation, conjecture, or 
inference that cannot be supported by sound scientific principles. ‘The courtroom is 
not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags science; it 
does not lead it.’ ” Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
208 Similarly, several courts have held that “discrimination against a 
transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, 
whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or gender.” Glenn, 663 F.3d at 
1317 (Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause decision, citing other cases); 
see supra note 204 and accompanying text reviewing similar precedent. 
209 While individuals may aver colorable unlawful sexual stereotyping based on 
employers’ sex-based perceptions regarding such individuals’ actual or seeming 
homosexuality, it remains true that under Title VII, homosexuals are not an 
expressly protected class. Thus, “[a] claim premised on sexual-orientation 
discrimination . . . does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Gilbert 
v. Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing Vickers v. 
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Justices to suppress Title VII’s plain text and first  
principle—discrimination is unlawful unless justified under the 
BFOQ defense or some other textually explicit exemption—until, 
if ever, empirical research evinced extensive or at least 
considerable popular support for Joseph Oncale’s claim or until 
Congress decided to add a provision specifically addressing the 
Oncale context. 
The foregoing discussion of the Supreme Court’s three 
directives disproves the mutability and unequal burden doctrines 
and, indeed, any similar principle based on a theory of trivial 
violations.  Hopkins and Oncale underscore that, pursuant to 
Congress’s explicit and deliberate definition of discrimination, 
practices no longer lawful may nonetheless remain the prevailing 
preferences of one or more groups, businesses, industries, 
organizations, or communities.  For some, perhaps many or even 
most, a particular opinion—such as the opinion that women 
should wear makeup—may be long and deeply held, steeped in 
the sincere belief that such is the natural or better order of 
things.  Yet, no less than generally reviled prejudices, 
discrimination cloaked by homely wisdom and conventional 
prudence is exactly what Title VII abrogates.210  In bleak 
contrast, unequal burden theory vindicates blatant sex and race 
stereotyping simply on the premise that the reviewing judges 
accept such sentiment as at least “reasonable” and discern no 
ensuing “unequal” or “unequal” burdens. 
Acknowledging, as it must, the foregoing principles, one 
noted legal encyclopedia offered a prudent caution: 
A statute should not be extended by construction beyond the 
correction of evils sought by it.  There is a peril in interpreting 
statutes in accordance with presumed legislative purpose,  
 
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also, e.g., Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005). 
210 As the Fifth Circuit noted nearly a half-century ago, “[I]t would be totally 
anomalous . . . to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers [—the 
public—] to determine whether the [challenged] sex discrimination was valid. 
Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to 
overcome.” Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); 
accord EEOC v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1039 n.12 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 
1982) (same); EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 
1981) (same). 
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particularly given that most statutes represent a compromise of 
purposes advanced by competing interest groups, not an 
unmitigated attempt to stamp out a particular evil.211 
Surely aware of the above admonition, the Supreme Court’s 
applicable law, especially Oncale, evinces a core point:  Whatever 
political history and pragmatic compromises might inform Title 
VII’s enacting,212 Congress intended that, to the fullest extent its 
language and structure permit, the Act truly comprises “an 
unmitigated attempt to stamp out a particular evil [specifically, 
employment discrimination based on the five statutorily 
211 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 71 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 
212 Although scrupulously debated on its merits prior to enactment, see supra 
note 111, the origin of Title VII was not without political drama. E.g., Michael Z. 
Green, Proposing A New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: 
Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 312 
n.14, 323 n.51-52, 325 n.59 (2001) (history and political considerations attendant to 
Title VII) (cited in Lamont E. Stallworth & Daniel J. Kaspar, Employing the 
Presidential Executive Order and the Law to Provide Integrated Conflict 
Management Systems and ADR Processes: The Proposed National Employment 
Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA), 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 171, 187 n.69 
(2013)); John G. Stewart, When Democracy Worked: Reflections on the Passage of The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 145 (2014–15). For instance, the 
inclusion of “sex” as a prohibited employment criterion notoriously occurred not 
through careful drafting by either congressional proponents or expert committees, 
but rather as a floor amendment proposed by Representative Howard Smith as a 
last ditch, and clearly failed, effort to defeat passage. E.g., Bayer, supra note 4 at 
848–52 (noting, among other things, that contrary to the views of some courts and 
commentators, the legislative history of the “Smith Amendment” reveals serious and 
thoughtful arguments that likely influenced Congress to take the extraordinary step 
of adding “sex” as an additional protected class without first holding full 
investigatory hearings); Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of 
Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1338–41 
(2014) (same). 
  To cite another prominent example, to secure passage, the Act’s proponents 
acceded to demands that, unlike many expert agencies authorized to enforce 
specialized laws, the EEOC lacks full enforcement powers. While the agency can 
bring lawsuits under its auspices, it cannot administratively resolve private claims. 
Rather, somewhat like mediators, the EEOC may attempt to conciliate disputes, but 
cannot perform quasi-judicial fact-finding leading to enforceable rulings as can, for 
instance, the National Labor Relations Board and the Social Security 
Administration. Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 955–56 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(noting political compromises that enabled the passage of Title VII). Similarly, while 
it can issue guidelines worthy of deference, unlike many agencies the EEOC cannot 
promulgate regulations with the force of statutory law. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 n.6, (2002) (“[W]e have held that the EEOC’s interpretive 
guidelines do not receive Chevron deference.”); Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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prohibited criteria].”213  Accordingly, given the foregoing Supreme 
Court explications illuminating the Act’s text, purpose, and 
policy, judges have no competence to uphold non-BFOQ 
discriminatory employment rules as inoffensive and unobtrusive. 
5. The Meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)—Congress 
Reiterates Title VII’s “First Principle” 
Reversing perhaps an unprecedented number of Supreme 
Court decisions,214 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.215  Of particular significance herein, section 107, codified as 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), reads, “Except as otherwise provided in 
213 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 71 (2015); see also Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 
248 F.3d 465, 473 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011). 
214 Congress overturned eight separate opinions issued in 1989, evincing that 
Congress was so disappointed in then-recent Supreme Court rulings that it enacted 
major statutory reformation within the rather short span of two years. As one 
federal district court recounted: 
The Act overturns or modifies eight recent Supreme Court decisions: 
(1) Section 101 overturns the decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), as regards the scope 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [limiting § 1981’s ban against racial discrimination in 
contracting solely to the formation of contracts]; (2) Sections 104 and 105 
overturn the decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 
109 S. Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), regarding the legal standards 
controlling disparate impact cases; (3) Section 107 overturns the decision in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 
268 (1989) [regarding its holding that a defendant states a complete defense 
in a mixed-motive action if it can prove it would have made the same 
adverse employment decision absent discriminatory animus]; (4) Section 
108 overturns the decision in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 
104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989), as regards the permissibility of collateral 
challenges to affirmative action plans in consent decrees and court orders; 
(5) Section 109 overturns the decision in EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 
111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991), as regards the applicability of Title 
VII in overseas workplaces; (6) Section 112 overturns the decision in 
Lorance v. AT & T, 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989) 
[Title VII’s statute of limitations to challenge a seniority system begins to 
run when the system initially was adopted]; (7) Section 113 overturns the 
decision in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 
111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) [no recovery of experts’ fees as part 
of recovery of attorneys’ fees]; and (8) Section 114 overturns the decision in 
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 
(1986) [Congress did not waive under Title VII Federal Government’s 
traditional immunity from interest]. The general effect of the CRA was to 
restore the law to the state at which it existed prior to these decisions. 
Smith v. Petra Cablevision Corp., 793 F. Supp. 417, 419 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(emphasis added). 
215 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
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this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated 
the practice.”216 
This Article urges that, as elucidated by its legislative 
history, § 2000e-2(m)’s fairly clear language is Congress’s 
reaffirmation of Title VII’s first principle:  Unless justified by an 
express textual exception, the Act proscribes all employment 
discrimination predicated on any of the five forbidden 
classifications, regardless of whether with purported ease the 
affected employees can comply with the employer’s 
discriminatory standard.217  While, with some aptness, courts 
have stated, “we certainly do not pretend that the text of Section 
107(a) [§ 2000e-2(m)] speaks with unmistakable clarity,”218 and 
there is some disagreement regarding § 2000e-2(m)’s coverage,219 
§ 2000e-2(m)’s purpose was and remains unmistakable:  The very 
introduction into an employment transaction of race, sex, color, 
national origin, or religion comprises a discrete, remediable 
violation of the Act.220  Congress put the proposition 
straightforwardly:  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reaffirms that 
discrimination is itself an unequal burden.221 
Doubtless Congress adopted § 2000e-2(m) to overturn the 
portion of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that accorded a complete 
statutory defense in mixed-motive cases.222  In a mixed-motive 
case, the given record proves that the employer imposed the 
particular adverse employment action, both to further one or 
216 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added). 
217 Indeed, the amendment’s history specifically references Congress’s intent to 
return to the status quo ante of 1964. As the 1991 Congress accented, “When 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made clear that it intended to 
prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin in 
employment decisions.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 17, reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Congress passed § 2000e-2(m) 
to restore Title VII’s original purpose banning non-BFOQ discrimination. 
218 Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 217 (3d. Cir. 2000). 
219 See infra notes 230–32 and accompanying text. 
220 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
221 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 16–17, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,  
709–10. 
222 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); see supra notes 165–86 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Hopkins Court’s analysis of sexual stereotyping under Title VII and 
other aspects untouched by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
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more discriminatory purposes and to foster one or more lawful 
ends.223  Hopkins ruled that to prevail, a plaintiff does not have to 
prove that unlawful discrimination was the sole motive 
underlying the challenged adverse employment decision.224  
However, the Court erroneously declared that employers enjoy 
complete exoneration—a full statutory rebuttal—if the record 
shows that they would have taken the same adverse employment 
actions absent their discriminatory motives.225 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) reversed that portion of Hopkins.  As 
the Supreme Court succinctly but tellingly held, “Section  
2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only 
‘demonstrat[e]’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration 
with respect to ‘any employment practice.’ ”226  Naturally, lower 
223 As the Sixth Circuit explained, “[C]laims brought pursuant to Title 
VII . . . are often categorized as either single-motive claims, i.e., when an illegitimate 
reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, when ‘both 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision.’ ” Wright v. Murray 
Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003)). 
224 As the Court in Hopkins noted: 
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a 
statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words “because 
of,” Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role 
played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment 
decision she challenges. We conclude, instead, that Congress meant to 
obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based 
considerations in coming to its decision. 
490 U.S. at 241–42. Indeed, in 1964 the enacting Congress rejected a proposed 
amendment that would have limited Title VII’s coverage to discrimination based 
solely on any of the forbidden classifications. See Bayer, supra note 4, at 781. 
225 The Hopkins Court held: 
To say that an employer may not take gender into account is not, however, 
the end of the matter, for that describes only one aspect of Title VII. The 
other important aspect of the statute is its preservation of an employer's 
remaining freedom of choice. We conclude that the preservation of this 
freedom means that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, 
even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the 
same decision regarding a particular person. 
490 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added). 
226 Costa, 539 U.S. at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting portions of 
 § 2000e-2(m)). A decade later, the Court reiterated that plaintiffs establish Title VII 
claims “based solely on proof that race, color, religion, sex, or nationality was a 
motivating factor in the employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013) (emphasis added) (ruling that § 2000e-2(m) does not 
apply to retaliation cases brought pursuant to § 2000e-3(a)). Consistent with the 
extensive breadth of Title VII, the Costa Court further ruled that plaintiffs may 
prove mixed-motive cases through circumstantial evidence, direct evidence, or both. 
Regarding these two forms of proof, “The term ‘direct evidence,’ . . . is simply 
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courts echoed the Supreme Court’s crucial determination of 
§ 2000e-2(m)’s comprehensive meaning.227  For instance, the 
Fourth Circuit aptly declared, “Pursuant to the 1991 Act, the 
impermissible factor need not have been the sole factor.  As long 
as it motivated the adverse action, the plaintiff can establish an 
unlawful employment practice.”228 
True, Congress markedly limited recovery under  
§ 2000e-2(m) if the defendant proves that it would have taken the 
same employment action even absent discriminatory intent, thus 
demonstrating that the discriminatory intent was not the  
“but-for” cause of the employer’s unlawful conduct.229  Moreover, 
some courts believe that § 2000e-2(m) covers only mixed-motive 
claims while others believe it has a broader application.230  
evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference 
or presumption.” Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys. Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2004)); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004)). Such direct proof often derives from 
defendant’s outright admission of unlawful bias, although not necessarily directed 
against the particular plaintiff. “The term ‘circumstantial evidence,’ on the other 
hand, is ‘proof of a chain of facts and circumstances’ indicating the existence of a 
fact, United States v. Curry, 187 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted), 
or ‘[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.’ 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (8th ed. 2004).” Id. 
227 See, e.g., Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, No. 14-14596, 2016 WL 
158820128, at *4–5,  (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016); Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005). 
228 Id. at 318. The Ninth Circuit identically explained, “Indeed, the language of 
Title VII and well-settled case law establish that an employer will be held to have 
committed an unlawful employment practice when the plaintiff ‘demonstrates 
that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice.’ ”  Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 
424 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Three years later, the Second Circuit echoed, “An 
employment decision, then, violates Title VII when it is ‘based in whole or in part on 
discrimination.’ ” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Third 
Circuit likewise noted that “[s]ection 107(a) [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)] 
mandates a finding of liability whenever an illegitimate factor motivates an adverse 
employment action.” Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
229 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). Accordingly, when limited solely to 
§ 2000e-2(m) proof, plaintiffs may recover “declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and 
costs, and some forms of injunctive relief . . . but the employer’s proof that it would 
still have taken the same employment action would save it from monetary damages 
and a reinstatement order.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526. 
230 In 2003, the Supreme Court noted, “This case does not require us to decide 
when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.” Costa, 539 U.S. at 
94 n.1. The Court has yet to address that matter. Regarding the split in authority, 
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Courts have also disagreed over which evidentiary or  
“burden-shifting” standards to apply under summary 
judgment.231  And, it still may be an open question whether 
§ 2000e-2(m) comprises a separate statutory cause of action or 
purely elucidates the meaning—the coverage—of § 2000e-2, 
although the Supreme Court has suggested the latter.232 
the Ninth Circuit held, “Following the 1991 amendments, characterizing the 
evidence as mixed-motive instead of single-motive results only in the availability of a 
different defense, a difference which derives directly from the statutory text. . . .” 
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d on 
other grounds, 539 U.S. 90; see also, e.g., Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2009); Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 
1180, 1195 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 
992 (D. Minn. 2003). Some courts, by contrast, have held that § 2000e-2(m) applies 
only to mixed-motive cases. E.g., Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 215–16 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that a plaintiff who is not minimally qualified for the job is not 
entitled to mixed-motive instruction); Ginger v. Dist. of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 
1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Watson, 
207 F.3d at 218–20; Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 (4th Cir. 1995); cf. 
Davis v. City of Clarksville, 492 F. App’x 572, 578 n.7 (6th Cir. 2012) (inferring that 
§ 2000e-2(m) only applies to mixed-motive cases). Interestingly and convincingly, 
after careful review of applicable precedents, one noted scholar determined that this 
circuit split is more conceptual than practical: 
It has been true virtually from the beginning that [Title VII] does not 
actually require a showing that discrimination is the “single motive” of the 
employer in order to establish liability. . . . So, the plaintiff never needs to 
prove that discrimination was the only motive or cause of the employer’s 
challenged action. That means that liability can be established in all Title 
VII cases with a showing that is less than sole cause. 
Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, 
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1923 (2004). For what it is worth, 
this Article agrees with Professor Zimmer and adds only that even assuming there is 
an actual, sensible difference among plaintiff’s Title VII claims, decisions limiting 
§ 2000e-2(m)’s application to mixed-motive cases unduly restrain the reach Congress 
unequivocally intended that subsection to exercise. 
231 See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397–401 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(detailing different federal circuit court’s respective rulings). 
232 In 2003, the Supreme Court inferred the existence of a discrete claim stating 
that § 2000e-2(m), “first establishes an alternative for proving that an ‘unlawful 
employment practice’ has occurred.” Costa, 539 U.S. at 94. Although possibly dictum, 
the Court more recently concluded that “§ 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar 
on discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation standard for 
proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530; see 
also Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, No. 14-14596, 2016 WL 158820, at *5, 
(11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016) (accepting Nassar’s statement as a legal ruling).  Professor 
Sperino sensibly denoted that portion of Nassar as “clarify[ing] the relationship 
between different portions of Title VII.” Sandra F. Sperino, Beyond McDonnell 
Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 261 n.34 (2013). Accordingly,  
§ 2000e-2(m) may not be a separate cause of action, but rather a clarification that 
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This flurry of interpretive dilemmas, however, is irrelevant 
to the manifest significance of § 2000e-2(m) with regard to 
unequal burden theory.233  The congressional report 
accompanying the legislation explicitly affirms that if enacted, 
§ 2000e-2(m) would “restore the rule applied in many federal 
circuits prior to the Hopkins decision that an employer may be 
held liable for any discrimination that is actually shown to play a 
role in a contested employment decision.”234  In that regard, 
§ 2000e-2(m)’s legislative history is unequivocal and consistent:  
“[A]ny reliance on prejudice in making employment decisions is 
illegal.”235 
plaintiffs can prevail under § 2000e-2 without proving that animus was the but-for 
cause of defendants’ actions; although absent but-for causation, the plaintiff’s 
recovery is limited to noncompensatory relief. See supra note 229 and accompanying 
text. 
233 This Article agrees with Dean Van Detta that § 2000e-2(m) was born of 
Congress’s frustration with the problematic judicial tendency to limit, through 
unnecessarily complex interpretations, Title VII’s language explicitly outlawing 
nonexcepted employment discrimination. His cogent lament is worth fully quoting: 
[E]ven if there could have been some debate about the full reach of Title 
VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 put an end to such debate. The legislative 
purpose of the law that gave us section 703(m) was clearly stated, although 
little recognized by many amici appearing before the Supreme Court in 
Costa. The Act’s purpose is “to provide appropriate remedies for intentional 
discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace” in response to 
the congressional finding that “legislation is necessary to provide additional 
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.” This is the 
congressional equivalent of hitting the bench and bar about the head with a 
two-by-four. The haggling and nit-picking that the courts and 
commentators have engaged in, trying to maintain the iconic position of the 
1973-1989 Supreme Court decisions, is most misplaced in the face of 
language of such sweeping breadth and expansive purpose. The legislative 
purpose laid out by Congress is quite obvious: to clear the litigation path 
for Title VII plaintiffs of the underbrush that the Supreme Court had 
planted and tended like some tangled, insular English garden. 
Van Detta, supra note 18, at 124 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2(3), 3(1), 105 Stat. 1071). Dean Van 
Detta’s rebuke likewise might be applied to the courts’ disagreement regarding the 
reach of § 2000e-2(m). Certainly, Congress intended the furthest possible range of 
application to realize Title VII’s first principle. 
234 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 48 (1991) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586 (Committee on Education and Labor); see also Zimmer, supra 
note 230, at 1946 (quoting legislative history); supra notes 222–35 and 
accompanying text (quoting Supreme Court and lower court rulings that, pursuant 
to § 2000e-2(m), Title VII prohibits any nonexempted discrimination motivated by 
animus against the any of the five protected classes). 
235 H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (II), at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 
(emphasis added). Identically, the debate comments of one of Congress’s most 
respected members regarding civil rights, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy, 
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Indeed, § 2000e-2(m)’s legislative history reaffirms Title 
VII’s core point, “If Title VII’s ban on discrimination in 
employment is to be meaningful, proven victims of intentional 
discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of 
discrimination must be held liable for their actions.”236  Likewise, 
accenting the amendment’s breadth, Congressman Fish assured 
his colleagues, “This legislation gives expression to our 
recognition that discriminatory practices must be discouraged 
regardless of whether they turn out to be outcome 
determinative.”237  Consistent with the history informing the 
original 1964 enactment,238 nothing in these legislative 
statements evince in the slightest that Congress wished to allow 
the judiciary either to dilute or to limit § 2000e-2’s ban against 
discrimination by excepting facially discriminatory policies under 
underscore Congress’s intent to return Title VII to its first principle: “[A]ny reliance 
on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal . . . .” 136 CONG. REC. 1655 
(Feb. 7, 1990) (Sen. Kennedy’s memorandum section entitled Making Clear That Job 
Bias is Always Illegal, introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1990). Five months later, 
Senator Kennedy accented, “As one of our legal experts testified, the [Hopkins] 
decision sent a message to employers that ‘a little discrimination is OK.’  The Civil 
Rights Act repairs that hole by affirming that the law is violated whenever 
discrimination contributes to an employment decision.” Id. at 16,705 (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). Many other legislators robustly endorsed Senator Kennedy’s 
understanding. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 21,984 (statement of Rep. Traficant) (“If 
the Price Waterhouse decision is not overturned, then we send the message that 
there is nothing wrong with a little overt racism or sexism . . . . We must reaffirm 
the principle that title VII tolerates no discrimination.”); id. at 21,993 (statement of 
Rep. Collins) (“[The bill] makes it clear that intentional discrimination is never 
acceptable, whether as a primary factor or otherwise.”); 137 CONG. REC. 20,026 (Nov. 
7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (“[The bill] overturns the Price Waterhouse 
decision thus making any reliance on prejudice illegal.”); Id. at 13,541 (statement of 
Rep. Cardin) (“The civil rights bill specifies that it is illegal for intentional 
discrimination to be any factor in the employment process.”); see also Heather K. 
Gerken, Note, Understanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991: An Analysis of Intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped 
Interview Questions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1843 n.104 (1993). 
236 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, at 711; 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (I), at 47, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585–86 
(Committee on Education and Labor). 
237 137 CONG. REC. 30,667 (remarks of Rep. Fish). Representative Fish 
expressed the principle as a matter of justice, certainly one of Title VII’s pivotal 
considerations: “The Price Waterhouse problem must be rectified because it is unjust 
for our courts to ignore reliance on discriminatory employment criteria simply 
because an employer can show that ‘its legitimate reason, standing alone, would 
have induced it to make the same decision.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). See generally 
Gerken, supra note 235, at 1840–45 (discussing § 2000e-2(m)’s legislative history). 
238 See supra notes 111, 120 and accompanying text. 
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an unequal burden regime nowhere found within the Act.  
Rather, Congress reasserted in 1991 what it had directed in  
1964:  Because “discriminatory practices must be discouraged,”239 
any prejudice is unlawful except if it is allowed by a textual 
exception.240  
Section 2000e-2(m), then, reasserts Title VII’s first principle 
that discrimination itself is redressable injury.241  Neither 
239 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
240 Interestingly, “Both the Senate and the House rejected amendments 
[particularly one proposed by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R. Kan.)] that would have 
strengthened the standard by requiring a showing that discrimination was a ‘major 
contributing factor’ for the hiring decision.” See Gerken, supra note 235, at 1844 
(discussing the text of the Kassebaum Amendment, which expired on the floor 
without a vote); 136 CONG. REC. H6,784–85 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (rejecting the 
LaFalce-Michel-Goodling substitute). But see id. at S15,366 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) 
(statement of Sen. Jeffords) (arguing that there is little difference between the terms 
“major contributing fact” and “motivating factor”). Technically, adoption of the 
Kassebaum Amendment would not diminish § 2000e-2(m)’s implicit repudiation of 
unequal burden theory because applicable grooming codes and their ilk are per se 
discriminatory, thereby more than satisfying the amendment’s proposed “major 
contributing factor” language. Nonetheless, rejection of that amendment evinces 
Congress’s refusal to see its statutory definition of discrimination either weakened 
or narrowed. Therefore, the Kassebaum Amendment’s demise bolsters the argument 
that through § 2000e-2(m), Congress reaffirmed Title VII’s “first principle” 
prohibiting all discrimination not expressly excepted by the Act’s text itself. 
241 Worth accenting in this regard is the forceful Supreme Court constitutional 
corollary, elucidated contemporaneously with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and completely consistent with the meaning of the subsequently enacted 
§ 2000e-2(m), that discrimination itself—discrimination qua discrimination—is 
injurious per se. In a remarkably brief four pages, Anderson v. Martin invalidated 
Louisiana’s requirement identifying the race of candidates on election ballots, 
pursuant to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964). Arguably, Louisiana’s law engendered an 
unconventional form of discrimination because all voters regardless of race were 
informed of the race of all candidates. Id. at 402. Thus, outwardly, neither 
candidates nor voters were disparately affected due to their respective races. 
Nonetheless, the Court stated: 
[B]y placing at [sic] racial label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in 
the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the State 
furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to 
operate against one group because of race and for another. This is true 
because by directing the citizen’s attention to the single consideration of 
race or color, the State indicates that a candidate’s race or color is an 
important—perhaps paramount—consideration in the citizen’s choice, 
which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial 
lines. . . . The vice lies . . . in the placing of the power of the State behind a 
racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court discerned no legitimate reason to offset the State’s 
discriminatory contrivance. Id. at 403 (“We see no relevance in the State’s pointing 
up the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office. Indeed, this 
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§ 2000e-2(m)’s language nor its emphatic legislative history 
allows courts to construct within the Act realms of lawful 
discriminatory conduct that fails to satisfy an express textual 
defense or exemption.242  Reestablishing what Congress 
understood to be Title VII’s meaning when originally passed in 
1964, § 2000e-2(m) tells us without hesitation or equivocation 
that because discrimination is itself an injury, the offending 
employer is obligated to remedy that injury even if indulging 
discriminatory animus was neither that employer’s primary or 
but-for motive—indeed, even if discriminatory intent was the 
factor in itself ‘underscores the purely racial character and purpose’ of the statute.”). 
Of great significance, the challengers did not have to prove that Louisiana’s law 
actually influenced voters in any fashion. Rather, the State’s introduction of race 
into the electoral process comprised the constitutional violation. See Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 252 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Anderson 
clarified that states cannot “encourage citizens to cast their votes solely on the basis 
of race”); Rosen v. Brown, No. 1:88CV2973, 1990 WL 384957, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 
7, 1990) (understanding Anderson to mean that states cannot turn official forms 
such as ballots into “a state-furnished vehicle through which prejudice may be 
aroused”). Likewise, in 1964, the Supreme Court substantively affirmed a three-
judge district court ruling invalidating Virginia statutes that mandated, as a clerical 
matter, separating voter lists and property tax assessments by race. Hamm v. Va. 
State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 157 (E.D. Va.) (three-judge panel), aff’d sub 
nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). Even assuming such existed, 
the Hamm court would not have been impressed by data showing no ill effects from 
the simple racially-based separation of inventories. Citing, among other things, 
Anderson, the judges reasoned: 
[I]t [is] axiomatic that no State can directly dictate or casually promote a 
distinction in the treatment of persons solely on the basis of their color. To 
be within the condemnation, the governmental action need not effectuate 
segregation of facilities directly. The result of the statute or policy must not 
tend to separate individuals by reason of difference in race or color. 
Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although infrequently cited, recent 
Justices of arguably dissimilar legal philosophies have extoled Anderson’s expansive 
understanding of official invidious discrimination as inherently injurious. Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 460 (2008) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 532 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 
430 U.S. 144, 186 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 
130, 159 n.20 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). When it enacted the Civil Rights Act 
in 1964, the very year that the Court delivered Anderson, Congress understood that 
discrimination in the private context, as in the governmental milieu, is injurious by 
definition. Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). See 
generally supra note 41. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 generally and the portion 
encoded as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) specifically simply but resolutely maintain the 
legacy of the 1964 Congress and Supreme Court. See supra notes 234–40 and 
accompanying text (discussing the legislative histories of Title VII, in general, and 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), in particular). 
242 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
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least of its motivations.243  This congressional principle of decency 
is at odds with any judicial doctrine that Title VII permits 
purportedly “reasonable,” non remedial discriminatory conduct.244  
Especially considering the breadth of coverage afforded under 
§ 2000e-2(m), had Congress wished to constrain the Act’s 
comprehensive definition of unlawful discrimination by excluding 
non-BFOQ conduct that reviewing judges consider “reasonable,” 
it would have so stated explicitly.245 
C. Dignity Theory Explains Why Disparate Grooming Policies 
Are Significantly Injurious 
The foregoing has presented essentially a text-based 
approach challenging the legitimacy of unequal burden theory.  
Still, while constitutionally required to respect explicit statutory 
texts and manifest legislative intent,246 doubtless judges are duty 
bound as well to judge,247 which includes eschewing “unthinking 
243 Id. 
244 When necessary to alleviate proven discrimination, the Act expressly allows 
remedial measures based on otherwise forbidden criteria. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see, e.g., 
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (court 
ordered race-based affirmative action plans); Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. 
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 504 (1986) (holding that Title VII does not preclude 
“entry of a consent decree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who 
were not victims of the defendant’s discriminatory practices”); United States v. 
Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2011). Moreover, due to its remedial 
purposes, the judiciary properly has recognized a limited, albeit extratextual regime, 
of “voluntary affirmative action” without requiring employers and unions first to 
risk liability by declaring that the conditions to which an affirmative action plan is 
addressed constitute extant violations of Title VII. See supra note 161 and 
accompanying text. 
245 In that regard, it surely is significant that the only portion of the Hopkins 
decision Congress thought worth overturning was the holding that to be remediable, 
proven discrimination must have been the “but-for” cause of the defendant’s 
challenged conduct. Congress left untouched the Hopkins Court’s recognition that 
enforcing sex-based stereotypes can be unlawful even when the stereotyping 
concerns plaintiffs’ demeanor, appearance, dress, and comportment, which are 
apparently mutable characteristics—although the Court did not use that particular 
term. See supra notes 165–86 and accompanying text. Given that when enacting the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, of which § 2000e-2(m) was a part, Congress took the 
extraordinary action of statutorily reversing in whole or part eight Supreme Court 
cases, see supra note 214, had it thought claims such as Ms. Hopkins were 
unreasonable and had it disagreed with the Court’s explicit reaffirmation that only 
BFOQs can justify discrimination, Congress would have so clarified in its 
amendments. 
246 See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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obedience to literalism”248 that would render an “absurd 
result.”249  Such determinations, however, are not matters of 
either judicial discretion or judges’ policy preferences but rather 
questions of nice discernment tempered by the judiciary’s 
constitutional function to enforce the given statute as thoroughly 
as its meaning allows.250  Consequently, courts understand that 
an absurd outcome is an “extraordinary consideration”251 arising 
only when applications of the given text would seriously 
compromise that text’s underlying purposes, not when courts 
consider such applications to be poor policy.  Therefore, as earlier 
accented, “It is well established that ‘when the statute’s language 
is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it 
according to its terms.’ ”252 
Pursuant to these rules of statutory interpretation, 
invalidating non-BFOQ sex- and race-based appearance rules is 
fully consistent with, indeed mandated by, Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination principle.  Courts, then, cannot refuse to so 
enforce the Act even if they consider the resulting outcomes to be 
curious, silly, or even unnerving.253  Rather, courts may only 
uphold non-BFOQ discriminatory grooming and comportment 
248 United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1961). 
249 E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013). 
250 The Supreme Court recently had occasion to reinforce these standards of 
statutory interpretation in the contentious area of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), legislation 
lacking the clarity of Title VII. Indeed, the Court referred to the ACA as “far from a 
chef d’oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 n. 
3 (2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441–42 
(2014). King accented that reviewers must not construe statutory provisions in 
isolation but rather, while the discrete langue of each portion is informative, the 
statute must be understood as a statute, meaning, to the extent feasible, as an 
integrated whole. Id. at 2489. Reference to “context” is essential whether to salvage 
clarity from ambiguous text or to confirm the apparent clarity of the reviewed text. 
Id. at 2489, 2494. Avoiding absurd results certainly is a contextual aspect of 
statutory enforcement. 
251 Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 10. 
252 Tista v. Holder, 722 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. 
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000); 
supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ duties to enforce 
statutes as written). 
253 See Doe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs of U.S., 519 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
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directives to preclude an absurd outcome.  Accordingly, this 
writing now turns from the compelling textual arguments 
against the unequal burden doctrine to proof that applying the 
Act’s first principle to invalidate discriminatory dress and 
appearance rules is not absurd. 
As a threshold point, contrary to the en banc Ninth Circuit’s 
patently misplaced concern, abrogating grooming rules, or any 
employment policy for that matter, would not, indeed could not, 
be based on a Title VII standard “that every grooming, apparel, 
or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally 
offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-
image . . . create[s] a triable issue of sex discrimination.”254  
Rather, plaintiffs must plead and prove disparate treatment 
based on a statutorily prohibited criterion not only to win, but 
also at the initial pleading stage to state a colorable claim 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). Likely plaintiffs often are motivated to sue pursuant to, 
and in vindication of, their own “self-image.”  But it is immaterial 
whether they sue to obtain justice under Title VII, to attain 
personal satisfaction, out of pure orneriness, on a dare, to indulge 
the most conceited and eccentric of “self-images,” or for some 
other reason no matter how evidently sensible or seemingly 
peculiar.  So long as they plausibly can aver and subsequently 
prove that the challenged appearance policy is race or sex-based, 
plaintiffs have good-faith causes of action that, if procedurally 
sound, should succeed unless defendants establish a BFOQ. 
Therefore, complaints must suitably allege that the 
employer’s offending policies discriminate based on one or more 
of Title VII’s forbidden criteria.255  Plaintiffs cannot simply claim 
that the challenged employment rules abstractly are “personally 
offensive.”256 
254 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
255 Id. at 1112–13. 
256 Id. at 1112. While sympathetic to the concept, this Article does not herein 
advocate for a “freedom of dress” as does Professor Ramachandran, wherein 
individuals might have viable claims based on the assertion that employers have no 
presumed authority to compel employees to comport with the employers’ grooming 
preferences regardless of whether those grooming preferences discriminate against 
any statutorily protected class. See Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 23; see also 
supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. Title VII’s text, design and policy 
provides sufficient bases to disprove the grooming cases reliance on an unequal 
burden theory. However, as a general matter, this author supports the argument 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 45 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 45 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_BAYER 3/29/2016  4:26 PM 
478 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:401   
More importantly, again contrary to prevailing judicial 
perceptions, individuals’ choice of dress, grooming, and other 
indicia of appearance are not trivial decisions, but rather are 
worthy of respect.  As earlier explained, although discrimination 
commonly adversely affects victims’ economic and professional 
statuses, the Act prohibits as well criteria, standards, or 
practices that insult, demean, stigmatize, humiliate, or similarly 
harm employees and employment applicants.257  The theory is 
straightforward:  Absent BFOQ, employers may not use their 
status and power to impose the harm of discrimination, not 
because the harm injures a protected class, but because the harm 
injures discrete individuals due to their membership in the 
particular protected class.  Ownership or management of an 
enterprise no longer entails authority to deny the unique 
personhoods—the “self-images,” to borrow the Ninth Circuit’s 
term258—of each worker insofar as that unique “self-image” is 
linked to race, sex, color, national origin, and religion.259 
 
 
 
 
that Congress may proscribe employment discrimination but may not limit 
protection from such discrimination to a handful of special classes even if those 
classes endure the most persistent and most common forms of discrimination. See, 
Bayer, supra note 33. In that regard, employees and applicants would enjoy 
“freedom to dress” when employers’ regulations arbitrarily limit such freedom. 
257 As illustrated supra in notes 190–92, 201 and accompanying text, a 
prominent example is hostile environment harassment based on the proposition 
that, even absent “tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was 
so severe or pervasive that it created a [hostile] work environment . . . offends Title 
VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 
(1993). Indeed, the first such Supreme Court decision explained that Title VII 
proscribes sexual harassment because, among other things, it is “demeaning and 
disconcerting.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), quoted in 
Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 757 (8th Cir. 2003).  
258 See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
259 Thus, for example, Price Waterhouse could not deny Ann Hopkins promotion 
to partnership based on her singular combination of personal traits that led some 
partners to consider her to be mannish and unfeminine. See supra notes 165–86 and 
accompanying text. Equally, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. violated Title VII by 
allowing Joseph Oncale’s coworkers, an entirely male work force, to harass him due 
to their perception that the particular amalgam of behaviors comprising his 
comportment rendered Mr. Oncale inappropriately womanly and seemingly 
homosexual. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, applying the established moral philosophy particularly 
widespread in contemporary civil rights judicial opinions,260 Title 
VII protects the personal dignity of employees and employment 
applicants.261  Indeed, an early decision striking a male-only 
hair-length policy expressed the idea with appropriate passion: 
 
 
260 See Bayer supra note 33, at 370–403 (discussing the moral underpinnings of 
constitutional civil rights). 
261 As the Federal Circuit properly explained, “The purpose of Title VII is not to 
import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to 
liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby 
to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment.” 
King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994), quoted in Gallagher v. Delaney, 
139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir.), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632, n.7 (2d Cir. 
1997). Similarly, Justice Souter recognized, “There are definite parallels between, 
say, a defamation action, which vindicates the plaintiff’s interest in good name, and 
a Title VII suit, which arguably vindicates an interest in dignity as a human being 
entitled to be judged on individual merit.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 247 
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (implicitly overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
Recently, the EEOC accented the link between Title VII and human dignity in an 
EEOC decision invalidating a Department of the Army decision forbidding a 
transgendered female from using the womens’ restrooms and requiring, instead, 
that she use a unisex washroom that accommodates only one person at a time. 
Lusardi v. McHugh, E.E.O.C. Dec. 0120133395 (E.E.O.C.), 2015 WL 1607756 (Apr. 
1, 2015). The EEOC concluded: 
But the harm to the Complainant goes beyond simply denying her access to 
a resource open to others. The decision to restrict Complainant to a “single 
shot” restroom isolated and segregated her from other persons of her 
gender. It perpetuated the sense that she was not worthy of equal 
treatment and respect … The Agency's actions deprived Complainant of 
equal status, respect, and dignity in the workplace, and, as a result, 
deprived her of equal employment opportunities. In restricting her access 
to the restroom consistent with her gender identity, the Agency refused to 
recognize Complainant's very identity. Treatment of this kind by one's 
employer is most certainly adverse. 
Id. at *10 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 Dignity, identically, has become the overarching concept informing 
constitutional due process of law, both generally and as manifested in specifically 
enumerated rights. E.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (noting that 
the Eighth Amendment’s protection is understood in terms of “the Constitution’s 
protection of human dignity”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 
(2013) (holding that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional 
because it “interfere[s] with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity 
conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power”); Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Utah’s ban on same-sex 
marriage and accenting the connection between substantive due process and the 
dignity of marital relationships). See generally Bayer, supra note 33, at 391–96. 
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When this Nation was settled it was hoped that there [would] 
be established a society where every individual would be judged 
according to his ability rather than who his father was, or what 
foreign land his family came from, or which part of town he 
happened to live in, or what the color of his skin was. . . . The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was born of that hope.  Although the 
legal technicalities are many, the message of the Act is 
clear: every person is to be treated as an individual, with 
respect and dignity.262 
Accordingly, Title VII confounds “import[ing] into the 
workplace the prejudices of the community”263 for “an employee’s 
dignity might require standards higher than those of the 
street.”264  Surely these astute and prudent observations are 
consistent with, indeed integral to, Title VII’s first principle 
proscribing all but textually excepted discrimination.  Borrowing 
the Federal Circuit’s phrasing, although Title VII’s words accord 
no such exemption, unequal burden theory permits employers to 
“import into the workplace the prejudices of the community,”265 
thus affronting the dignity of workers and job applicants who 
wish nothing other than to earn an honest living without 
betraying their personhoods to assuage the class-based 
prejudices of their employers. 
1. Dignity Requires Treating Persons as “Ends,” Not “Simply as 
a Means” 
The question becomes:  What is “dignity?”  Although subject 
to varying definitions, this Article urges that dignity is best 
exemplified by the moral theory of the noted Enlightenment 
philosopher Immanuel Kant.  Specifically, this Article joins the 
many that embrace “Kantian ethics,” meaning understanding 
and applying the overarching moral philosophy espoused by Kant 
rather than implementing “Kant’s ethics;” that is, the outcomes 
Kant himself likely would claim emanate from using his general 
262 Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972) 
(holding that employer’s male-only hair-length rule violated Title VII); see also 
MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:44 
(“Denial of job opportunities also results in a denial of dignity and political and 
economic empowerment.”). 
263 Hillen, 21 F.3d at 1582. 
264 McCowan v. Software Spectrum, Inc., No. 08-00-00077-CV, 2002 WL 505138, 
at *10 (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 2002). See generally supra notes 135–45, 261 and 
accompanying text. 
265 Hillen, 21 F.3d at 1582. 
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moral schema to resolve discrete scenarios.266  While worthy of 
fuller explication,267 his ideas may be summarized acceptably.  
Kant argued that all persons possess innate, immutable “dignity” 
derived from humankind’s unique, perhaps divinely bestowed, 
capacity to seek and to discern moral truth through reason.268  
Because morality is comprised of immutable, transcendent truth, 
the correct moral answer is not a matter of, to use the prevailing 
term, “striking a balance” to attain some perceived best available 
outcome.269  Rather, as noted, the correct moral answer must be 
discerned from reason regardless of the resulting outcome for any 
answer based on either choosing a preferred outcome or avoiding 
a disfavored result merely reveals the personal preferences of 
either the commentator or some person or group discussed in the 
commentator’s analysis.270 
266 See Bayer, supra note 33, at 347–48 (explaining the difference between 
“Kantian ethics” and “Kant’s ethics”). 
267 See id. at 346–58. See also Peter Brandon Bayer, The Individual Mandate’s 
Due Process Legality: A Kantian Explanation, and Why It Matters, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 865, 896?912 (2013), for a more complete elaboration of Kant’s theory of 
morality and dignity. 
268 Kant was a deontologist; that is, he believed that moral principles are a 
priori, thus preceding the existence of humankind. Consequently, morality and its 
applications to discrete situations are not humanly created but rather derive from 
reason. See Bayer, supra note 267, at 888–96; see also Bayer, supra note 33, at  
293–321 (defining terms and explaining why deontology rather than 
utilitarianism—also known as consequentialism—correctly explicates morality). As 
explained in the above-cited works, morality must be deontological rather than 
based on utilitarian or consequentialist theories that the morally correct resolution 
of a problem is the one that yields the greatest aggregate happiness or satisfaction. 
The very short but compelling reason is that a philosophy of morality predicated on 
what engenders the greatest happiness can only prove what all, most, or some 
people want. Such philosophy cannot prove that what people want in fact is moral 
except by the fiat of defining morality as some measure of aggregate happiness. 
Empirically establishing popular preferences alone is not enough to prove why those 
popular preferences are moral. For example, no matter how purportedly 
sophisticated, any system of morals dependent on collective happiness renders 
slavery, rape, and concentration camps moral if the happiness they engender either 
generally, or for certain designated individuals or groups, exceeds the misery they 
cause either generally, or for certain designated individuals or groups. Unless one 
believes those abhorrent practices are made moral through popular acclamation, 
proving the immorality of slavery, rape, and concentration camps must stem from 
the only possible alternative: deontology’s precept that morality is transcendent, 
apolitical, universally applicable, and not a human invention. 
269 See Bayer, supra note 33, at 321. 
270 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. Therefore, although their 
conclusions regarding the rightness vel non of regulating dress, grooming and 
comportment may be correct, critics who espouse the balancing inherent in 
consequentialism fail to provide an objective, impartial basis to debunk the unequal 
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burden theory. For instance, in support of her theory of “freedom of dress,” Professor 
Ramachandran stated: 
[T]he exercise of certain fundamental rights by workers must at least be 
balanced against market forces and employer preferences, given that we 
spend such a great deal of time at work and given that, after all, we are 
balancing one right against another, such as property versus speech, 
contract versus speech, or property versus privacy. When weighing 
property and contract rights against other rights, a balance must be struck. 
Ramachandran supra note 22, at 50–51 (footnote omitted). Professor 
Ramachandran’s statement sounds reasonable until one notices that she does not 
sufficiently explain how to perform the purported balancing of rights. Professor 
Ramachandran argues eloquently about the link between personal appearance and 
the individual’s core sense of self. Id. at 30–61. Upon that analysis, she urges a 
familiar position that employers ought not have the authority through grooming 
rules to require employees to betray their individual selves unless those rules are 
necessary to maintain “core job functions and the core goals of the enterprise in 
question” which, interestingly, she refers to as “unduly burden[ing] the industry as a 
whole.” Id. at 62. She posits, therefore, that while restaurateurs rationally might 
want waitstaff to wear prescribed uniforms, absent proof of “core job functions,” 
rationality alone is insufficient to justify imposing such uniforms that could well 
impinge on employees’ self-definitions. Professor Ramachandran supposes, perhaps 
not illogically, that over time customers would not find it odd that waitstaff provide 
their services while wearing clothing of their choice. Id. at 63. Her suppositions may 
be empirically correct, but, her “balancing” approach does not really explain why the 
employers’ sense-of-self enforced by requiring waitstaff to wear uniforms is less 
important than the waitstaff’s sense-of-self except that the employer’s livelihood is 
not truly dependent on waitstaff wearing uniforms, and possibly the argument that 
the preferences of the many should surpass the preferences of few. The purported 
right of employees to demand that the employer change her employment preferences 
to preserve the employees’ self definitions is not self-evident as contrasted with the 
purported right of the employer to fulfill her self-definition by directing every aspect 
of her business. 
  In support of her position that rights compete and must be balanced, 
Professor Ramachandran analogizes a right to housing that implies a corresponding 
right of, say, an African-American individual to move into a neighborhood even if the 
present homeowners do not want African-American neighbors. See id. at 51–52. Yet, 
it is unclear why the accumulated preferences of the bigoted white residents ought 
not trump the desire of the African-American would-be purchaser. To highlight this 
point, it is worth noting that meaningful enjoyment of a home often concerns 
becoming part of the social life of the neighborhood. Therefore, suppose bigoted 
white homeowners refuse to invite their new African-American neighbor to their 
parties, barbeques, and similar gatherings. It is unclear how Professor 
Ramachandran’s balancing approach can tell us whether and why the African-
American resident’s annoyed white neighbors may or may not ostracize her from 
participation in community social gatherings. Balancing cannot resolve whether the 
“right” to live in a community trumps or falls to the privacy-based “right” to socialize 
with whom we please because the only things that can be “balanced” are the degrees 
to which the balancer likes or dislikes various outcomes. We might claim that we are 
balancing the intensity of the respective interests of the various parties; but, 
performing the balance means that we have to do one of two things. First, we can 
discern the intensity of each party’s preferences without judging those preferences 
and perform a simple mathematical calculation. If the total intensity of the bigoted 
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Of course, persons are imperfect; therefore, their capacities 
to fully comprehend morality are imperfect.  However, it is the 
capacity, not the actuality, of either striving for or attaining 
correct moral judgment that renders persons dignified.271 
Because human dignity arises from the facility to be moral, 
rather than actual moral comportment itself, persons are entitled 
to respect, meaning they must be treated in ways that do not 
neighbors is greater than the intensity of the African-American resident, the 
neighbors win; if not, the resident wins. Thus, the moral answer according to the 
foregoing process is, as consequentialism supposes, a function of empiricism. That 
does not seem like a worthy moral basis for, as noted, such balancing would justify 
anything. Alternatively, the balancer can decide whose preferences she thinks are 
more laudable, thus worthy of enforcement, which, of course, is a subjective 
judgment on the balancer’s part. To illustrate, let us presume, as may be likely, that 
among the numerous alternatives, the balancer adopts two propositions: (1) The 
right of the African-American individual to move into the white neighborhood 
outweighs all the bigoted white homeowners’ preferences for racial exclusivity; but, 
(2) those homeowners’ personal privacy interests in choosing friends and lovers 
allow them to exclude the African-American resident from their private social 
functions, such as backyard parties. When asked, the balancer says that she believes 
those two propositions together comprise the right balance, but we must then 
inquire, “Why?” She might state that the first propositon involves the homeowners’ 
property rights while the second proposition concerns something more substantial, 
their personal right to choose friends. However, such labeling is not highly 
informative because it is hardly clear that property rights are less momentous than 
personal rights, or that indeed property interests do not involve personal concerns 
and vice versa, as the issue of community social interaction demonstrates. The white 
homeowners may aver that their personal interests, preferences and identity are 
served by neither living near nor having to associate with minority individuals. The 
African American may say that her self identity is demeaned if, due to her race, she 
is excluded from both neighborhoods and local, private social events held within 
those neighborhoods. It is not clear why a commentator would conclude that the 
African American may not be demeaned through the denial of housing but may be 
demeaned through exclusion from social events. The labeling of the former as 
sounding in a property right and the latter as sounding in a privacy right provides 
no explication. Accordingly, if the commentator responds, “Based on my life’s 
experience and study, this is the balance that makes me feel best,” we must demand 
a more objective analysis—her impartial, detached, objective bases underlying her 
chosen balance. We insist that she justify her feelings with something other than her 
feelings themselves. We need to understand the logic that led her to conclude that 
the bigoted neighbors have no moral authority to prevent minority individuals from 
purchasing homes but have the moral authority to demean those individuals by 
excluding them from parties and similar social functions linked in whole or part to 
neighborhood residency. Thus, a meaningful answer cannot be found in a balancing 
of personal preferences masked as an impartial study of conflicting rights. Rather, 
the solution must lie in some proposition of moral human behavior that is absolute, 
that, as Kant rightly taught, stems from reason completely unmoored from the sum 
of subjective predilections vindicated by the balancing process. 
271 See Bayer, supra note 33, at 348–53. 
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compromise their intrinsic dignity regardless of how they 
actually behave.272  Accordingly, every individual has an 
affirmative, immutable duty to treat all others in a dignified 
fashion plus a corresponding immutable right to be so treated by 
all others.273 
The next matter is:  How does one person respect the dignity 
of another?  Kant notably espoused two applicable, essential 
formulae he called categorical imperatives.274  The first holds, 
“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law.”275  Put perhaps too 
simply, the first categorical imperative echoes the Golden Rule; 
that is, your behavior towards others should be based on 
standards applicable to all similarly situated persons.  
Accordingly, if in response to Smith’s action, Jones takes another 
action, then equally Smith, or any person, should be able to take 
the action Jones took if Jones, or any similarly situated person, 
performs the action Smith took.276 
The first categorical imperative is necessary but insufficient 
because while it eliminates hypocrisy, it does not assure that any 
given “maxim” is a moral “universal law.”277  Thus, we need more; 
272 See id. at 350–51. 
273 See id. at 353–56. Indeed, such is the primary philosophical basis for the U.S. 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights, particularly its general guarantee of due process of law. 
See id. at 358–69 (discussing Kant’s third categorical imperative that to assure 
moral order, persons must form societies controlled by overarching governments 
predicated on preserving human dignity); id. at 370–403 (discussing American 
constitutional law as an example of Kant’s third categorical imperative). In fact, the 
revered American jurist and legal theorist Benjamin Cardozo “may have been 
correct to say: ‘Our jurisprudence has held fast to Kant’s categorical 
imperative . . . . We look beyond the particular to the universal, and shape our 
judgment in obedience to the fundamental interest of society that contracts shall be 
fulfilled.’ ” Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the 
Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1615 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139–40 (1921)). 
274 See Bayer, supra note 33, at 353–54. 
275 See id. at 354. 
276 For example, if Smith hits Jones because Jones insulted Smith, then Smith 
can have no moral objections if Jones hits Smith should Smith comparably insult 
Jones. 
277 “The first formulation lacks a common neutral basis to judge whether the 
proposed universal maxim is moral.” Bayer, supra note 33, at 355. For instance, 
referring to the situation in note 276, Smith meets the first categorical imperative if 
she believes not only that she may hit persons who insult her but also that she 
rightly may be hit by anyone she similarly insults. See supra note 270. In that way, 
Smith has not carved out a special moral rule for her own benefit that others may 
not use against her. Smith’s commendable rejection of duplicity, however, does not 
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indeed, the essence of Kantian morality is found in the acclaimed 
second categorical imperative, “Act in such a way that you 
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end.”278  As that somewhat esoteric quote 
logically informs, it is not per se immoral to treat persons as 
“means.”  Indeed, human exchanges are predicated on 
individuals and groups giving and receiving benefits.  Rather, 
persons cannot treat others “simply”—only—as “means.”  
Persons must respect the dignity of those with whom they 
interact by treating others as “end[s]” in themselves.279  “As 
Professor Kutz compellingly invoked, ‘[Using] a person [solely] 
[for another’s gain] does not sufficiently respect and take account 
of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he 
has.’ ”280 
Accordingly, during our interactions, we respect the dignity 
of others—treat them as ends—by not objectifying them, meaning 
we do not regard them as though they were inanimate objects 
existing only for the use and pleasure of whoever controls 
them.281  The application to Title VII is evident:  When 
discrimination is based on BFOQs, employers respect the dignity 
of employees.282  The clear reason is that no person reasonably 
may expect to be hired if she is incapable of performing the given 
work.  Rejecting unqualified applicants, then, is not using them 
inappropriately, as thought they were inanimate.283  Similarly, 
prove that her principle—insults may be met with battery—is morally correct. All 
that Smith has shown is that she willingly allows her “maxim” regarding insults to 
be applied as a “universal law” applicable to all similarly situated others. 
278 See KANT, supra note 38, at 96. 
279 Bayer, supra note 272, at 899–903; see Bayer supra note 33, at 354–55. 
280 Bayer, supra note 33, at 355–56 (alterations in original) (quoting Christopher 
Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 256 (2007) 
(quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974)). 
281 See id. at 354–58. We morally may use, even abuse, equipment and similar 
impassive objects for they have no soul, no dignity, and no sense of self. Logically, 
the immorality of abusing without permission somebody else’s object—property—is 
not that we have affronted the object, but that the abuse affronts the other person 
whose legitimate interest in the object should be respected. 
282 See supra notes 133, 261 and accompanying text. 
283 A classic example is a police undercover operation in which the race or sex of 
the infiltrating officer is essential to success. Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 
F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum). For instance, law enforcement might use 
a Caucasian agent to infiltrate a “White supremist” organization. Under that 
circumstance, a non-Caucasian officer’s dignity has not been demeaned because, due 
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refusing to hire or to promote someone solely because she is not 
the most qualified available applicant may aggravate and sadden 
her.  However, because maximizing efficiency is a legitimate 
business concern, she has no principled expectation to be 
preferred over a better job candidate.  Choosing the better 
applicant is classically, under Title VII, a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” evincing that, in fact, the given 
employer’s decision was not based on an impermissible 
criterion.284 
In sum, absent BFOQs, employers have no moral 
justification to discriminate, which is exactly as Congress 
intended.285  Therefore, employers indulging non-BFOQ personal 
or customer discriminatory preferences treat employees no better 
than objects that exist uniquely for the gratification of those 
employers and their patrons.  By imposing bigoted 
predilections—stereotypes—that are not essential to business 
to her race or color, that officer simply could not perform the presumably legal and 
legitimate job of infiltrating the racist group. Accordingly, the non-Caucasian officer 
has no moral expectation—could not rationally agree—that race is an illegitimate 
consideration regarding such undercover work. Thus, refusing to consider the non-
Caucasian officer to be the infiltrator does not render her an implicit object to be 
used for the gratification of her employer. 
284 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Of course, 
efficiency is not a sufficient basis to justify actual employment discrimination, such 
as refusing to hire men who wear long hair. See supra notes 133–46, 261 and 
accompanying text (discussing the BFOQ defense). 
285 Left for another article is the compelling question whether in the first 
instance, civil rights laws are immoral, and thereby unlawful. One might argue that 
the government treats persons, even corporate individuals, as objects—as mere 
means—by depriving them of the opportunity to use their own property to gratify 
personal prejudices. After all, we allow persons to discriminate on virtually any 
arguably arbitrary basis in other instances of intimate human interaction, such as 
the selection of friends and lovers. Indeed, it may be a violation of the Due Process 
Clauses and the First Amendment for government to compel personal 
interrelationships. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of 
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (holding that the use of a state public accommodations 
law to require participation in a privately sponsored parade on public thoroughfare 
of an unwelcome group advocating for rights of homosexual and bisexual individuals 
violated the First Amendment). Therefore, one might wonder whether moral 
arguments demonstrate that, even with good intentions, government may not 
outlaw employment discrimination. For now, this Article presumes what likely is the 
correct conclusion: Civil rights acts, such as Title VII, are moral statutes that do not 
treat violators only as means, not as ends in themselves. Cf. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary 
Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 537 (1987) (finding that California’s public 
accommodations civil rights law did not violate the First Amendment by requiring a 
private organization of businessmen, the Rotary Club, to admit women as full 
members). 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 50 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 50 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_BAYER 3/29/2016  4:26 PM 
2015] DEBUNKING JUDICIAL MYTHS 487 
operations, businesses demean and humiliate individuals by 
forcing them to accept the indignity of discrimination as the price 
of employment.  If there is no BFOQ, the employer cannot treat 
employees merely as means—tools or objects—to gratify 
unnecessary discriminatory predilections.  By logical extension, 
because it legalizes such non-BFOQ discrimination, unequal 
burden theory defies the moral philosophy of Title VII by allowing 
employers to treat employees and applicants merely as conduits 
through which employers exercise their discriminatory 
preferences. 
2. The Indignity of Non-BFOQ Grooming and Comportment 
Rules 
Because they offend the dignity of workers and employment 
applicants, non-BFOQ appearance standards predicated on any 
of the Act’s five forbidden criteria are unlawful per se.  
Nonetheless, to underscore that such literal applications of Title 
VII’s text are not absurd,286 this Article briefly explains the link 
between human dignity and grooming.  Indeed, even courts 
embracing the unequal burden doctrine recognize that, in some 
instances, dress and appearance rules can be unduly, thereby 
unlawfully humiliating.287  A particularly strong example is 
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago,288 
which struck the defendant-bank’s rule allowing male employees 
to choose their own work-appropriate attire but requiring “female 
employees . . . to wear [clothing] . . . selected from what the 
employer euphemistically referred to as a ‘career ensemble.’ ”289  
Because Talman presumed that women are too untrustworthy 
and immature to select their own businesslike attire, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded, “[T]he disparate treatment is demeaning to 
women.”290  Several courts have followed Carroll’s rationale, 
286 As noted, the unequal burden doctrine would be lawful if it averted “absurd” 
applications of Title VII. See supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 76–90 and accompanying text. 
288 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979). 
289 See Bayer, supra note 4, at 867 n.359 (discussing Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033). 
290 Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33. The court explained, “While there is nothing 
offensive about uniforms per se, when some employees are uniformed and others not 
there is a natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser 
professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business clothes.” 
Id. at 1033. Indeed, the deeply incensed Seventh Circuit avowed that it would have 
struck the “career ensemble” scheme had only one of Talman’s female employees 
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particularly when the prescribed grooming or appearance 
standard is sexually demeaning, provocative, or invites sexual 
harassment.291 
Consistent with Title VII’s antidiscrimination principle is 
the substantial link between individual appearance and 
individual identity.292  Specifically, “Our appearances are a 
symbolic representation of our self-concepts and convey messages 
found the policy offensive enough to warrant a lawsuit. Id. Perhaps predictably, 
seeking to salvage precedents such as the male-only hair-length decisions, the 
Seventh Circuit accented that the sex-based humiliation in Carroll is not acceptable 
in current society, thus it is more than Title VII allows employers to impose. By 
contrast, “[s]o long as they find some justification in commonly accepted social norms 
and are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such regulations are 
not necessarily violations of Title VII even though the standards prescribed differ 
somewhat for men and women.” Id. at 1032. The Carroll court’s attempted 
distinguishing is, as the judiciary often says, a “distinction without a difference.” 
E.g., Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). Indeed, Carroll does not 
demonstrate that Talman Bank’s “career ensemble” for women actually offends 
“commonly accepted social norms.” It would not be surprising if sentiments circa 
1979 found such sex discrimination acceptable or no more than mildly intrusive. One 
can easily imagine the prevailing opinion to be that the issue is only about clothes 
during work, and the women should “lighten up.” Furthermore, this Article has 
debunked the idea that Title VII does not forbid discriminatory standards, even 
those evoking “commonly accepted social norms . . . reasonably related to the 
employer’s business needs.” Rather, such commonly are precisely the stereotypes 
that Title VII proscribes. 
291 See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (finding that a female employee who was deemed not pretty enough in a 
“Midwestern girl” sense stated a claim under Title VII); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that male-on-male 
harassment based on sexual stereotyping was unlawful but that generally 
reasonable sex-based dress and grooming standards were not necessarily unlawful 
under Title VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 
2000) (reasoning that the refusal of a bank to provide a cross-dressing male with a 
loan application unless he wore male-appropriate attire could be a violation of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)); Knox v. Donahoe, No.  
C-11-2596 EMC, 2012 WL 949030, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (holding that local 
postal service office’s attire-rule directed solely at plaintiff did not result in unlawful 
sex-based humiliation); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 n.15 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that sexually provocative uniform for females humiliating 
and caused harassment). 
292 Because dignity herein is a function of personal identity, a brief definition of 
“identity” is useful. “[I]dentity . . . can [be] define[d] as the particular values, beliefs, 
and aspects of our selves that we deem so important we consider them self-defining. 
Our aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices all make up our identity, but our identity 
in turn then affects our aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices.” Ramachandran, 
supra note 22, at 32 (emphasis omitted) (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND 
PUNISHMENT, 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). Of 
course, any individual’s choice of identity comes from some combination of genetic 
and societal influences. 
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to others about how we would like to be perceived.”293  The 
significance of pride and self-respect attained through preferred 
modes of appearance is difficult to exaggerate.294  Professor 
Tirosh offered charmingly, “Like the meaning of a poem, I 
suggest, appearance is not a reflection of identity, but a part of 
finding, making, and maintaining an identity.”295  Professor 
Tirosh’s invocation of poetry is superbly apt for the idea of poetic 
depicts things sentimental yet pragmatic, lyrical but stark, 
romantic still possibly banal, whimsical if nonetheless 
profound—all the consistency and contradictions that, through 
choice or happenstance, render each of us unique.296 
As much as our taste in friends and lovers, politics and 
partialities, careers and diversions, choice of personal 
appearance expresses our discrete distinctiveness.  Thus, there is 
a particularly acute bond between our conceptions of our true 
personae and the outward manifestation we create for ourselves.  
Even if seemingly careless and random, our clothing, grooming, 
293 May Ling Halim et al., Pink Frilly Dresses and the Avoidance of All Things 
“Girly”: Children’s Appearance Rigidity and Cognitive Theories of Gender 
Development, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1091, 1091 (2014). Similarly, nearly 
thirty-five years ago, commentators concluded, “A hair style . . . is one of the most 
visual examples of personality. To prevent the individual’s expression of preference 
would be to offend a widely shared concept of dignity.” John D. Ingram & Ellen R. 
Domph, The Right To Govern One’s Personal Appearance, 6 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
339, 354 (1981). Justice William O. Douglas, a revered champion of individual 
liberty, likewise captured the importance of grooming and individuality: 
I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might insist that every 
male have a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of ‘life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence, later found specific definition in the Constitution itself, 
including of course freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had 
supposed those guarantees permitted idiosyncrasies to flourish, especially 
when they concern the image of one’s personality and his philosophy 
toward government and his fellow men. 
Ferrell v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 856, 856 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the denial of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit’s upholding of a 
public school’s policy disciplining male students who wear long hair); accord Bishop 
v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971) (striking public high school’s hair-
length restrictions applicable only to male students). 
294 See, e.g., Halim, supra note 293; Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 41–42. 
295 Tirosh, supra note 21, at 60. 
296 See id. at 57 (“The analogy to poetic language is helpful here because it 
enables us to recognize that appearance is never just appearance; it is never a 
matter of form and not content, an external and insubstantial issue. The language of 
poetry functions not merely to deliver information or develop an argument. Rather, 
it is a language that calls attention to itself. In poetry, the medium is inseparable 
from the meaning.”). 
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makeup, bearing, stance, intonations, and other modes of 
appearance evince intensely personal choices alerting the world 
how we deem ourselves to be distinctive, conforming, or, more 
likely, a blend of both:   
Clothes, and other aspects of personal appearance, help us 
negotiate the need to conform to the group and the need to 
express ourselves as individuals . . . . As such, [appearance, 
particularly clothing,] is the place where we form and reform an 
identity that is both individual and part of a community or 
subculture.297 
Similarly, scholars note the inexorable link between personal 
grooming and group identity.298  It is hardly revelatory that 
groups of various kinds—racial, religious, ethnic, political, social, 
or other types—indoctrinate new members and maintain 
established loyalties through often intricate frameworks of 
norms, principles, customs, and practices including appearance 
and comportment rules.299  Indeed, such indoctrination begins 
very early in life.300 
It is hardly surprising, then, that individuals judge 
themselves and are judged by others based on varying concepts of 
how group members should or should not comport themselves, 
particularly regarding dress, grooming, and other displays of 
appearance.  This predominant propensity is particularly acute 
297 Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 41–42 (emphasis omitted). 
298 “Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and cultural theorists have long 
recognized that fashion and other forms of manipulating appearance play a unique 
role in the development of the individual as a member of society—the negotiation 
and formation of the public self.” Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 15; see also, e.g., 
Scott A. Hunt & Kimberly A. Miller, The Discourse of Dress and Appearance: 
Identity Talk and a Rhetoric of Review, 20 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 69 (1997); Tirosh, 
supra note 21, at 57. 
299 See, e.g., SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 4, 28 (2002); FRANK 
HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 47 (1994); Bayer, supra note 33, at 332–33. 
Classically, for example, military uniforms “foster military discipline, promote 
uniformity, encourage esprit de corps, increase the readiness of the military forces 
for early deployment and enhance identification of [a particular unit] as a military 
organization.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 864 F.2d 178, 
186 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Div. of Military & 
Naval Affairs, State of N.Y., 15 F.L.R.A. 288, 293 (1984)). 
300 See Rhode, supra note 21, at 1037–38. Professor Ramachandran observed, 
“Children begin to have a visible interest in clothing around the age of two, one that 
is deeply influenced by parents ‘who confer their ideas of masculinity and femininity 
on young children,’ and therefore encourage girls to develop a stronger and more 
detailed interest.” Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 40 (quoting KARLYNE ANSPACH, 
THE WHY OF FASHION 290 (1967)). 
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regarding race, sex, ethnicity, and religion—the criteria 
prohibited by Title VII.  For instance, Professor Onwuachi-Willig 
noted: 
Curiously, the hair was considered the most telling feature of 
Negro status, more than the color of the skin.  Even though 
some slaves . . . had skin as light as many Whites, the rule of 
thumb was that if the hair showed just a little bit of kinkiness, 
a person would be unable to pass as White.  Essentially, the 
hair acted as the true test of blackness, which is why some 
slaves opted to shave their heads to try to get rid of the genetic 
evidence of their ancestry when attempting to escape to 
freedom.301 
Enforcing discriminatory appearance rules, therefore, causes 
significant and palpable harm by requiring individuals, as the 
price of employment, to subvert their personhoods by complying 
with chauvinistic employers’ stereotypical conceptions of how 
group members should appear and comport themselves.302  Thus, 
“[w]ithout protection from Title VII, protected groups feel 
compelled to ‘cover their race and gender by conforming their 
behavior and appearance to a white, male norm (known as 
workplace assimilation).’ ”303 
301 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1100 (alteration in original) (quoting 
AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK 
HAIR IN AMERICA 17–18 (2001)). Thus, “[f]or minority women in general, and Black 
women in particular, hairstyle choices are subject to pressures to conform to 
mainstream norms of attractiveness and professionalism.” Ashleigh Shelby Rosette 
& Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations or 
Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 411 (2007). “Indeed, 
a recent study concluded that presenting an image that was both conventionally 
attractive as well as professional was easier to attain for white women than for 
Black women.” Id. at 410 (citing Rose Weitz, Women and Their Hair: Seeking Power 
Through Resistance and Accommodation, 15 GENDER & SOC’Y 667, 682 (2001)). 
302 Professor Bandsuch denotes this practice as “trait discrimination”: 
Employers . . . use physical traits that are largely irrelevant to job criteria 
as a proxy for job-pertinent attributes. For example, employers may relate 
grooming, hairstyle, jewelry, glasses, and attire (color, style, and material 
of clothing) with characteristics like intelligence, honesty, loyalty, and 
discipline. Facial features, nose size, skin color, eye shape, height, and 
weight also carry certain connotations about personality and performance, 
as do behavioral traits like language, accents, and smoking. Employers use 
these traits as signals to assess the abilities and attitudes of individuals as 
well as their compatibility with the organization and its values. 
Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 289–90 (footnotes omitted). 
303 Id. at 293–94 (quoting Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace 
Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 380 (2008)). 
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Indeed, the harm is exponential because, by way of unequal 
burden theory, court enforcement evinces that not only the 
particular employer, but also greater society, speaking through 
the judiciary, believes that those who do not conform to accepted 
group stereotypes may be unworthy of employment because their 
appearance preferences are strange, if not actually deviant and 
possibly evil.304  Unequal burden doctrine thus perpetuates 
popular or elitist criteria describing a given group’s purportedly 
natural or normal characteristics as a basis to judge conforming 
or nonconforming individuals’ worth, merit, and goodness.305  
304 See, e.g., Tirosh, supra note 21, at 55–56 (arguing that law’s emphasis on 
identity—group traits accepted as normal by society or government—inflicts on the 
liberty of minorities, including minorities of one, a societal expectation of purported 
normalcy). As Professor Onwuachi-Willig profoundly explained in the sex 
discrimination context: 
Even in the face of changing gender norms in our society, 
antidiscrimination law continues to reinforce traditional expectations about 
appearance. . . . In upholding these codes, courts give legitimacy to the 
gendered beauty expectations for men and women, essentially proclaiming 
that desirable men and women adhere to such gender norms. 
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1094–95. 
305 See Rosette & Dumas, supra note 301, at 413–14 (explaining that black 
women may conform their hairstyles, among other things, to forestall being judged 
according to Caucasians’ stereotypical beliefs about African Americans as less 
worthy than whites). As Professor Rhode explained, such cultural indoctrination 
begins virtually at birth and continues throughout adulthood with devastating 
consequences: 
A wide array of research documents a phenomenon that psychologists 
describe as “what is beautiful is good.” Less attractive individuals are less 
likely to be viewed as smart, happy, interesting, likeable, successful, and 
well-adjusted. They are less likely to marry and to marry someone well off; 
and surveyed college students would prefer a spouse who is an embezzler, 
drug user, or shoplifter than someone who is obese. Unattractive litigants 
receive higher sentences and lower damage awards in simulated legal 
proceedings, while attractive litigants have an advantage. Not only are the 
less attractive treated worse, their unfavorable treatment can erode self-
esteem, self-confidence, and social skills, which compounds their 
disadvantages. 
See Rhode, supra note 21, at 1037–38 (footnotes omitted). Professor Onwuachi-Willig 
similarly reported about race: 
In a society where straight, long, fine hair (compared to black hair) is 
viewed not only as the norm[,] but as the ideal for women, tightly coiled 
black hair easily becomes categorized as unacceptable, unprofessional, 
deviant, and too political. Image consultants routinely advise black women 
to remove hairstyles such as braids and locks. 
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1107. 
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Even assuming there is broad, possibly instinctive, 
consensus on what is or is not attractive,306 the sound Kantian 
morality of Title VII recoils from validating that consensus as 
legally enforceable yet non-BFOQ employment standards.  As 
earlier noted, by imposing grooming and appearance rules that 
are not necessary to performing legitimate work assignments, 
employers use their workers purely as means to gratify such 
employers’, or their customers’, untoward prejudices.  Employers 
certainly may use employees as means to perform particular 
work through which the employers attain economic benefits, 
status within the given field, and other tangible and intangible 
advantages.  But, by degrading employees’ dress, appearance, 
and similar modes of comportment, employers fail to treat 
employees as ends in themselves worthy of dignity. 
In sum, unless constituting a BFOQ, employers, in 
particular, and society, in general, simply have no legitimate 
basis to mandate by law workers’ conformity of appearance—a 
betrayal of personal identity—as the cost to obtain 
employment.307 
CONCLUSION—HOW FAR CAN THIS GO? 
Pursuant to unequal burden theory, a court could 
promulgate a local rule requiring female judges to wear robes 
adorned with white lace.  After all, no less than male-only hair-
length standards and female-only makeup directives, the 
hypothetical rule comports with familiar concepts of masculinity 
306 Research confirms what astuteness suggests: Collectives generate a fairly 
strong communal sense of beauty contrasted with ugliness. That communal sense 
can be measured within specific groups or even across societies: 
To be sure, some preferences, particularly those regarding grooming and 
body shape, have varied across time and culture. But the globalization of 
mass media and information technology has brought an increasing 
convergence in standards of attractiveness. 
 . . . [Research] yield[s] a strikingly high degree of consensus even among 
individuals of different sex, race, age, socioeconomic status, and cultural 
backgrounds. 
See Rhode, supra note 21, at 1035–36. 
307 See Tirosh, supra note 21, at 52 (“First, unlike jars of jam, which should be 
correctly labeled in order to protect consumers, there is no compelling interest that 
people be ‘marked’ correctly. Second, even if the idea that social actors' identities 
should be easily and securely decipherable seems at first appealing, this vision of the 
social world is oppressive, unresponsive to the dynamic interplay between identity 
and appearance, and inapplicable given the complex nature of appearance.”). 
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and femininity.308  Moreover, compliance is easy, inexpensive, 
and does not impair the ability of female judges to perform their 
assigned duties—all factors premising unequal burden 
analysis.309  Yet, surely a reviewing court would invalidate any 
such rule as demeaning, insulting, and certainly unlawful sexual 
stereotyping under Title VII.310 
Some might contend that the foregoing hypothetical is 
different from the female-only makeup rules, upheld by the 
Ninth Circuit in Jespersen, that Harrah’s Reno, Nevada, casino 
imposed on its bartenders.311  Specifically the argument would be 
that requiring female judges to wear feminine robes insults their 
esteemed societal rank as members of the judiciary by implying 
that female judges must conform with a perceived societal 
concept of womanly appearance while publicly performing their 
308 Legal scholarship has benefited from articles exploring and explaining the 
nature of “masculinities” from the intersection of legal, cultural, scientific, and other 
relevant perspectives. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: 
Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 713, 720 (2010) (“Masculinities researchers consider how societal norms 
shape behavior of individual men and women, how masculinities [“masculine 
identities”] are imbedded in the structure of institutions, and how individuals and 
groups perform masculinities within those institutions.”); Ann C. McGinley, 
Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 364 (2004). 
309 Nor is the rule unlawful due to animus based on the belief that female judges 
cannot be trusted to dress appropriately. See Carroll v. Talman Savings & Loan, 
Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), discussed supra at notes 289–92 and 
accompanying text. Rather, the rule seeks to beautify the work environment through 
adding a touch of female flourish that may be lost if female judges wear the same 
types of somber dark robes as their male colleagues. 
310 Arguing that such rules actually are burdensome, Judge Kozinski similarly 
opined: 
Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, 
mascara[,] and lipstick while on the bench. Like Jespersen, I would find 
such a regime burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job 
performance. I suspect many of my colleagues would feel the same way. 
Everyone accepts this as a reasonable reaction from a man, but why should 
it be different for a woman? It is not because of anatomical differences, 
such as a requirement that women wear bathing suits that cover their 
breasts. Women’s faces, just like those of men, can be perfectly presentable 
without makeup; it is a cultural artifact that most women raised in the 
United States learn to put on—and presumably enjoy wearing—cosmetics. 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, 
J., with two judges, dissenting). 
311 See Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 467, 488 n.83 (2007); Jane M. Siegel, Thank You, Sarah Palin, 
for Reminding Us: It’s Not About the Clothes, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 144, 170 
(2009). 
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duties.  By contrast, female bartenders enjoy no similar status 
and, therefore, may be treated as sexual objects or as inherently 
different from men by compelling them to wear makeup although 
doing so is not necessary to serve drinks.  That argument works 
only if one believes that due to the nature of their respective 
work, a female judge’s dignity is greater than that of a female 
bartender or that the former’s humanity is more worthy of 
respect than the latter’s, which is a supposition thoroughly 
incompatible with Kantian morality.  The differences between 
bartenders and judges may justify employment variances 
concerning tenure, salaries, and even social status.  But, a 
bartender is no less of a dignified person than is a judge because 
both are human beings whose capacities to act in a moral fashion 
are not products of their professions.  Accordingly, no less than 
female judges, female bartenders cannot be made to conform to 
employers’ stereotypical concepts that women, but not men, 
should conform with purported standards of femininity, such as 
wearing facial makeup.  The moral philosophy that informs Title 
VII’s letter and spirit, then, forbids imposing discriminatory 
employment terms that treat judges, bartenders, or any persons 
as purely means—treatment that disdains their dignity. 
One frustrated judge bemoaned: 
Apparently, the majority would hold that an employer violates 
Title VII if it declines to hire a female cheerleader because she 
is not pretty enough, or a male fashion model because he is not 
handsome enough, unless the employer proves the affirmative 
defense that physical appearance is a bona fide occupational 
qualification.312 
Chief Judge Loken correctly understood, but mistakenly 
decried, that the morality of dignity requires nothing less than a 
BFOQ to justify the imposition of discriminatory terms and 
conditions of employment.313  His lament perhaps is 
understandable as coerced conformance with stereotypes 
provides boundaries, standards, and rules for those who value 
the dependability and constancy of what they like and who have 
312 Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1043 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(Loken, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from majority’s ruling that plaintiff stated an 
actionable sex discrimination claim against her employer, a motel, that dismissed 
her because she appeared too mannish and lacked the “Midwestern girl look”). 
313 Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender 
Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 169, 207–08 (2009). 
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the power and the selfishness to impose their preferences on 
unwilling others.  But, morality does not exist to assuage the 
sensitivities of any individual or group, even personages as 
elevated as federal judges. 
Perhaps there is some truth to this hyperbole:  “[M]akeup for 
a woman is the way of the world; it keeps navigation in the 
convoluted social jungle of sexual identities relatively safe.  If 
women did not wear makeup, we would find ourselves in a 
dreadfully vague social environment, an endless game of fluid 
identities.”314  More generally, Professor Yuracko worries: 
Yet even as a normative ideal, the libertarian reading of the 
prohibition is impractical and unappealing.  At its most 
expansive, gender libertarianism requires protection for all 
forms of gender expression—those that are stereotypical, 
atypical, and idiosyncratic; those that are persistent; and those 
that are transient.  Under this view, gender becomes whatever 
people say it is.  As gender becomes solely a matter of self-
identification, the distinction between gender and personal 
idiosyncrasy becomes one of mere nominalism, and all conduct 
becomes potentially entitled to protection. 
. . . Herein lies the core tension within the libertarian 
interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping: 
complete gender freedom is incompatible with any kind of stable 
and workable definition of gender, but Title VII requires such a 
definition.315 
The world Professor Yuracko describes recalls the untoward 
fears mentioned at the outset of this Article316 of a fretting Judge 
Richard Posner who bemoaned “a federally protected right for 
male workers to wear nail polish and dresses and speak in 
falsetto and mince about in high heels, or for female ditchdiggers 
to strip to the waist in hot weather.”317  Put generally, it would be 
a world where people could define their own peaceful existences 
that others would be compelled to respect.318  In light of such 
314 Tirosh, supra note 21, at 72. As Professor Tirosh notes, “The courts are 
happy to help prevent this from happening.” Id. 
315 Yuracko, supra note 179, at 770–71. 
316 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
317 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
318 In that regard, under Title VII’s doctrine—its first principle—the simple idea 
of stereotyping should be sufficient to evince the “stable and workable definition of 
gender” that Professor Yuracko reasonably seeks. See Yuracko, supra note 179, at 
771. For each case, the particular employer’s conception of how men are different 
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upheavals, abridging other persons’ dignity may seem to some a 
small price, especially when the other persons are paying.  That 
is the core theory of the unequal burden doctrine. 
But, whatever the upheaval, the unacceptable alternative is 
Title VII enforced immorality through the lawful denigration of 
individuals based on non-BFOQ stereotypes approved by the 
reviewing courts.319  Unequal burden theory cannot stand 
because as Title VII rightly administers, selling one’s labor 
should not require betraying one’s soul. 
from women would provide the discrete, applicable basis to discern Title VII’s two 
requisites: (1) Did the employer discriminate on the basis of sex—or one of the other 
four forbidden criteria—and, if so, (2) can the employer establish a BFOQ? See also 
supra notes 254–56 and accompanying text. 
319 Accordingly, Title VII requires employers to respect the dignity of all persons 
whether it is men wearing long hair, woman eschewing makeup, or even men 
wearing skirts and women wearing neckties. 
